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This three-article dissertation aims to apply Bayesian data analysis to improve the method-
ologies that process effectiveness findings, cost information and subjective judgments with
the purpose of providing clear, localized guidance for decision makers in educational resource
allocation. The first article shows how to use a Bayesian hierarchical model to capture the
uncertainty of the effectiveness-cost ratio. The uncertainty information produced by the
model may inform the decision makers of the best- and worst-case scenarios of the program
efficiency if it is replicated. The second article introduces Bayesian decision theory to ad-
dress a subset of methodological barriers that hamper the influence of research on educational
decision-making, including how to generalize or extrapolate effectiveness and cost informa-
tion from the evaluation site(s) to a specific context, how to incorporate information from
multiple sources, and how to aggregate multiple consequences of an intervention into one
framework. The purpose of this article is to generate evidence of program comparison that
applies to a specific school facing a decision problem by incorporating the decision-makers’
subjective judgements and modeling their specific preference on multiple consequences. The
third article proposes a randomized control trial to detect whether principals and practition-
ers update their beliefs on the effectiveness and cost of educational programs in the light of
uncertainty information and localized evidence. Supplemented by a pilot qualitative study
that guides decision makers to work on self-defined decision problems, the pilot testing of
the experiment provides some evidence on the plausibility of using an experiment to identify
the causal impact of research evidence on decision-making.
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With the establishment of formal educational accountability systems in many countries,
decision makers at the classroom-, school-, district-, state- and federal-level are increasingly
pressured to use research evidence to guide and justify their decision-making on resource
allocation (Earl and Louis, 2013, p.196; Hoffer, 2000, p.534; Honig and Coburn, 2007, p.1; Lai
and Schildkamp, 2013, p.9; Slavin, 2002, p.15). Consequently, there has been a steady flow of
educational research, mostly quantitative, on measuring and estimating various educational
outcomes (e.g., studies on international large-scale assessments), on identifying the causal
effect of educational inputs on educational outcomes (e.g., program evaluations), and on
evaluating the efficiency of resource allocation (e.g., cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit and cost-
utility analysis). Despite the consensus on the important role of evidence in educational
decisions, practitioners and policymakers find that the abundant educational research has
not enhanced school reforms in a direct way (Biesta, 2007, pp.1-2; Slavin, 2002, p.17).
Properties of research that fail to accommodate the real contextual needs have been
widely discussed in the literature. For example, evaluations of program effectiveness are often
criticized for providing information on what worked rather than what will work (Biesta, 2007,
p.16). A school facing a decision problem is very likely to differ from the evaluation site(s) in
student characteristics, teacher profiles, school leadership, and other factors that may affect
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
program effectiveness (Orland, 2009, p.119). Therefore evidence on program effectiveness
should be adjusted based on local circumstances and decision makers’ values and interests
at a specific setting (Tseng and Nutley, 2014, p.173). The same criticism also applies to cost
estimation that monetizes all the resources required to implement a program, since cost can
vary in response to the number of students served and the qualification and experience of
teachers and school staff. As a result, research evidence is widely considered irrelevant in
the decision-making process (Henig, 2008, p.42).
To provide clear, localized guidance for decision makers in educational resource allo-
cation, this dissertation aims to apply Bayesian data analysis to improve the methodologies
that process effectiveness findings, cost information and subjective judgments. It is com-
posed of three articles related to evidence-based decision-making. The first article shows
how to use a Bayesian hierarchical model to capture the uncertainty of the effectiveness-cost
ratio. The uncertainty information produced by the model can inform the decision makers
of the best- and worst-case scenarios of the program efficiency if it is replicated. The second
article introduces Bayesian decision theory to generate evidence of program comparison that
applies to a specific school facing a decision problem by incorporating the decision makers’
subjective judgements and modeling their specific preference on multiple consequences. In
addition to the methodological development, this dissertation also explores how decision
makers respond to the information generated by these models. The third article proposes a
randomized control trial to detect whether principals and practitioners update their beliefs
on the effectiveness and cost of educational programs in the light of uncertainty information
and localized evidence. Supplemented by a pilot qualitative study that guides decision mak-
ers to work on self-defined decision problems, the pilot testing of the experiment provides
some evidence on the plausibility of using an experiment to identify the causal impact of
research evidence on decision-making.
The first two articles of the dissertation are built upon cost-effectiveness and cost-
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utility analysis respectively. Both aim to help decision makers choose among several alter-
natives so that the best alternative can achieve the most with a certain amount of resources
or produce a given result in the least costly way (Levin, 1983, p.30). Cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis compares multiple programs that share the same outcome based on a ratio of program
effectiveness to cost (or a ratio of cost to effectiveness) (Levin and McEwan, 2001, pp.10-11).
According to the current methodology, the preferable program is the one with the highest
effectiveness-cost ratio (equivalent to the smallest cost-effectiveness ratio). While calculating
one ratio estimate for each program and comparing them directly is intuitive and straight-
forward, it does not take into account the uncertainty of the ratio estimates induced by the
uncertainty of both program effectiveness and cost. Therefore the first article is developed to
address the methodological gap in estimating the uncertainty of an effectiveness-cost ratio.
Compared to cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-utility analysis has the advantages of consid-
ering decision makes’ preference and combining multiple measures of effectiveness together
using a utility measure (Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.21). Using the Bayesian framework, the
second article on Bayesian decision theory extends the cost-utility framework by modeling
uncertainty and incorporating decision makers’ subjective judgments on the realization of
the outcomes.
Note that the main focus of this dissertation is on the micro-level school practice,
such as classroom-, school-, district-level decisions, rather than state- and federal-level ed-
ucational policies. Orland (2009) defines educational practice as the specific actions that
directly affect students, while educational policy refers to “laws, regulations, requirements
and operating procedures that govern the general manner in which educational services are
provided” (p.114). The emphasis on school practice in this dissertation is based on both
the importance and the necessity of utilizing educational research for local decision-making.
First, micro-level decision makers play a dominant role in shaping daily school practice and
localizing federal and state policies, even though the influence of federal educational policies
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has been increasing in the past ten years in the United States (Tracy, 2010, p. 210; as cited
in Asen et al., 2013, p.35). Second, a plethora of scientifically-based research induced by
the funding requirements of No Child Left Behind, mostly randomized control trials, is more
appropriate to guide school-level pedagogical and curricular practice than to inform broad
educational policies related to school governance and management, such as how to appoint
the principals and pay the teachers (Hess, 2005, p.2). Third, local decision makers usually
lack dedicated staff to search for and synthesize studies related to a decision problem, not
to mention evaluate the quality of these studies (Asen et al., 2013, p.35). In all, to better
guide the local decision-making, simple and transparent models to synthesize and process
educational research may be of high need.
The decision problem addressed in this dissertation is the choice problem, i.e., how
to choose the best alternative among several comparable educational programs for educa-
tional resource allocation. Based on Roy (1981)’s classification, the formulation of decision
problems can be divided into four types: choice, sorting, ranking and description. A choice
problem refers to the selection of the single best alternative; a sorting problem requires
categorization of the alternatives based on similar characteristics of organization; a ranking
problem is aimed at sorting the alternatives in decreasing order of preference; and a de-
scription problem requires the systematic description of alternatives and their consequences
in order to understand their characteristics (Roy, 1981, pp. 432-435). In daily educational
practice, principals and district administrators often encounter problems such as deciding
which reading program to purchase in order to increase test scores, or how much professional
training schools should provide for a new curriculum given a tight budget (Schildkamp and
Lai, 2013, p.1). These decision problems are usually formulated as choice problems that aim
to identify how to best allocate resources in order to achieve a given result with the least
resources (Hummel-Rossi and Ashdown, 2002, p.1; Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.1).
Since a consensus has not been reached among researchers and practitioners on what
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categories of research can be accounted for in the context of evidence-based decision-making
(Lai and Schildkamp, 2013, p.10), it is essential to clarify the types of information that can
be processed by the Bayesian models. Researchers have argued that multiple types of data,
including input, process, outcome, satisfaction, and context data, should be systematically
collected, analyzed and organized with the purpose of helping teachers, school and district
administrators, and educational policymakers to make optimal decisions that lead to bet-
ter school and student performance (Ikemoto and Marsh, 2007, p.108; Lai and Schildkamp,
2013, p.2; Marsh et al., 2006, p.1). Use of comprehensive data may contribute to providing
decision makers with a good understanding of effectiveness, costs, benefits, possible unantic-
ipated outcomes, and challenges of implementation (Hess, 2008, p.4-5). In this dissertation,
evidence mainly refers to 1) the effectiveness findings obtained from experimental or quasi-
experimental evaluation studies, and 2) cost information collected using ingredients method.
Compared to the rapidly increasing literature on how to use school data, such as test scores,
grades, discipline reports and attendance, to inform decision-making (Bowers et al., 2014,
p.1), studies on how to use research evidence of program effectiveness and cost are still
limited.
Before proceeding, the abstracts of these three articles are described as follows.
Article One: Understanding the Uncertainty of the Effectiveness-cost Ratio in
Educational Resource Allocation: A Bayesian Approach
Despite an increasing awareness on the importance of using cost-effectiveness analysis
to guide decision-making in educational resource allocation, there is little research on how to
capture the uncertainty around a single, scalar efficiency ratio. To address this problem, this
article synthesizes two sources of uncertainty, and evaluates several methods used to quantify
the uncertainty of a ratio for each source. As illustrated by the demonstrative examples,
compared to Fieller’s Theorem, bootstrapping, Monte Carlo analysis, sensitivity analysis and
other conventional methods that capture either sampling variation or incomplete information,
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a Bayesian approach using a hierarchical model has at least two advantages. First, it provides
a distribution of an efficiency measure to answer the questions that practitioners are most
interested in: 1) the best guess for what would happen if a program is replicated at a specific
site, and 2) the worst-case and best-case scenarios. Second, the validity of the inference
is not threatened by the limited number of observations available, a data feature that is
commonly observed in educational cost-effectiveness analysis.
Article Two: Bayesian Decision Theory Guiding Educational Decision-making:
Theories, Models and Application
The emerging movement to call for research-informed decisions in educational re-
source allocation leads to an abundance of rigorous studies on the effectiveness, cost, and
implementation of educational interventions. However, school- and district-level practition-
ers tend to find that the applicability of these studies to their decision-making problems
in the real educational context can be limited due to multiple barriers. This article intro-
duces Bayesian decision theory to address a subset of methodological barriers that hamper
the influence of research on educational decision-making, including how to generalize or ex-
trapolate effectiveness and cost information from the evaluation site(s) to a specific context,
how to incorporate information from multiple sources, and how to aggregate multiple conse-
quences of an intervention into one framework. To demonstrate the estimation, presentation
and interpretation of the results, a proposed statistical model is applied to a typical decision
problem of choosing between two reading programs.
Article Three: Research Findings and Decision-making in Educational
Research Allocation: Lessons Learned on an Experimental Research Design
The provision of research findings on the effectiveness and cost of educational inter-
ventions to principals and practitioners does not suffice for evidence-based decision-making.
Therefore it is important to understand how decision makers respond to the information pro-
vided. This article proposes an experimental design that aims to detect whether principals
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and practitioners update their beliefs on the effectiveness and cost of educational programs
in the light of two types of information: 1) a range of possible values that capture uncertainty
and 2) localized estimates that apply to the specific school facing a decision problem. The
108 responses collected from current students and alumni of a principal preparation program
suggest that the availability of uncertainty information and localized evidence provided in
the experimental setting did not have a significant impact on the change of beliefs (i.e.,
the deviation of the posterior belief from the prior belief), even when the information was
provided at different precision levels. The non-significant effect may be due to 1) the small
sample size of the trial, 2) measurement error, and/or 3) the strong priors that decision mak-
ers had in mind before any information was revealed. Supplemented by a pilot qualitative
study that guides decision makers to work on self-defined decision problems, the pilot testing
of the experiment also provides some evidence on the plausibility of using an experiment to
identify the causal impact of research evidence on decision-making.
Chapter 2
Article One
Understanding the Uncertainty of the Effectiveness-cost Ratio in Educational
Resource Allocation: A Bayesian Approach
2.1 Introduction
Influenced by the movement that calls on using scientifically based research to guide decision-
making in the field of educational resource allocation, researchers and practitioners have
become increasingly aware of the importance of estimating cost rigorously to supplement
the effectiveness evidence in the framework of educational evaluations (Dhaliwal et al., 2013,
pp. 286-287). This movement has propelled the expansion of cost-effectiveness analysis,
which aims to compare the efficiency of alternative programs based on the ratio of cost
and a quantifiable measure of effectiveness (Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.10). The efficiency
ratio can be expressed as either a cost-effectiveness ratio or an effectiveness-cost ratio, both
representing the trade-off between effectiveness and cost (Levin and McEwan, 2001, pp.133-
137). Cost-effectiveness analysis can reveal the most resource efficient program entailing the
lowest cost to achieve a given amount of effectiveness among two or more programs that
share the same objective (Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.11).
8
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Despite wide-ranging support for the message that both effectiveness and cost infor-
mation should be taken into account for program selection, some methodological standards
for conducting cost-effectiveness analysis in education are still under discussion (Levin and
Belfield, 2015, pp.408-410). One methodological issue in debate is whether it is reasonable
and sufficient to compare the alternatives only based on a single, scalar efficiency measure,
i.e., a cost-effectiveness/effectiveness-cost ratio estimate derived from the observed sample
for each program of interest. To ensure comparability, a solid cost-effectiveness analysis
should be based on evaluation studies of different programs that are matched in target pop-
ulations, outcome measures, and methods of cost estimation. Given the difficulty of finding
such studies, it is expedient to compare a single ratio estimate for each program since not
all evaluations provide enough information to tackle how the effectiveness and the cost vary
jointly. However, it should be noted that such comparison fails to take into account the
uncertainty of the estimate and may result in a misleading choice.
Uncertainty arises either from sampling variability or incomplete information. First,
from the perspective of frequentist inference, a ratio estimate obtained from an observed
sample is a realization of the function that generates estimates. If in an imaginary world one
can implement a program in exactly the same setting and at the same time repeatedly, the
realizations of the ratio estimate for this setting are expected to be different from replication
to replication due to sampling variability, even though in reality the variability can not be
revealed due to the fact that at most one realization is observable for a specific setting at
a specific time. Second, from the perspective of Bayesian inference, the true value of the
efficiency ratio for a specific setting is fixed, but our knowledge of the true value is limited.
Therefore uncertainty is caused by incomplete information. In the decision-making process
of program selection, educational practitioners are interested in 1) the best guess for what to
anticipate in terms of efficiency, and 2) the worst-case and best-case scenarios. In this case,
the Bayesian interpretation of uncertainty is more suitable than the frequentist interpretation
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to answer these two questions. Note that the uncertainty defined here mainly captures
measurement errors and site-by-site variability in implementation, target population and
resources available shown in the evaluation studies, but it does not address external validity.
Providing uncertainty information does not enlarge the generalizability of the estimates. In
other words, it does not depict how the estimates of interest may vary when implementation,
student characteristics or teacher profiles are different from the original evaluation designs.
This article aims to explore how to apply Bayesian inference to cost-effectiveness
analysis so as to capture the uncertainty of a ratio-type efficiency measure. Following this
introduction of the background and the research question, the second part of the article
summarizes the characteristics of the evaluation data that are commonly available in edu-
cational research, discusses the ratio property and proposes two estimators of interest (i.e.,
the unweighted effectiveness-cost ratio and the weighted effectiveness-cost ratio). The third
section synthesizes two sources of uncertainty in the literature (i.e., sampling variability and
incomplete information), and reviews the conventional quantitative methods that address
the uncertainty of a ratio for each source. The fourth part proposes two Bayesian models
that share the assumption of multivariate normality but differ in the assumption of site-
level variability, and demonstrates the estimation, presentation and interpretation of the
results using the comparison of two high school dropout prevention programs: New Chance
and JOBSTART. The last section summarizes the strengths and limitations of the Bayesian
method, and lists some directions for future exploration.
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2.2 Data and Estimators
2.2.1 Data
2.2.1.1 Characteristics of commonly available datasets
Determined by the research design of impact evaluations and the delivery method of edu-
cational programs, the raw datasets available for cost-effectiveness analysis are at best site-
level1 effectiveness and site-level cost data, usually with a small sample size. In recent years,
large-scale multi-site experimental studies are increasingly common in educational evalua-
tion research, making it possible to explore the site-level variation in both effectiveness and
cost (Levin and Belfield, 2015, p.414). For simplicity, I will embed the following analysis in
the framework of a randomized block trial, in which individuals at each site (called block)
are randomly assigned into either the treatment group or the control group2 (Gerber and
Green, 2012, p.71).
Why is site-level variation more attainable than the individual-level variation in ed-
ucational cost-effectiveness analysis? In terms of effectiveness, individual treatment effect is
impossible to obtain given that only one potential outcome, either being treated or not being
treated, is observable for each student (Rubin, 1974, p.690)3. To address this fundamental
1Site refers to the level at which the treatment effect and the cost are averaged, e.g., school or classroom.
It is determined by the design of the evaluation.
2Cost-effectiveness analysis can also rely on effectiveness and cost information generated by quasi-
experimental evaluations, such as studies using instrumental variables, difference-in-differences, regression
discontinuity, and propensity score matching methods as identification strategies. Researchers may need to
pay more attention to the comparability of programs evaluated by different methods, since these methods
may produce average treatment effect for different populations. For example, instrumental variables can only
identify the average treatment effect for compliers (i.e., subjects who would receive the program if assigned
to the treatment group, and would not receive it if assigned to the control group); regression discontinuity
focuses on the subgroup of subjects whose measures of the assignment variable fall around the cutoff of the
treatment; and propensity score matching usually generates the average treatment effect for the treatment
group (Murnane and Willett, 2011). For simplicity, I embed the cost-effectiveness analysis in the framework
of experimental evaluations.
3Note that the individual treatment effect is not the individual-level outcome, which is usually available
as a post-treatment measure or a pre-post gain.
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problem of causal inference, experimental design constructs a control group that is distri-
butionally identical to the treatment group as a whole. The comparison of the two groups
only allows one to estimate the average treatment effect at the level that randomization is
conducted.
Unlike the individual treatment effect that is conceptually unattainable, the estima-
tion of individual-level cost is possible in theory, but usually not feasible in practice mainly
due to the way that educational programs are delivered. First, interventions are commonly
delivered to the students in the treatment group collectively4, making it impossible to iden-
tify the variability of resources allocated across students. Second, even for some programs
that are delivered to students individually rather than as a group, it is still difficult to collect
cost information by student. Take one-to-one tutoring programs as an example. Some of
the ingredients, such as principal’s time devoted to program coordination and a dedicated
classroom for the program, belong to fixed costs and have to be spread out evenly over all
the students served. As to the variable costs, such as the tutoring time and the number
of notebooks used, there is usually no dramatic variation across students given the require-
ment of the structured curriculum and the enforcement of implementation fidelity. If reliable
records on the individual usage of these ingredients are not available during the program im-
plementation, researchers usually have to rely on interviews with knowledgable informants to
collect information on the quantity and quality required for each of these ingredients after the
evaluation is completed. In this case, it is very likely that the data collection process would
introduce a high degree of random measurement errors that obscure the true individual-level
variation.
In all, in educational cost-effectiveness analysis, the unit of analysis is usually sites
rather than individuals. Due to the budget and time constraints commonly imposed on large-
scale multi-site evaluation studies, the number of sites included in the experiments is usually
4It is due to the program design or/and the evaluation design with the purpose of eliminating the spill-over
effect.
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limited. These data characteristics need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the
quantitative methods to capture the uncertainty of an efficiency ratio estimate.
2.2.1.2 Demonstration data: New Chance and JOBSTART
As a demonstration, I will apply the methods and models to the site-level effectiveness and
cost data of two programs that share the objective of increasing high school completion rate:
New Chance and JOBSTART. Implemented at 16 sites across the country between 1989
and 1992, New Chance was a residential demonstration project targeting 16- to 22-year-
old mothers who had first given birth as teenagers, had dropped out of high school, and
were receiving cash welfare assistance (Quint et al., 1997, pp.1-2). JOBSTART was a non-
residential demonstration program targeting 17- to 21-year-old, economically disadvantaged
high school dropouts. It was implemented at 13 sites across the country between 1985
and 1988 (Cave et al., 1993, p.3). Both programs provided academic tutoring, vocational
education, and job training to their participants. As discussed in Hollands et al. (2014,
p.321), the comparability of these two programs is somewhat limited due to the differences
in target populations. This issue is beyond the scope of this article since the focus of this
article is not on the selection of alternative programs to make a valid comparison.
The impact evaluations (designed as randomized block trials) and cost analyses of
both programs were conducted by MDRC (Cave et al., 1993; Fink and Farrell, 1994; Quint
et al., 1997). Levin et al. (2012, pp. 35-42) adjusted both the effect and cost data to
increase the comparability of the data for the purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis. For
example, they transformed the intent-to-treat estimates of effectiveness and cost reported
in the evaluations to treatment-on-the-treated estimates; they added the cost of medical
and dental services to the reported cost estimate of JOBSTART, and added the cost of
medical care and housing to the reported cost estimate of New Chance, so that the adjusted
cost estimates of both programs can capture all the ingredients required to implement the
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programs; in addition, they also expressed the costs of both programs in 2010 dollars. This
article is based on the adjusted estimates of effectiveness and cost. As shown in Appendix A,
the outcome of interest is the high school completion rate, and the average treatment effect
is estimated as the difference in high school completion rates between the treatment group
and the control group. Average cost per participant at each site represents the incremental
cost of the program, i.e., the difference in average costs between the treatment group and
the control group. The scale variable is the number of participants in the treatment group
when the outcome was measured.
2.2.2 Estimators of interest
2.2.2.1 Cost-effectiveness ratio or effectiveness-cost ratio?
In cost-effectiveness analysis, there are generally two ways to combine the evidence on ef-
fectiveness (E) and cost (C): 1) cost-effectiveness (CE) ratio (i.e. C
E
) that represents the
cost required to obtain one unit of effectiveness, and 2) effectiveness-cost (EC) ratio (i.e., E
C
,
also called “yield”) that shows the magnitude of effectiveness achieved for investing one unit
of cost (either one dollar or a multiple of a dollar) (Levin and McEwan, 2001, pp.133-137).
Effectiveness and cost evidence for the alternatives is usually collected from different experi-
mental evaluation studies. For each alternative, the average treatment effect is the difference
in average post-treatment outcomes between treatment and control groups, and the average
cost is the difference in resources utilized between treatment and control groups.
In the field of education, the range of possible values (i.e., sample space) of the effect
and cost variables demonstrates certain patterns. Average treatment effect may take positive,
zero, or negative values. In fact, it is very rare that researchers can rule out the possibility
that the true average treatment effect equals zero ex ante; therefore, the most frequently used
hypothesis testing is to check whether the true average treatment effect is different from zero
based on the sample information. Theoretically, average cost can also take zero or negative
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values when the program is a replacement of some services received by the control group
in the evaluation settings5. However, in order to assure comparability of the alternatives,
when doing cost-effectiveness analysis, researchers tend to select the experimental evaluations
that share similar control groups, not only with respect to population characteristics, but
also with respect to relevant services received during the experiment. The easiest way to
have comparable services received by the control group is to choose the evaluations that
set up the programs to evaluate as add-ons that only treatment students have access to,
while the control group students receive the regular “business-as-usual” education that may
be considered similar across different experiments. In this case, the average cost is always
positive, since the treatment group receives the program to evaluate in addition to what
the control group has had. This article focuses on the situation that both programs for
comparison are add-ons to business-as-usual.
Given the characteristics of the sample spaces of average treatment effect and average
cost, the CE ratio as an estimator suffers from at least two problems. First, when a program
demonstrates a negative effect, the CE ratio, indicating the amount of money spent to achieve
a unit of effect loss, is not interpretable (Levin et al., 2012, pp.12-13). Second, the variance
of the ratio (assuming that the expectation of effect is not zero) can be dramatically large,

















When E(E) is not zero but close to zero, the variance is blown up, leading to estimates of the
ratio that go astray (Franz, 2007, p.4). Intuitively, since the average cost is always positive,
the CE ratio tends to be positive infinity when the average treatment effect approaches zero
from the positive direction; as it approaches zero from the negative direction, the CE ratio
5In this case, the estimand is the incremental average treatment effect (or incremental average cost) of
one program received by the treatment group compared to some other services received by the control group.
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dramatically veers to negative infinity. The discontinuity at zero average treatment effect
can cause the estimation of the expectation of the CE ratio to be very unstable, leading to
an arbitrarily large or unbounded confidence interval (Briggs et al., 2002, p.384; Franz, 2007,
p.9).
When the effectiveness estimates are noisy and close to 0, EC ratio demonstrates
smaller variation than CE ratio, given that its denominator does not take non-positive val-
ues in research designs that evaluate add-on programs. Figure 2.1 compares the observed
variation of CE ratio and EC ratio across sites based on the sample data of New Chance
and JOBSTART respectively. For each program, sites are sorted from most cost-effective
to least cost-effective. It is obvious that the widely-used selection rule of “smaller CE ratio
is better” does not apply to the sites with negative CE ratios, while the rule of “bigger EC
ratio is better” works consistently for both positive and negative values. More importantly,
the variance of the EC ratio seems negligible compared to the huge variance of the CE ratio,
since in both graphs the EC ratios demonstrate as almost straight lines compared to the wide
dispersion of the CE ratios. Given these advantages, I will choose EC ratio as the efficiency
measure in this article.
2.2.2.2 Two estimators of interest
Estimators used in the cost-effectiveness analysis should be able to provide clear and useful
guidance for decision makers. In educational practice, there might be two typical scenarios
to which results generated by cost-effectiveness analysis can be applicable. First, a school
principal is thinking about which program to acquire for her school. She is interested in
the comparison of the alternatives with regard to the site-level efficiency, or the trade-off
between effectiveness and cost if a program is replicated at a typical site similar to her
school. For her, school is the unit of interest, and she would prefer considering each school
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of the site-level variance of CE ratio and EC ratio
in the data equally when averaging the efficiency ratios of these sites. Second, in contrast
to a principal who focuses on one school, a superintendent needs to consider the pooled
efficiency in the whole district. She is aware that whatever program is chosen, some schools
would implement the program more efficiently than others. Therefore she is interested in
maximizing the collective efficiency for all students in a group of sites. In this case, she would
prefer paying more attention to schools with more students by emphasizing the contribution
of scale when averaging the efficiency ratios. Estimators suitable for the two decision-making
scenarios are 1) the unweighted EC ratio and 2) the weighted EC ratio respectively.
For a program, let ATEj represent the average treatment effect at Site j; ACj be the
average cost per participant at Site j; nj be the scale of the program at Site j, and N is the
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In other words, the unweighted EC ratio is the average of the site-level EC ratios; and the
weighted EC ratio is the weighted average treatment effect across all sites divided by the
weighted average cost, with the weights proportional to the scale of the sites. This article
will investigate methods to estimate the expectation of both estimators.
2.2.2.3 Differences of ratio estimators in educational and medical research
Although researchers in health economics have advanced the methods to account for the un-
certainty of a ratio, the application of these methods to cost-effectiveness analysis embedded
in the educational context is rather limited. Distinct from the way that two ratios are com-
pared in education, in health literature, an Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER),
defined as the ratio of the difference in costs to the difference in outcomes between the treat-
ment group and the control group (O’Brien et al., 1994, p.151), is used to convey whether
the intervention received by the treatment group or the intervention received by the control
group is more cost-effective. The comparison is made within one experiment probably be-
cause the treatment of interest is usually a replacement of an old treatment rather than an
add-on, a reasonable feature of the research design given that it is not ethical to leave the
control group without any treatments or to apply both the old and the new treatments to
the treatment group (which may not be compatible).
Methodological challenges to address the uncertainty of a ratio are different between
the two fields in at least two aspects. First, in health literature, stochastic variation is avail-
able for both outcome and cost, since individual-level cost can be obtained based on informa-
tion about visits to doctor, hospitalization, medicine, etc. The availability of individual-level
data in both outcome and cost helps to circumvent the problem of small sample size, a data
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feature widely seen in educational cost-effectiveness analysis. Second, acknowledging the
difficulty to estimate a confidence interval for a ratio, health researchers utilize a concept
of “acceptable ceiling ratio” and transform the ratio estimator to a linear estimator of net
monetary benefit (i.e., the difference in outcomes multiplied by the acceptable ceiling ratio
minus the difference in costs), which demonstrates a better behaved sampling distribution
than that of the ratio (Briggs et al., 2002, p.389). The acceptable ceiling ratio, indicating
the maximum willingness to pay for one unit increase of effect, is difficult to conceive in the
educational context. Since results of cost-effectiveness analysis should be presented in clear,
useful and compelling ways in order to influence decisions (Levin and Belfield, 2015, p.407),
this article sticks to using the ratio-type estimators, even though they suffer from instability,
a natural consequence of a ratio that can not be avoided (Franz, 2007, p.9).
2.3 Sources of Uncertainty
In the literature of statistics, there are generally two sources of uncertainty: sampling vari-
ability, and incomplete information. This section is going to synthesize methods aimed at
capturing each source of uncertainty for a ratio estimator, and analyze whether it is reason-
able to apply these methods to educational cost-effectiveness analysis.
2.3.1 Stochastic uncertainty derived from sampling variability
The way to perceive uncertainty as sampling variability is derived from the inference frame-
work that the observed dataset is a random sample of the population, and the inference
from the sample to the population is based on an imaginary situation in which the sampling
process is repeated infinite times. We are interested in the true parameter of the popula-
tion, but what we actually derive is a point estimate obtained by applying the estimator to
the sample. Since the sample is evidently not the population, there is arguably a deviation
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of the sample estimate from the true parameter of the population, called sampling error.
Measures of the sampling error, such as standard errors and confidence intervals, are used
to model the uncertainty of the point estimate in terms of estimation precision. Since a
ratio estimator does not have a mathematically tractable formula to calculate the variance
(Briggs et al., 2002, p.384), researchers usually use the Delta method or Fieller’s theorem to
approximate the confidence interval of a ratio along with reporting a single point estimate
from the sample, or they rely on bootstrapping or the Monte Carlo method to generate the
sampling distribution of the estimator of interest.
2.3.1.1 Frequently used methods
The Delta Method For a ratio of the means of two random variables, the Delta method,
also called the Taylor method as it utilizes the Taylor approximation, can be used to identify
the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval under the assumption that the two
variables are distributed bivariate normally (Franz, 2007, p.10; O’Brien et al., 1994, p.158).
Let R = E(Y )E(X) , and the upper and lower bounds (denoted as l1 and l2) can be constructed as







− 2Cov(X, Y )
X̄Ȳ
(2.4)
where R̂ is the point estimate of the ratio; Z is an assumed sampling distribution of the
ratio; α is the significance level; X̄ and Ȳ , V ar(X) and V ar(Y ) are the sample means
and variances of the two variables respectively; and Cov(X, Y ) is the covariance of the two
variables (Franz, 2007, p.10; O’Brien et al., 1994, p.159). Note that the accuracy of the
approximation relies heavily on whether the coefficients of variation (i.e., standard deviation
divided by the mean) of the two variables are small enough (O’Brien et al., 1994, p.159). In
addition, how Z is distributed is unknown (O’Brien et al., 1994, p.161); to make the upper
and lower bounds estimable, Z is often assumed to be a well-behaved parametric distribution,
such as normal when the sample size is large (O’Brien et al., 1994, p.159).
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Fieller’s Theorem Another method to estimate the confidence interval of a ratio of the
means of two random variables, probably more frequently used, is Fieller’s Theorem. Similar
to the Delta Method, it also assumes that the two variables are bivariate normal. Let
R = E(Y )E(X) , and the upper and lower bounds (denoted as l1 and l2) are
l1/2 =
[X̄Ȳ − z2α/2Cov(X, Y )]
X̄2 − z2α/2V ar(X)
±
√
[X̄Ȳ − z2α/2Cov(X, Y )]2 − [X̄2 − z2α/2V ar(X)][Ȳ 2 − z2α/2V ar(Y )]
X̄2 − z2α/2V ar(X)
(2.5)
where z is a standard normal distribution; α is the significance level; X̄ and Ȳ , V ar(X) and
V ar(Y ) are the sample means and variances of the two variables respectively; and Cov(X, Y )
is the covariance of the two variables (revised based on Briggs et al., 2002, p.397).
Bootstrapping Bootstrapping is a non-parametric method that generates an approxima-
tion of the sampling distribution of the estimator of interest (Franz, 2007, p.11). The first
step is to re-sample the observed data with replacement N times (N is large), each having
the same sample size as the original sample. Then the estimator of interest is applied to
the N bootstrap samples, creating N estimates that can serve as an approximation of the
sampling distribution. The mean, 2.5th- and 97.5th-percentiles of the N estimates can be
reported as a point estimate and the 95% confidence interval of the estimate.
Compared to the Delta Method and Fieller’s Theorem, bootstrapping has at least two
advantages. First, it rests on the empirical probability distribution of the data, and therefore
does not require any parametric assumption on the distribution of the two variables (O’Brien
et al., 1994, pp.160-161). Second, it does not restrict the estimator of interest to be the ratio
of the means of two random variables. As long as the replicated samples are available, any
estimator can be applied. Note that bootstrapping works well only when the original sample
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size is large enough to provide sufficient information on the variation of the population. As
a rule of thumb, when the sample size is smaller than 15, the point estimate might deviate
far from the true value, and the coverage of the 95% confidence interval will be smaller than
intended (Franz, 2007, p.18).
Monte Carlo method The Monte Carlo method is aimed at generating the sampling
distribution of the estimator of interest by treating the parameters of the estimator as
draws from probability distributions (Boardman et al., 2011, p.178). The main challenge
of this method is how to identify the probability distributions of the parameters. As to
cost-effectiveness analysis, one method, as demonstrated in Evans and Popova (2014), is to
sample from a normal distribution of the effectiveness that is defined by the sample mean
and the sample standard deviation while considering the cost as a fixed number (pp. 5-6).
Levin et al. (2012, p.45) models each parameter (i.e., average treatment effect, average cost,
and scale) as a normal distribution with the mean and the standard deviation defined as
the sample mean and the sample standard deviation. An updated version of Levin et al’s
method takes into account the correlation of these parameters by modeling them as a joint
multivariate normal distribution, as shown in Bowden (2014, p.118). The mean vector and
the variance-covariance matrix of the joint distribution are also derived from the sample esti-
mates. Once the probability distribution(s) are created, random draws of the parameters (as
opposed to random draws of the observed data in bootstrapping) can be simulated from the
distribution(s). As each simulation generates an estimate of the estimator, a large number
of simulations will lead to a sampling distribution of the estimator of interest.
Similar to bootstrapping, the Monte Carlo method can convey information on the
mean, the spread, or other characteristics of the sampling distribution for any estimator of
interest. However, it does require parametric assumptions to identify the probability distri-
butions of the parameters. When these distributions are determined by the statistics of a
sample, the constructed distributions are less likely to deviate much from the true distribu-
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tions of the population when the sample size is large enough. Therefore, even though there
is no rule of thumb for determining the minimum sample size, it is probably reasonable to
require that the sample size is large enough to capture sufficient information of the popula-
tion so that the method can produce a good approximation of the sampling distribution of
the estimator.
2.3.1.2 Applicability of these methods in educational cost-effectiveness analysis
Practical implication of sampling variability In the context of educational practice,
sampling variability is only interpretable when repeatability is involved. In other words,
this inference framework is appropriate to utilize when the practitioners are interested in
a situation in which a program is replicated over and over again. However, in reality, it
is probably quite rare that the focus of the practitioners is on homogeneous replication.
Instead, they are more likely to encounter the problem of predicting the probability that a
program can achieve a certain efficiency level when it is implemented once, a question that
none of the above methods can answer.
Restricted applicability due to small sample size All of these four methods can
produce deviated point estimates of the expectation and/or the confidence interval when
the sample size is very small. As stated in 2.3.1.1, bootstrapping and Monte Carlo are only
recommended when the sample size is large enough to contain sufficient information of the
population. As to the Delta Method and Fieller’s Theorem, there is a bias term between the
estimator of our interest (i.e., E(E
C




















− bias term (2.6)
If the sample size is large, the covariance between C and E
C
diminishes as the sampling
variability between C and E diminishes, which drives the bias term to approach zero (Gerber
CHAPTER 2. ARTICLE ONE 24
and Green, 2012, p.151). Only in this case, it is reasonable to use the estimation of E(E)E(C)
to approximate E(E
C
), a method that researchers in health economics widely adopt when
large-scale individual-level data of outcome and cost are available. With a small sample
size, the bias term is non-negligible, leading to an overstatement or underestimate of the
expectation of the EC ratio. Since data available in educational cost-effectiveness analysis
usually have a limited number of sites, as explained in Section 2.3.1.1, the four methods to
address sampling variability should be applied with cautious checks on whether the sample
size is large enough to contain sufficient information of the population or to reduce the bias
term to a negligible number.
Interpretation of the results Assuming that repeatability is the concern of a study and
the sample size of the site-level data is large enough, bootstrapping and Monte Carlo may
generate more meaningful results than the other two methods in terms of their ability to
inform and guide decision-making. To be specific, the confidence interval obtained by the
bootstrapping and Monte Carlo methods, if applied properly, gives the range which 95%
of the ratio estimates will fall into under infinite repetition of a program. In contrast, the
confidence interval calculated based on one sample, either by the Delta Method or Fieller’s
Theorem, does not convey any information on whether the true value of the estimator falls
within the limits. All we know is that if the process of calculating a confidence interval based
on one random draw of data from the population is repeated infinite times, 95% of these
confidence intervals will be able to capture the true value.
In all, sampling variability may not be the main source of uncertainty that matters to
educational practitioners given the rarity of replicating a program many times in practice.
In addition, the applicability of the Delta Method, Fieller’s Theorem, bootstrapping and
Monte Carlo method is highly restricted by the limited sample size, a property commonly
observed among the available datasets in educational cost-effectiveness analysis. Only for
the purpose of demonstration, Appendix B shows how to apply these four methods to the
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New Chance dataset in R, despite the fact that a sample size of 16 is probably too small to
generate reliable results.
2.3.2 Uncertainty derived from incomplete information
Compared to sampling variability, the way to perceive uncertainty as it arises from incomplete
information is probably more intuitive: one is uncertain about what happened in the past or
what will happen in the future because not all information is obtainable, reliable or certain.
For example, the interviewees might have forgotten some resources they had utilized to
implement a program by the time of data collection; the observed data of outcome and
cost must contain some measurement errors; and researchers may be uncertain about some
assumptions used in the cost estimation, such as the discount rate. Therefore, even though
the true efficiency level of a program is a fixed value, what we know about it entails some
randomness because of the limited availability of information; and the more information
one has, in expectation the less uncertainty there is6. Under this perception, there are two
categories of methods to quantify the uncertainty in cost-effectiveness analysis: conventional
sensitivity analysis and Bayesian approach.
2.3.2.1 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis refers to a group of techniques that can be used to examine how changes
in the inputs of the model (e.g., assumptions of the analysis) influence the output (i.e., the
ranking of the programs) (Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.141). Conventional methods used to
account for the incompleteness of information, as recommended by Boardman et al. (2011,
pp.183-184) for cost-benefit analysis and adopted by several demonstrative cost-effectiveness
6In expectation, the variance of the posterior belief is smaller than the variance of the prior belief,
indicating that the more information there is from the evidence, the less uncertainty remains in the posterior
belief on average. Faulty information will lead to a deviation from the true value, but the variance of the
posterior belief will get smaller in expectation too.
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studies in education (e.g., Bowden, 2014; Levin et al., 2012), include partial sensitivity
analysis and worst- and best-case analysis7.
Partial sensitivity analysis Holding all of the other factors constant, how does the
ranking of the programs vary with the change of a key assumption? For example, given that
average cost is highly influenced by the scales of operation, Levin et al. (2012) calculated
the cost-effectiveness ratios of New Chance and JOBSTART assuming that each site has the
same capacity to host the participants, and reported that this change in assumption does
not affect the ranking that JOBSTART is more cost-effective than New Chance.
Although simple to conduct and easy to interpret, partial sensitivity analysis suffers
from several major limitations. First, researchers arbitrarily determine which assumption to
manipulate and what possible values to impose on the key assumption, which may generate
intentional or unintentional selection bias (O’Brien et al., 1994, p.153). In fact, researchers
may not be able to identify the most influential assumption before doing the analysis (Board-
man et al., 2011, p.182). Second, the way to test one assumption at a time leaves out the
possibility that several related assumptions may change simultaneously in the real context
(O’Brien et al., 1994, p.154). Some researchers tend to account for the interaction by testing
all the possible combinations of the related assumptions, which may lead to conducting a
large number of sensitivity analyses and generating a range of estimates that is so wide as
to be meaningless.
Worst- and best-case analysis How does the ranking of the alternatives vary when the
efficiency of all programs reaches their worst or best levels? Two methods are adopted by
Levin et al. (2012, p.45) and Bowden (2014, pp.117-118) when estimating the weighted cost-
7Boardman et al. (2011) and the demonstrative studies also categorize Monte Carlo method as a sensitivity
analysis. Note that Monte Carlo method is mainly used to capture sampling variability, while partial sensi-
tivity analysis and worst- and best-case analysis are aimed at checking the influence of model assumptions
on the ranking of the programs.
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effectiveness ratio. One is to set up the efficiency levels of the most and least cost-effective
sites in the observed sample as the upper and lower bounds. The second method takes into
account the significance of the site-level effect estimates, since for sites with insignificant
effect estimates there is no sufficient evidence to show that these effect estimates are not
obtained by chance. An optimistic scenario would be to focus on those sites with significant
effect estimates only, and the weighted cost-effectiveness ratio is the weighted average cost
across sites with significant effects divided by the weighted average treatment effect across
the same sites. In contrast, a pessimistic estimate of the ratio would be the weighted average
cost across all sites divided by the weighted average treatment effect across the sites with
significant effect estimates, indicating that the resources utilized at the sites that are not
significantly effective should be counted as well given that it is impossible to identify the
effective sites ex ante. Similar to partial sensitivity analysis, how to identify the lower and
upper bounds of the efficiency measure also requires researchers’ arbitrary judgments since
a statistical inference framework is not involved.
2.3.2.2 A Bayesian approach
The inability of sensitivity analysis to fit in a statistical inference framework calls for an
approach that entails advantages of both intuitive interpretations and standard statistical
inference. Bayesian inference happens to be the one. It adopts the perception that uncer-
tainty arises in one’s beliefs about true parameters due to the incompleteness of available
information. Under the Bayesian framework, the concept of “probability” is used to quantify
uncertainty, which represents to what degree one believes that a statement of an unknown
parameter is true (Lindley, 2014, p.190). This contrasts with the inference framework that
builds on the imaginary situation of infinite replication8, where probability is defined as the
8In statistics, this inference framework is called the frequentist framework. It refers to the estimation
paradigm that draws inference of the population from sample data by emphasizing the frequency or propor-
tion of the data.
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proportion of times that an event would occur as the number of replication approaches to
infinity. In other words, Bayesian inference focuses on answering the question about what
we believe is likely to happen, rather than how many times it would happen if it is replicated
again and again.
In addition to the intuitive perception of uncertainty, Bayesian inference also has
the advantage that the validity of the inference does not rest on a large observed dataset.
Under the Bayesian framework, there is no distinction between sample and population; as a
result, whether the sample is large enough to capture enough information of the population
is no longer a concern. The inference is conditional on the observed data, no matter how
many observations there are. Therefore, even though more observations will make a larger
contribution to reducing the uncertainty of our belief regarding the true parameter, having
a small dataset does not threaten the validity of Bayesian inference. The next section will
illustrate how to use Bayesian inference to estimate the expectation of the two estimators in
detail.
2.4 Application of the Bayesian Approach
2.4.1 Brief introduction
Bayesian inference relies on Bayes’ Theorem. Let θ be a vector of unknown parameters, and




where f(θ|X), called the posterior distribution of θ, represents one’s updated belief on θ
in light of data; f(θ) is the prior distribution, modeling one’s belief regarding θ before any
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data X are revealed; and f(X|θ), called the likelihood function, reflects what is likely to
be observed in terms of data X given θ. Intuitively, Bayes’ Theorem depicts a process
of information updating based on one’s prior knowledge and the evidence: one’s modified
understanding of θ (expressed as the posterior distribution f(θ|X)) reflects the balance
between one’s belief about θ before seeing the data (i.e., f(θ)) and the observed data X
given θ (i.e., f(X|θ)). In other words, the posterior belief is the prior belief weighted by the
observed evidence. Useful introductory readings for Bayesian data analysis include Gelman
et al. (2013a), Lancaster (2004), Kruschke (2014), and Gill (2015).
Note that the prior distribution provides a flexible mechanism to model one’s sub-
jective belief regarding θ before seeing the data. When one prefers not to incorporate any
prior information, it is possible to use a non-informative prior or a weakly-informative prior
to model one’s “ignorance” (Kaplan and Park, 2013, p.553). Given that the purpose of this
article is not to provide a recommendation for a specific school (whose prior belief can be
identified) or to demonstrate the use of subjective beliefs, I tend to rely on the observed
data to tell the story by using non-informative or weakly-informative priors in the following
models.
In this article, the computation of Bayesian inference is conducted using Stan, a
newly-developed language based on the algorithm of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. Since the
focus is on the intuitive appeal of the Bayesian approach rather than the technical aspects,
I only report the final results in the format of tables and graphs in the main text. The Stan
code is attached as Appendix C.
2.4.2 Models
2.4.2.1 Distributions of effectiveness and cost
The first step of Bayesian inference is to set up a joint probability distribution for all the
observable (i.e., X) and unobservable quantities (i.e., θ) in a problem (Gelman et al., 2013a,
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p.3). To achieve this in a cost-effectiveness analysis model, it is necessary to explore how
the site-level average treatment effect and average cost are jointly distributed. Although
researchers seem to have doubts about the assumption that costs simply follow a normal
distribution (Levin and Belfield, 2015, p.410), so far we haven’t had much empirical evidence
available on the distributions of the two variables due to the lack of large-scale multi-site
evaluations that have estimated both effectiveness and cost. In this case, using a multivariate
normal distribution to model the joint distribution of effectiveness and cost is both reasonable
in theory and convenient in computation. The average cost variable, calculated as the sum
of the average costs of all ingredients that contribute to the program implementation, is
expected to distribute normally, since “any process that adds together random variables from
the same distribution converges to a normal” (McElreath, 2015, p.90). Due to this reason,
I assume that average treatment effect and average cost (or the linear transformations of
these two variables) are distributed as a bivariate normal joint distribution9.
To check whether the bivariate normal assumption is reasonable, several statistics
to assess multivariate normality (MVN) were applied to two sets of data for each program:
average treatment effect and average cost (ATE and AC), and average treatment effect and
the logarithm of average cost (ATE and log(AC)). These statistics include Henze-Zirkler’s
MVN test, Mardia’s MVN test, and Royston’s MVN test10 (Korkmaz et al., 2015). The
p-values of these tests for each set of data are reported in Table 2.1. As it shows, for New
9Theoretically, it is possible to relax the parametric assumption of bivariate normality by fitting the
two variables with the Johnson system (Karian and Dudewicz, 2010, p.611-662). However, this method
would introduce many more parameters to estimate. When applying the model to a small dataset with
non-informative or weakly-informative priors, each parameter would be estimated very imprecisely, leading
to an even more imprecise estimate of the expectation with a wider credible interval.
10Henze-Zirkler’s, Mardia’s, and Royston’s are the three most widely used MVN tests: Henze-Zirkler’s test
is derived from a measure of distance between two distributions, which can be approximated as a log-normal
distribution if the data are multivariate normally distributed; Mardia’s test is based on the sampling distri-
butions of the skewness and the kurtosis, which are approximately χ2 and normally distributed respectively;
and Royston’s test utilizes Shapiro-Wilk/Shaprio-Francia statistic to check the multivariate normality (Ko-
rkmaz et al., 2015, p.2-4). Mecklin and Mundfrom (2005) reviewed more than 50 statistical MVN tests and
recommended using Henze-Zirkler’s and Royston’s tests based on their good Type I error control and power
and using Mardia’s test to diagnose the reason for any deviation from multivariate normality.
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Table 2.1: P-values of multivariate normality tests
New Chance JOBSTART
Test ATE and AC ATE and log(AC) ATE and AC ATE and log(AC)
Henze-Zirkler 0.43 0.55 0.59 0.08
Mardia (Skewness) 0.11 0.65 0.51 0.25
Mardia (Kurtosis) 0.90 0.36 0.56 0.61
Royston 0.22 0.76 0.19 0.04
Note. ATC refers to average treatment effect, and AC refers to average cost.
Chance, each set of data follows a bivariate normal distribution. In this case, the one with
the log transformation of average cost is preferred for two reasons. First, the logarithm of
average cost is more likely to be distributed normally than average cost, with a p-value of
0.865 for Shapiro-Wilk normality test as compared to 0.154. Second, by using the logarithm,
the sample space of average cost is automatically restricted to positive values, a convenient
feature that helps to guarantee that all the simulated costs generated in the following steps
are reasonable. As to JOBSTART, it seems that we are more confident to conclude that
the combination of average treatment effect and average cost follows a bivariate normal
distribution. The combination of average treatment effect and the logarithm of average cost
fails to pass Royston’s test at the significance level of 0.05, indicating that the data deviates
slightly from bivariate normality. This is probably because the logarithm of average cost
is not normally distributed, as the p-value of Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.046. Therefore, the
datasets fit into the following two bivariate normal models are average treatment effect and
the logarithm of average cost for New Chance, and average treatment effect and average cost
for JOBSTART. Although following the same distributional assumption, the two models
differ in the assumption of site-level variability, as explained in the next two sections.
2.4.2.2 Complete pooling model
I first assume that the true values of average treatment effect and average cost at all sites
are the same. Let Ej and Cj represent (the linear transformations of) the estimated average
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uE ∼ N(0, 10) [Normal prior for uE]
uC ∼ N(0, 10) [Normal prior for uC ]
∆ ∼ 1
δ
[Jeffrey’s prior for each element of ∆]
Λ ∼ LKGCorr(η = 1) [LKJ prior for correlation matrix]
where the unknown parameters to estimate (denoted as θ in 2.4.1) include the mean vectoruE
uC
, the diagonal matrix of standard deviations ∆ and the correlation matrix Λ. The
combination of ∆Λ∆ represents the variance-covariance matrix of the bivariate normal distri-
bution. The model indicates that the estimated values of (the linear transformations of) the
two variables at different sites are independent random draws from the same bivariate nor-
mal joint distribution, for which we don’t have much information on the mean vector11 and
the variance-covariance matrix (as implied by the weakly-informative and non-informative
priors).
2.4.2.3 Hierarchical model
The assumption that all of the sites come from the same joint distribution of effect and cost
may not be plausible, since all the factors that affect the true value of effectiveness and cost,
such as students’ SES status, teachers’ profiles and school leadership, arguably vary from
site to site. Again, let Ej and Cj represent (the linear transformations of) the estimated
average treatment effect and average cost for site j. To capture the site-to-site variability, a
hierarchical model is expressed as follows.
11I standardized the average cost of JOBSTART before fitting the data into the model to make sure that
N(0, 10) is a reasonable weakly informative prior for it.

















∆ ∼ Gamma(2, 1) [Gamma prior for each element of ∆]
Λδ ∼ LKGCorr(η = 1) [LKJ prior for correlation matrix Λδ]
uE ∼ N(0, 10) [Normal hyperprior for uE]
uC ∼ N(0, 10) [Normal hyperprior for uC ]
τ ∼ Gamma(2, 1) [Gamma hyperprior for each element of τ ]
Λτ ∼ LKGCorr(η = 1) [LKJ hyperprior for correlation matrix Λτ ]
where θEj and θCj are the expectation of Ej and Cj respectively; ∆ and Λδ are the diagonal




 are drawn; uE and uC are the expectation of θEj and θCj; and
τ and Λτ are the diagonal matrix of standard deviations and the correlation matrix of the








) is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution that is specific for this site in
terms of expected effectiveness and cost (i.e.,
θEj
θCj
)12. Although different from site to
site, these expected values of effectiveness and cost are connected in a way that they are




variance-covariance matrix of τΛττ . As a result, the particularity of each site is captured by
12For simplicity, I assume that these bivariate normal distributions share the same variance-covariance
matrix (decomposed as ∆Λδ∆), which implies that the dispersion of average treatment effect, the dispersion
of average cost and the correlation of average treatment effect and average cost remain constant across
different sites.
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the site-specific parameters θEj and θCj, while the similarity of these sites is modeled by the
hyperparameters that are common to all sites, including uE, uC , τ and Λτ .
Priors on the parameters and hyperparameters are used to model one’s belief about
the site-specific and site-common characteristics before seeing the data. Despite that weakly-
informative and non-informative priors are preferred in general in this article, informative
priors are imposed on the standard deviation matrices of ∆ and τ for computational concerns.
As the number of parameters (including hyperparameters) to estimate increases and the small
datasets that are conditioned on can only provide very limited information, it is difficult to
make the Monte Carlo chains converge if the standard deviation vectors are centered around
0. With regard to the two demonstrative programs, since these sites were scattered all over
the country, it is also reasonable to believe that the site-to-site variability exists. Therefore,
to push ∆ and τ away from 0, a Gamma prior with the shape of 2 and the scale of 1 is
chosen for each of the standard deviation vectors.
2.4.2.4 Model comparison
Is the complete pooling model or the hierarchical model more favorable? The decision may
depend on the necessity to acknowledge the existence of site-by-site variability. In principle,
hierarchical model is preferred for several seasons. First, it is a more general model in the
sense that the complete pooling model is a special case of the hierarchical model in which τ
is equal to 0. Second, in the real educational context, whether a program would work and
what resources it would utilize may depend on the special characteristics of the students,
teachers, and resources available at a school, which makes it reasonable and necessary to
account for the site-level variation. Third, predictions are usually more reliable with the
additional components of site-level variability in the model (Gelman et al., 2013a, p.388).
In all, although the complete pooling model usually excels in computational efficiency with
less parameters to estimate, hierarchical model is generally superior in terms of fitness to
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the research problems and prediction power.
2.4.2.5 Generation of the posterior predictive distributions of the estimators
There are several additional steps to obtain the distributions of the estimators of interest
from the immediate output of a Bayesian model. First, marginalize over the unknown
parameters using the posterior distributions (i.e., f(θ|E,C)) to get the posterior predictive
distributions of Ej and Cj (i.e., f(Ẽj|θ, E,C) and f(C̃j|θ, E, C)). Random simulations of
the posterior predictive distributions are generated directly from Stan. Second, if a linear
transformation is involved before fitting the data into the Bayesian model, use the inverse
function of the transformation to get the variables of average treatment effect and average
cost. For example, as to New Chance, f(C̃j|θ, E, C) was exponentiated to get the posterior
predictive distribution of average cost for each observation, since I took the logarithm of
average cost before applying the Bayesian model to the data. Third, fitting the posterior
predictive distributions of average cost and average treatment effect into the formula of an
estimator to get the posterior predictive distribution of this estimator. Fourth, identify
the 2.5th- and 97.5th- quantiles of the distribution to get the 95% credible interval of the
estimator; take the mean of all the values that fall into the 95% credible interval to get a
point estimate of an estimator. Given that ratio estimators may generate extreme values at
both tails that lead to a dramatic distortion of the mean estimate, I choose to trim off the
left and right tails of the distribution in order to stabilize the estimation13.
13When the sample space of average cost is not restricted to positive values, there is usually a small
possibility that negative values of average cost are drawn when generating its posterior predictive distribution.
In the example of JOBSTART, about 1.56% and 1.73% of the simulated cost values are negative for the
complete pooling model and the hierarchical model respectively. Trimming off the tails can eliminate these
negative cost values.
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Table 2.2: Mean and 95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution of the
site-level EC ratio
Mean 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
New Chance (complete pooling model) 0.055 -0.120 0.233
New Chance (hierarchical model) 0.054 -0.140 0.245
JOBSTART (complete pooling model) 0.129 -0.227 0.933
JOBSTART (hierarchical model) 0.133 -0.289 1.060
2.4.3 Results and interpretations
2.4.3.1 Unweighted EC ratio
The first estimator of interest is the unweighted EC ratio, indicating the number of additional
high school graduates yielded by investing one thousand dollars for a typical site, with each
site, regardless of scales, contributing equally to the estimation. Table 2.2 reports the mean
value and 95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution of the unweighted EC
ratio for New Chance and JOBSTART, estimated by the complete pooling model and the
hierarchical model respectively. With regard to the unweighted EC ratio, the mean estimates
of the same program are not significantly different across models; the 95% credible interval
estimated by the hierarchical model is slightly larger than that generated by the complete
pooling model, given that 1) the site-by-site variability is incorporated into the model; and
2) each parameter is less likely to be estimated precisely as the number of parameters to
estimate increases.
The advantages of the hierarchical model can be demonstrated more intuitively with
the estimation of the posterior predictive distributions of the EC ratio for each site, as
displayed in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 for New Chance and JOBSTART respectively. The
red and blue dash lines in the diagrams are used to mark the mean, the 2.5th-percentile,
and the 97.5th-percentile of the posterior predictive distribution of the EC ratio across all
sites, as reported in Table 2.2; and the gray bars show the 95% credible intervals of the
posterior predictive distributions of the EC ratio for each site. At least two patterns are
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● Observed data Mean of posterior predictive distribution
(b) Hierarchical model
Figure 2.2: Estimation of site-level EC ratio (New Chance)
revealed in the diagrams. First, compared to the observed EC ratios that are estimated site
by site without any pooling (marked as the blue dots), the predicted means of the posterior
predictive distributions generated by the hierarchical model (marked as the red diamonds in
Figure 2.2(b) and Figure 2.3(b)) are distributed more tightly. The fact that the predicted
means of different sites are pulled towards the mean value across all sites (marked as the red
dash line) indicates that in the hierarchical model the estimation of site-specific parameters
for one site can borrow information from other sites so as to eliminate the extremeness.
Second, compared to the predicted means generated by the complete pooling model (marked
as the red dots in Figure 2.2(a) and Figure 2.3(a)), those generated by the hierarchical
model demonstrate some site-by-site variation, which is plausible in the sense that the same
program was implemented with different students by different teachers and staff with different
resources available. In all, as a compromise between no pooling and complete pooling, the
hierarchical model incorporates both the commonality across sites and the particularity of
each site into the model, leading to more reliable predictions.
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● Observed data Mean of posterior predictive distribution
(b) Hierarchical model
Figure 2.3: Estimation of site-level EC ratio (JOBSTART)
2.4.3.2 Weighted EC ratio
The second estimator of interest is the weighted EC ratio, indicating the number of ad-
ditional high school graduates yielded by investing one thousand dollars for a typical site,
with larger sites contributing more to the estimation. Table 2.3 reports the mean value and
95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution of the weighted EC ratio for
New Chance and JOBSTART, estimated by the complete pooling model and the hierar-
chical model respectively. As it shows, the distribution of the weighted EC ratio is more
concentrated than that of the unweighted EC ratio. It is consistent with our expectation
since the weighting process averages out both effectiveness and cost and tends to eliminate
the extreme values. Depending on the distribution of scale in different sites, the mean of
the weighted CE ratio can be larger or smaller than that of the unweighted EC ratio. For
example, the number of participants served by the New Chance program is more or less
balanced across the 16 sites (as seen in Appendix A); therefore the mean estimate of the
weighted EC ratio is approximate to that of the unweighted EC ratio. In contrast, the 13
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Table 2.3: Mean and 95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution of the
weighted EC ratio
Mean 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
New Chance (complete pooling model) 0.055 0.003 0.105
New Chance (hierarchical model) 0.051 0.004 0.099
JOBSTART (complete pooling model) 0.106 -0.004 0.262
JOBSTART (hierarchical model) 0.125 0.011 0.262
JOBSTART sites demonstrate a larger variance in scale as well as in effectiveness and cost,
leading to a deviation of the weighted EC ratio from the unweighted EC ratio. For both
New Chance and JOBSTART, the two models also generate dissimilar posterior predictive
distributions of the weighted EC ratio, indicating that accounting for the site-level variation
makes a difference in the estimation.
2.4.3.3 Comparison of New Chance and JOBSTART
To visualize the comparison of the two programs, I plot the posterior predictive dis-
tributions of average treatment effect, average cost, the unweighted effectiveness-cost ratio
and the weighted effectiveness-cost ratio for both programs together, all generated by the
hierarchical model. The extreme values below the 2.5th quantile and above the 97.5th quan-
tile are trimmed off for each distribution. As shown in Figure 2.4 (a) and (b), JOBSTART is
more effective and less costly than New Chance. Figure 2.4 (c) and (d) indicate that for both
the unweighted effectiveness-cost ratio and the weighted effectiveness-cost ratio, JOBSTART
has a larger mean value and a larger variance than New Chance; but there is also a small
probability that an estimate for JOBSTART is smaller than an estimate for New Chance.
It implies that in terms of the best guess to what would happen in efficiency, JOBSTART
is much better than New Chance; it is very unlikely that JOBSTART performs worse than
New Chance, although the worst-case scenario of JOBSTART can be worse than that of
New Chance. In conclusion, JOBSTART is preferred to New Chance in terms of efficiency
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New Chance (mean = 0.1)
JOBSTART (mean = 0.12)
(a) Average Treatment Effect
















New Chance (mean = 1.76)
JOBSTART (mean = 1.13)
(b) Average Cost












New Chance mean = 0.054
JOBSTART mean = 0.133
(c) Unweighted EC ratio











New Chance mean = 0.051
JOBSTART mean = 0.125
(d) Weighted EC ratio
Figure 2.4: Comparison of New Chance and JOBSTART
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Program A mean = 1
Program B mean = 1.01
(a) Example 1




















Program A mean = 1
Program B mean = 1.5
(b) Example 2
Figure 2.5: Two Hypothetical Comparisons
as measured by both estimators. A sensitivity analysis indicates that the conclusion drawn
from the complete pooling model is consistent with this conclusion based on the hierarchical
model.
Note that sometimes the comparison of two distributions may be more complex than
the New Chance and JOBSTART comparison, and the conclusion on which program is fa-
vorable may not be apparent. Figure 2.5 shows two hypothetical examples of program com-
parison based on the distributions of a EC ratio estimator (either unweighted or weighted),
among which one example shows a clearer pattern than the other. In Example 1, the EC
ratio distribution of Program A has the same mean as the EC distribution of Program B,
but it also has smaller variance compared to Program B. It implies that the best guesses
on the efficiency of Program A and Program B are the same, but we are less certain about
the efficiency of Program B. In this case, it is quite clear that Program A is preferred. In
Example 2, the EC ratio distribution of Program B has a larger mean as well as a much
larger variance than those of Program A. It shows that the best guess on the efficiency of
CHAPTER 2. ARTICLE ONE 42
Program B is better than that of Program A, but our belief on the efficiency of Program B
also involves much more uncertainty. In this case, the selection of programs depends on the
decision maker’s preference on how to balance various dimensions, such as the mean value,
the variance and the extreme-case scenarios.
2.5 Summary
To respond to the methodological challenge of capturing the uncertainty of an efficiency ratio
in cost-effectiveness analysis, this article synthesizes and evaluates various methods used to
quantify uncertainty derived from either sampling variability or incomplete information, and
proposes a Bayesian approach that can be used to process the available site-level effectiveness
and cost information. Compared to other methods, the Bayesian approach has at least two
advantages with regard to informing and guiding decision making in educational practice.
First, it provides direct answers to questions that decision makers are most interested in
when they encounter a choice problem related to resource allocation: the best guess on what
would happen in terms of efficiency if a program is implemented once, and the best-case and
worst-case scenarios. Second, its validity does not depend on the number of observations
available once the model is correctly specified. This feature is extremely attractive when site
is the unit of analysis and the datasets available usually have limited number of observations
in the educational context.
Note that the value of the results generated by the hierarchical model with non-
informative and weakly-informative priors lies in comparison and selection rather than pre-
diction and planning. In other words, the posterior predictive distributions of the estimators
of interest are not very useful to help principals and superintendents to set up an efficiency
goal or a budget plan, given that the distributions are usually too wide to be informative in
that way. Instead, they are more helpful in selecting the most cost-effective programs among
several alternatives. In addition, the use of the Bayesian approach for decision-making re-
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quires the decision makers to have some level of technical expertise to correctly understand,
interpret and utilize the results. Given that previous research indicates that people tend to
suppress uncertainty information when making decisions (Lindley, 2014, pp. 11-13), more
studies are needed to test whether principals and practitioners respond to the uncertainty
information and how institutions, including colleges and graduate schools, research institu-




Bayesian Decision Theory Guiding Educational Decision-making: Theories,
Models and Application
3.1 Introduction
Given the importance of education and the growing public demand for improving education
quality under tight budget constraints, there has been an emerging movement to call for
research-informed decisions in educational resource allocation, which leads to an abundance
of rigorous studies on the effectiveness, cost, and implementation of educational interventions
(Honig and Coburn, 2007, p.1; Lai and Schildkamp, 2013, p.9; Slavin, 2002, p.15). However,
school- and district-level practitioners find that the applicability of these studies to their
decision-making problems in the real educational context can be limited due to multiple
barriers (Biesta, 2007, pp.1-2; Slavin, 2002, p.17). In addition to the personal and profes-
sional barriers from the demand side of educational practitioners, such as lack of training
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on quantitative analysis, tight time constraints (Fusarelli, 2008, p.187; Lai and Schildkamp,
2013, p.2) and limited or bounded rationality (Orland, 2009, p.115), barriers from the sup-
ply side, i.e., properties of research that fail to accommodate the real contextual needs, have
been widely discussed in the literature. For example, current research, especially the rigor-
ous randomized control trials, tends to explore what worked in the evaluation settings, as
opposed to providing direct guidance on what will work in a specific context, which is what
practitioners and policymakers care most about in a decision-making environment full of
complexity (Orland, 2009, p.119). As a result, educational research is widely considered ir-
relevant (Henig, 2008, p.42), fragmented, and non-cumulative (Biesta, 2007, pp.1-2) in terms
of shaping actual decisions.
In response to these criticisms, the purpose of this article is to address a subset of
methodological challenges that hamper the influence of research on educational decision-
making, including how to generalize or extrapolate effectiveness and cost information from
the evaluation site(s) to a specific context, how to incorporate information from multiple
sources, and how to aggregate multiple consequences of an intervention into one framework.
In particular, I introduce Bayesian decision theory, a method that processes research findings
and subjective judgments using a transparent mechanism, to address these three challenges
so as to provide clear, localized direction for decision makers.
The first part of this article introduces the background and the outline of the study.
The second part provides a brief description of the three components of Bayesian decision
theory: maximization of expected utility, Bayes’ theorem, and Multi-Attribute Utility The-
ory. Based on a hypothetical choice problem of choosing between two reading programs,
the third section transfers the idea of Bayesian decision theory to a statistical model and
demonstrates the estimation, presentation and interpretation of the results. The fourth sec-
tion explains how Bayesian decision theory addresses the three methodological challenges
from the perspective of statistical theory. The last part maps some knowledge gaps and
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directions for future research, and summarizes the advantages of Bayesian decision theory.
In all, the ultimate goal of this article is to explore some methodological improvements to
the current evaluation framework that may contribute to lowering the barriers between edu-
cational research and educational decision-making and bringing the two worlds into greater
alignment.
3.2 Bayesian Decision Theory
3.2.1 Brief Introduction
Bayesian decision theory, also referred to as decision analysis, is a combination of multiple
analytical approaches based on the subjective expected utility model (French, 2008, p.1).
The underlying assumption of the theory is the rationality of belief under uncertainty, i.e.,
among all the alternatives, an economic person would choose the one that maximizes her
expected utility (Hausman and McPherson, 2006, p.53). Based on this assumption, decision
analysis utilizes Bayesian inference to update people’s belief on uncertainty, and uses Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory to model decision maker’s preference (French, 2008, p.2). Edwards
(1998) collectively defines these three components, Bayes’ theorem, Multi-Attribute Utility
Theory and maximization of expected utility, as Bayesian decision theory, and asserts that
“the 21st century will be the Century of Bayes”, in which “the explicit use of these three
formal decision models by decision makers will be as commonplace as use of spreadsheets is
now” (p.416).
It should be noted that Bayesian decision theory, or more specifically the subjective
expected utility model that the theory is built on, is a normative model that informs people
what they should do to achieve a rational choice, rather than a descriptive model that depicts
what people actually do in reality (French, 2008, p.2). Although the assumption of rationality
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has been challenged by empirical studies conducted by economists (e.g., Maurice Allais, and
Daniel Ellsberg) and psychologists (e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Paul Slovic)
(Bouyssou et al., 2009, p.xxii), the value of the normative model has not been undermined
(Lindley, 2014, p.33). Instead, the fact that people are rarely rational has highlighted the
importance of normative models in the way that decision makers should be “guided toward
the rationality assumed within the model, mindful of the cognitive limitations and behavioral
biases that he or she is likely to exhibit in interacting with the analysis” (French, 2008, pp.
2-3).
Bayesian decision theory has been widely applied in different fields such as medical
diagnosis, industrial engineering and nuclear emergency response, but the terminologies used
in the literature are not consistent from field to field. To clarify, this article uses “alternative”
(a ∈ A) to refer to available options from which the decision maker is supposed to choose
one; and “consequence” (c ∈ C) as the outcomes or objectives that the decision maker is
interested in. Synonyms of “alternative” (as used in French, 2008, p.1) in the literature
include “decision” (as used in Gelman et al., 2013a, p.238; Gill, 2015, p.250; Leonelli and
Smith, 2013, p.6), “action” (as used in Roy, 1981; Lindley, 2014, p.227), “option” (as used
in Ishizaka and Nemery, 2013), and “program” (as used in Edwards and Newman, 1982). In
addition to “consequence” (as used in French, 2008, p.1; Lindley, 2014, p.228), “outcome”
(as in Gelman et al., 2013a, p.238) and “attribute” (as used in Smith, 2000, p.176) are also
frequently used for the same concept1.
1In some literature (e.g., Smith, 2000), “attribute” is not interchangeable with “outcome” or “consequence”,
where “outcome” or “consequence” refers to the possible values of an attribute. For simplicity, this article
considers them interchangeable.
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3.2.2 Maximization of Expected Utility
Intuitively, to choose the best alternative among several options, one would score one’s
preference or desirability of each alternative using a common numeric scale, and then select
the one that has the highest number (Edwards, 1998, p.418). In economics, preference is
usually represented by the cardinal utility function that quantifies the merit of choosing each
alternative into comparable numbers under certain assumptions2. When there are multiple
consequences, the utility of each alternative would be some kind of combination of the
utility for each consequence conditional on the specific alternative, which will be specified in
detail in Section 3.2.4. However, comparing the utility values directly is far from sufficient,
since in most decision-making contexts, decision makers are uncertain about whether the
consequences of interest would be realized. Therefore it is necessary to take into account
uncertainty and calculate the “expected utility”: the weighted combination of utilities for
all consequences, with their respective probabilities of realization as the weights (Edwards,
1998, pp.418-419). The expected utility represents “how much” utility the decision maker
anticipates obtaining for any one alternative adopted, or what might happen on average
from the frequentist framework (Lindley, 2014, p.201). The best alternative would be the
one that maximizes the expected utility.
Mathematically, Bayesian decision theory is described as Formula 3.1 and 3.2 (revised
based on French, 2008, pp.1-2; Gelman et al., 2013a, p.238; Leonelli and Smith, 2013, p.7).
maxa∈AE(U(c, θ|X, a)) = maxa∈A
ˆ
Ω




U(c, θ|X, a)f(θ|X)dθ (3.2)
2These assumptions include completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1953).
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where θ is a vector of all unknown parameters with the sample space of Ω; a is a vector
of alternatives with the sample space of A; X represents a matrix of observed data, such
as the effectiveness and cost data in the following reading program example; c is a vector
of measurable quantities that map the consequences of each alternative into numbers; U(.)
represents the (multi-attribute) utility as a function of the consequences c and θ; and f(.) is
the probability density function. The expected utility for each alternative is the expectation
(E) of the utility function U(.), which is intuitively the sum of all the possible values of the
utility function U(.) weighted by their respective probabilities (as shown in Formula 3.1).
Since U(.) may be a continuous variable, the sum is generalized into the integral. Given that
θ is a vector of all the unknown parameters (i.e., df(U(c, θ|X, a)) = f(θ|X)dθ), the expected
utility can be simplified into the utility function U(.) as a function of θ multiplied by the
probability density function of θ, integrated over Ω, the sample space of θ.
As shown in Formula 3.2, the expected utility can be decomposed into two parts: a
utility function U(.) that represents desirability or preference3, and a probability distribution
f(.) that models uncertainty. U(.) is usually constructed based on Multi-Attributed Utility
Theory, and f(.) is updated using Bayes’ theorem in the light of data X. The relationship
of the three components is displayed in Figure 3.1 (revised based on French, 2003, p.232;
French, 2008, p.2).
3Note that in terms of preference, some literature (e.g., Berger, 1985, p.57; Gill, 2015, p.251) prefers
using the loss function L(.) which measures the penalty for making a decision that is far from optimal, to the
utility function U(.) that measures the merit of choosing one alternative. In this case, the best choice is the
one that generates a zero loss. Mathematically, the loss function is equal to the negative utility function (i.e.,
L(.) = −U(.)) (Berger, 1985, p.59), so the best choice should remain the same regardless of the selection of
the functions.
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship of the Three Components of Bayesian Decision Theory
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3.2.3 Bayes’ Theorem
f(θ|X), the probability density function of θ conditional on data X, is the posterior distribu-
tion of θ in Bayesian terms. According to Bayes’ theorem, the term f(θ|X) can be extended
to Formula 3.3.






where f(θ) is the prior distribution, modeling the decision maker’s belief on θ before any
data X is revealed; and f(X|θ), called the likelihood function that contain information from
the available dataset. As explained in Section 2.4.1, Bayes’ theorem depicts a process of
information updating using one’s prior knowledge and the evidence: one’s modified under-
standing of θ (expressed as the posterior distribution f(θ|X)) reflects the balance between
her belief about θ before seeing the data (f(θ)) and the observed data X given θ (f(X|θ)).
In other words, the posterior belief is the prior belief weighted by the evidence observed.
Under the Bayesian framework, both quantitative and qualitative information is ex-
pected to be transformed into mathematical prior distribution(s). Prior distributions based
on quantitative empirical studies can be derived via specific studies or meta-analysis of
an intervention, while priors from other sources (e.g., expert opinions, testimonies, imple-
mentation reports, case studies, contextual information, etc.) rely on the elicitation of the
decision maker’s subjective judgments (Congdon, 2008, p.3). Elicitation techniques that
are widely used include 1) informal discussion with the decision maker; 2) structured inter-
views; 3) structured questionnaires; and 4) computer-based elicitation (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2004, pp.141-142). Given the difficulty of quantifying subjective opinions, a well-reasoned
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parametric structure is usually imposed on the probability distribution before elicitation
(O’Hagan et al., 2006, pp.121-122). Since no evidence has shown a clear advantage of com-
plex elicitation techniques over simple methods (Chaloner, 1996) and evaluating the quality
of elicitation is theoretically impossible due to the unknown “true” belief (O’Hagan et al.,
2006, p.161), it is essential to provide transparent documentation of how the prior beliefs
are elicited and constructed (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004, p.142).
Priors can be very flexible. When multiple priors derived from both external evidence
and the subjective judgments of the decision maker are available4, the community of priors
can be combined based on the decision maker’s beliefs on how much to weight each kind of
prior. When the decision maker prefers not to incorporate any prior information and relies
on the data to tell the story, one can use a non-informative prior or a weakly-informative
prior to model her “ignorance” (Kaplan and Park, 2013, p.553). Sensitivity analysis may also
be necessary to check how the final conclusion responds to a change of priors (Spiegelhalter
et al., 2004, p.166).
3.2.4 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
The utility function U(c, θ|X, a) is usually identified by Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
(MAUT), a technique in the family of Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) meth-
ods aiming to address the trade-offs of multiple objectives in a complex decision context5
4The multiplicity of priors can be driven by other reasons. When a group of stakeholders make the decision
together (referred to as the participation group decision model, as opposed to the supra decision maker model)
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, p.540), there might be varying priors elicited from different stakeholders. In this
case, the priors can be combined based on a number of alternative strategies, including 1) reaching a group
consensus by discussion; 2) pooling the priors together arithmetically or logarithmically; and 3) setting the
extreme priors as the boundaries of the community of priors (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004, p.143).
5For a clear mapping of the four types of decision-making problems and MCDA methods, see Ishizaka
and Nemery (2013, pp.4-5). There are also other ways to distinguish the differences between MAUT and
MCDM. For example, Dyer et al. (1992) noted that MCDM is used when the attributes are known with
certainty while MAUT is used when risks or uncertainties are involved in definition and assessment of the
alternatives (p.647).
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(Ishizaka and Nemery, 2013, p.81). The essential idea of using MAUT to construct a utility
function is to transform values of attributes (which may be measured in different scales and
units) into utility values, a uniform measure of preference, and then combine the utilities of
different consequences in a quantitative way such that an overall utility value can be assigned
to each alternative6 (Abdellaoui and Gonzales, 2009, p.583; San Cristóbal Mateo, 2012, p.63).
The underlying assumptions of MAUT are that 1) an overall utility value for a n−attribute
utility function exists; and 2) it can be decomposed into a function of none-attribute utility
functions (Yilmaz, 1978, p.318). In other words, the utility loss in one attribute can be
compensated by the utility gain in another attribute, also called compensation evaluations
(Perreault and Russ, 1977, p.425).
The construction of U(c, θ)7 can be divided into two steps. The first step is to map
each consequence onto a one-attribute utility function. The functional form can be linear,
concave or convex under the assumption of constant, diminishing or increasing marginal
returns, respectively. How to identify the values of the parameters in the function is deter-
mined by the decision maker’s attitude towards risks and uncertainty (Keeney and Raiffa,
1993, p.141). When the attributes are treated as uncertain (or risky), the identification of
the parameters may rely on a five-point assessment procedure in which a decision maker
is asked to specify her 25−, 50− and 75−percentile certainty equivalents8, while the lower
and upper bounds of possible values of an attribute are set as 0 and 1 in the utility scale
(for details see Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pp.193-196). When the attributes are treated as
6This is the first category of Multi-Attribute Utility Theories, as classified by Yilmaz (1978, p.318).
The other category of Multi-Attribute Utility Theories, called lexicographic models, ranks the attributes by
importance and then chooses the alternative that maximizes the preference of the most important attribute.
Since lexicographic models may not lead to a utility function, this article only focuses the first category of
MAUT theories.
7For simplicity, let’s suppress data X and alternative a in U(c, θ|X, a) for a while.
8The 100p-percentile certainty equivalent is the level of the attribute (i.e., x) that makes the decision
maker indifferent between a risky alternative (i.e., the probabilities of attaining the highest and lowest
possible values of the attribute are p and 1 − p respectively) and a certain alternative (i.e., the probability
of attaining the value of x is 100%).
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certain (or riskless)9, one should identify the values of the attribute that are associated
with 25−, 50− and 75−percentiles of the utility, rather than the certainty equivalents (for
methods to identify a simpler linear/bilinear utility function under certainty, see Edwards
and Newman, 1982, p.65-74). As pointed out by Keeney and Raiffa (1993), the searching
process of an appropriate utility function involves the researcher’s judgment on where to
stop due to the difficulty in satisfying all the constraints at the same time (p.198). While a
complex functional form may depict one’s preference in a more flexible way, it may result in
more parameters to estimate and therefore induce more uncertainty in the precision of the
identification.
After identifying the utility function for each attribute, the second step is to aggregate
them together based on one’s assumptions regarding the dependencies of these attributes.
Although there are complex ways of aggregation like the multiplicative model and the mul-
tilinear model, the most widely used functional form for aggregation is the simplest and
the most intuitive one: the additive model (Edwards and Newman, 1982, p.74; Ishizaka
and Nemery, 2013, p.83). Under the assumption of additive independence10, an additive





where m is the number of attributes, ui(ci) is the utility of attribute ci, and wi is the nor-
malized weight assigned to ci (Ishizaka and Nemery, 2013, p.83). The weights represent the
relative importance of each attribute, with the sum of all weights equal to 1 (Edwards and
Newman, 1982, p.52). A more generalized functional form, the multilinear model, is intro-
9In this case, the function is called value function rather than utility function in the literature of Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, p.80). For simplicity, I use the word “utility function”
loosely to refer to the functions identified under both certainty and uncertainty, as in Levin and McEwan
(2001, pp.200-201).
10Additive independence is explained in detail in Appendix E
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duced in Appendix E. Similar to one-attribute utility function, the generalized functional
form provides more flexibility to model one’s preference, but also increases the number of
parameters to estimate to 2m− 2, compared to m weights to estimate in the additive model.
3.2.5 Bayesian Decision Theory in Education
While Bayesian decision theory has been widely adopted in many fields to solve choice prob-
lems extending from nuclear emergency response (French, 1996) and health-care evaluations
(Spiegelhalter, 2004) to selection of manual wheelchairs (Delcroix et al., 2013) and design
of Six Sigma (Rajagopal and Castillo, 2007), its application to educational decision-making
has been relatively scant. Girshick (1954) introduced the basic idea of statistical decision
theory to the field of education, and described how the combination of Bayes’ theorem and
the loss function offers a statistical framework to model rational behavior under uncertainty
by accounting for both costs and consequences (p.464). However, the theory is illustrated
based on a coin-toss example, so it does not provide a concrete example on how to apply
it to the specific educational decision-making context. Duff and Lynch (1977) combined
Bayesian inference and cost-benefit analysis and demonstrated how to identify the optimal
cutoff in GRE scores to minimize the opportunity loss based on a bivariate normal model.
Probably the first educational study that formally adopted the framework of Bayesian deci-
sion theory11, Saar (1980) specified a step-by-step approach to identify the utility function
and update the expected utility in the light of data using Bayes’ theorem. These pioneering
studies have opened the door to explore the potential of Bayesian decision theory in the edu-
cational context; however, due to underdevelopment of Bayesian computation before 1990s,
11Saar (1980) used “Multi-Attribute Utility Theory” to refer to what is defined as “Bayesian decision
theory” in this article. According to his definition, MAUT is divided into two parts: the first part identifies
the goals and assigns weights of importance to the goals; and the second part involves Bayesian statistics to
update the prior belief based on observed data (p.64).
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the models demonstrated are still very primitive.
Although distinct from Bayesian decision theory, empirical studies in cost-utility anal-
ysis may provide some reference for the application of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory to
construct the utility function. In terms of the one-attribute utility function under certainty,
Roche (1972), as described in Keeney and Raiffa (1993, pp.365-376), asked a superintendent
and an assistant superintendent to identify the relationship between students’ performance
level in four subjects and their utility level without imposing any parametric assumptions
on the functional form. The results show that among 8 value functions that were identified,
7 are concave (indicating that the decision maker is very concerned with low performance)
and 1 is S-shaped (indicting that the decision maker may be most concerned with mediocre
performance). In terms of the multi-attribute utility function, the most frequently used func-
tional form is additive, as in Bitsoi Largie (2003), Fletcher et al. (1990), Lewis et al. (1994),
Lewis and Kallsen (1995), and Pruslow (2001). Note that in educational cost-utility studies,
cost is not incorporated in the utility function; instead, the utility function only measures
the desirability of these consequences that represent gains. Therefore, the comparison of the
alternatives is made based on the cost-utility ratios or utility-cost ratios of the alternatives
of interest.
Winkler (2001) pointed out that one of the primary reasons that the application of
Bayesian decision theory in health care evaluations falls behind the burgeoning development
of Bayesian computation is the lack of demonstrative models of analysis that are readily
available (p.61); the same argument may also apply to the field of education. In the next
section, I am going to demonstrate one way of applying Bayesian decision theory to a typical
choice problem in educational resource allocation. Compared to the previous literature on
Bayesian analysis in the education field, the model proposed has the following advantaged.
First, it doesn’t require using conjugate priors and therefore entails more flexibility on the
elicitation of the priors. Second, the one-attribute utility function does not assume a linear
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relationship between the outcome of interest and utility, making it possible to take into
account diminishing marginal returns.
3.3 Models and Application
3.3.1 Demonstration Example: Reading Now and Literacy Ladders
To set up a typical example to illustrate the terminologies and the models, we assume that
a researcher’s role is to guide the principal of Neverland Primary School in deciding which
supplemental reading program to implement for 100 students in Grade 3. For simplicity,
suppose that the principal is the Supra Decision Maker who has the right to decide how to
balance the individual utilities of all stakeholders (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, p.539); therefore
her utility function represents the group utility of the stakeholders. The principal is inter-
ested in improving student academic achievement in fluency and comprehension. She is also
concerned about the cost of the program. Among all the reading programs she has reviewed,
she is deliberating between two alternatives, Reading Now and Literacy Ladders. Both are
aimed at improving reading proficiency in fluency and comprehension and serve students in
Grade 3, but differ in the program specifics. Reading Now provides teacher training on how
to organize students to cooperate in small groups, while Literacy Ladders is a computer-
assisted reading program. The two programs are described in detail in Appendix D. Both
programs are feasible to be implemented at Neverland Primary School.
In order to make a well-informed decision, the principal asks the researcher to collect
evidence on the effectiveness and cost of these two programs and help her to process the
evidence. The consequences that matter to the principal include the impact of a program on
reading fluency cfluency, the impact of a program on reading comprehension ccomp, and the
average cost of a program ccost. The three consequences compose the vector of c, as shown in
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Formula 3.1 and 3.2, where c ∈ C12. The alternatives that the principal is deliberating are
represented by a two-element vector a, where a1 = ReadingNow and a2 = LiteracyLadders.
3.3.2 Data X
The ideal dataset that the researcher can obtain for each alternative of interest (i.e., X|a)
is the point estimates of all consequences of interest from a large-scale, multi-site, blocked
randomized control trial, with sites as the unit of analysis13. Such datasets have the following
advantages. First, in terms of internal validity, a well-implemented experimental design
based on randomization can exclude all confounding factors that affect both the treatment
and the outcome, and conclude that the difference in the post-treatment outcomes between
the treatment group and the control group can be attributed to the program. Second,
the multi-site blocked design generates multiple estimates for each consequence of interest,
providing information on the heterogeneity and uncertainty of each consequence. Third,
when all consequences of interest are measured in the evaluation, the correlation matrix of
the consequences can reveal how these consequences vary jointly. Despite these advantages,
however, it is usually difficult to collect such an ideal dataset for each program of interest for
at least two reasons. First, it is very costly to conduct multi-site experiments. Second, the
outcomes measured in the evaluations may not perfectly match the consequences of interest
identified by a specific decision maker.
12C is the sample space, or all possible consequences that a reading program can have for students,
schools, and the society as a whole, e.g., student achievement, student motivation, student self-esteem,
teacher-student relationship, school learning environment, social cohesion, etc.; c is a vector of consequences
that matter for the specific decision maker. The same logic applies to the relationship between A (i.e., the
sample space of reading alternatives, or all the available reading programs that meet the decision maker’s
selection criteria, e.g., English reading programs for students without disabilities in Grade 3) and a (i.e., the
vector of alternatives being considered by the decision maker).
13Site refers to the level at which effectiveness and cost are averaged. For example, when the evaluation
is a blocked randomized control trial in which students at each school are randomly assigned to either the
treatment group or the control group, site refers to school, since both the effectiveness and the cost are
averaged at the school level.
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Given the limited availability of the ideal dataset, this article explores one way to uti-
lize the program descriptions, existing evidence on similar programs, and reasonable guesses
to simulate the data under mathematical constraints. Assume that for each alternative a,
data X (i.e., a stack of observations for variables cfluency, ccomp and ccost) is drawn from a
multivariate normal distribution. The mean vector and the variance-covariance matrix of
the multivariate normal distribution are defined in Formula 3.5. The researcher may use
the following method to identify the values of each parameter in the mean vector and the


















The researcher finds that although no evaluations have been conducted on Reading
Now, there is a rich literature on the effectiveness of similar programs, part of which are
summarized in a meta-analysis conducted by Slavin et al. (2009). She selects those studies
that 1) evaluate programs focusing on cooperative learning, 2) measure the impact of the
programs on both vocabulary and comprehension, and 3) cover third graders in the sample,
as shown in Table F.1 of Appendix F. These estimates of effectiveness, all expressed in effect
size14, provide some idea about the average and the dispersion of the impact of cooperative
learning programs on vocabulary and comprehension, as well as how the effects on these
two outcomes vary jointly. As a result, the researcher may assign u1 and u2 to be 0.176
and 0.18, the sample means of the impact estimates on vocabulary and comprehension
respectively; assign σ1 and σ2 to be 0.081 and 0.106, the sample standard deviations of
the impact estimates on vocabulary and comprehension respectively; and assign σ21 to be
14Note that these studies may use different measures and norming samples.
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−0.152, the sample correlation of the impact estimates on vocabulary and comprehension.
Based on the program description, the researcher lists all the resources utilized to
implement Reading Now, identifies the quantity of each ingredient required to serve 100
students, and prices out the cost of each ingredient using national prices. Then she sums
them up and divides the total cost by 100 students, getting an estimate of $350 for the
average cost per participant. She assumes that u3 equals 350, since it captures the cost of
a standard implementation required by the program design. As to the standard deviation
of the average cost, since there is no evidence available as far as the researcher can tell,
it requires some reasonable guesses. Based on her understanding of the implementation
variability, she assumes that σ3 is equal to 30, indicating that if the program is replicated
again and again, 95 times out of 100, the average cost per participant would fall in the range
between $291.2 and $408.8. The details of the cost estimation are provided in Table F.3 of
Appendix F.
The difficulty lies in “guessing” how the program impact on vocabulary and that on
comprehension correlate with the average cost per participant respectively (i.e., σ31 and σ32)
while only the correlation between the program impact on the two reading outcomes (i.e.,
σ21) is known. One way to construct the correlation matrix is to fill in the missing elements of
the Cholesky factor of the correlation matrix based on the algorithm proposed by Kurowicka
and Cooke (2006). The basic idea is to draw two random values for the two missing elements
of the Cholesky factor such that the correlation matrix satisfies the mathematical constraint
of positive definiteness (Stan Development Team, 2016, p.500). One random pair of σ31 and
σ32 drawn in this analysis is 0.115 and −0.652.
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Now the researcher simulates 50 observations from the multivariate normal distribu-
tion defined above and generates a dataset of cfluency, ccomp and ccost for Reading Now.
The same procedure can be applied to Literacy Ladders, for which the effectiveness
evidence on computer-assisted instruction programs is collected to inform the assignment of
values for u1, u2, σ1, σ2 and σ21, as shown in Table F.2 of Appendix F; u3 is assigned to
be 300, as indicated by the cost estimation in Table F.4 of Appendix F; σ3 is arbitrarily
determined to be 30; a random pair of draws for σ31 and σ32 used in the analysis is 0.323
and 0.586; and the sample size is also 50. The demonstrative datasets of Reading Now and
Literacy Ladders are available upon request for the purpose of replication.
3.3.3 The Uncertainty Model
3.3.3.1 Characteristics of the consequence variables
The first step of Bayesian inference is to set up a joint probability distribution for all the
observable (i.e., X) and unobservable quantities (i.e., θ) in a problem (Gelman et al., 2013a,
p.3). To achieve this in the Bayesian decision theory model, it is necessary to identify the
variable types of the consequence measures and explore how they are jointly distributed. In
the demonstrative example, the two effectiveness measures cfluency and ccomp are expressed in
effect size and therefore are continuous variables without bounds; average cost per participant
ccost is a continuous variable with a lower bound of 0, since the average cost is always positive
in the defined experimental settings where the treatment group receives the program of
interest beyond what has been received by the control group. Although a common practice to
address the positivity of a variable is to take the logarithm of the variable, the researcher may
prefer leaving the lower bound issue unaddressed for two reasons. First, taking the logarithm
of the cost variable implies that the ingredients accumulate in a multiplicative way; however,
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the average cost per participant is the sum of the average cost of each ingredient, showing
that the ingredients are actually combined together additively. Second, given the mean and
the standard deviation of the cost variable, the possibility that it takes non-positive values is
very low. Therefore, the model proposed below considers each of the consequence measures
as a continuous variable without bounds15.
3.3.3.2 Identification of the likelihood f(X|θ)
Given the specified variable types of the consequence measures, it is necessary to model the
likelihood function f(X|θ) according to theories on how data are generated. Suppose that we
had not simulated the datasets, a reasonable parametric assumption on the likelihood would
be multivariate normal (or Gaussian) due to two justifications summarized by McElreath
(2015, pp.75-76). First, from the ontological perspective, Gaussian distributions are the
most common existing pattern in real life. A large proportion of variables that we are
interested in are generated as the sums or multiplication of a repeated process. The addition
or multiplication causes the extreme values to balance out, leading to a normal distribution
regardless of the shape of the single process. Second, from the epistemological perspective,
Gaussian distribution imposes the least new assumptions on the shape of a variable if all
we would like to assume is the mean and the variance-covariance matrix (Park and Bera,
15At the student level, educational consequences can be measured as continuous variables (e.g., academic
achievement, earnings, and cost), dichotomous variables (e.g., high school graduation and college enroll-
ment), count variables (e.g., credit accumulation and educational attainment), and categorical variables
(e.g., school choice). The dominating variable types of consequence measures are continuous and dichoto-
mous. To enhance comparability, the magnitudes of effectiveness on different consequence measures are
usually transferred to effect size (WWC, 2014, p.22). The transformation also removes the bounds if the
sample space of the original measure is restricted. Therefore, this article only explores how to model the
likelihood when all the consequence variables are continuous without bounds.
Modeling the joint distribution of a likelihood that combines different variable types is possible, but
demanding. Further study may be conducted to propose the idea of using the combination of Gaussian Copula
and marginal distributions to model the joint distribution of the likelihood, and use the Johnson family of
distributions to transfer any variable type with or without boundaries to a standard normal distribution so
that it is computable.
CHAPTER 3. ARTICLE TWO 63
2009, p.221). In other words, “the Gaussian distribution is the most natural expression
of our state of ignorance” (McElreath, 2015, p.75). For notation convenience, I label all
the unknown parameters in the model as θ, which include ufluency, ucomp, ucost, ∆ and Λ,
where ufluency, ucomp and ucost represent the expected impact of a program on vocabulary,
the expected impact of a program on comprehension, and the expected average cost per






), and Λ is the correlation matrix. The likelihood function is
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3.3.3.3 Elicitation of the priors f(θ)
Once the likelihood is modeled and the unknown parameters are identified, the researcher
proceeds to construct priors for these unknown parameters. Since she has utilized the avail-
able research evidence to generate the datasets, now she mainly focuses on eliciting the
principal’s subjective beliefs on the unknown parameters, especially on those that have prac-
tical implications. The information may be collected through informal discussion with the
principal or structured interviews; in either way, the process should be iterative and inter-
active, requiring the judgments from both the researcher and the principal. Note that the
researcher is not supposed to reveal any information learned from the data to the principal;
however, she may have to explain the practical implications of the unknown parameters if
possible, provide some guidance on a range of reasonable values for a specific parameter
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to anchor the principal’s beliefs, or/and make some arbitrary assumptions to transform the
principal’s beliefs expressed in layman’s terms into statistical distributions.
Suppose that the researcher would like to impose normal priors for ufluency, ucomp and
ucost, each of which is defined by a location parameter and a scale parameter respectively.
Given that the standard deviations and the correlation matrix are difficult to be conceived
by the principal, the researcher directly imposes non-informative Jeffery’s priors for the
standard deviations and a weakly-informative LKG prior with η = 1 for the correlation
matrix (Lewandowski et al., 2009). Regarding the scale parameters of the normal priors
for ufluency, ucomp and ucost, one feasible way to identify the values of them is to enlarge
a reasonable scale guessed by the researcher δ based on how confident the principal is on
her best guess16. The procedure is proposed in Table 3.1, which should be repeated for
each consequence and each program. Take the prior on reading comprehension for Reading
Now as an example. The researcher first asks whether the principal has any opinion on
how effective Reading Now improves reading comprehension. If the principal does not have
an opinion, the location parameter of the prior distribution for ucomp is assigned as 0 and
the scale parameter as 10δ. If the principal has an opinion, the researcher then asks about
the best guess on the effectiveness of Reading Now in improving reading comprehension as
measured in effect size. The reported best guess x is assigned as the location parameter.
Then the researcher may ask how confident the principal is about the best guess. The scale
parameter is imputed as 2δ, 1.5δ and δ respectively based on the reported confidence level
of “Not very confident”, “Fairly confident” and “Very confident”.
Suppose that the principal has some prior beliefs on the effectiveness and cost of
Reading Now, since her school implemented that program two years ago; but she doesn’t
know much about Literacy Ladders. The priors that are identified by her are listed in Table
16δ is prior-specific. In other words, the researcher needs to identify a reasonable guess on the scale
parameter for each of the normal priors. The researcher’s judgments are needed here because the decision
makers usually lack the expertise to identify the scale parameters by themselves. We prefer enlarging the
scale guessed by the researcher in order to be conservative.
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Based on your previous experience
with reading programs and what you
know about [Program], do you have
any opinion on how effective it will be
to improve [Outcome consequence] /
on how costly [Program] is?
No 0 10δ
Yes Proceed to Q1.2
1.2
What is your best guess on the
effectiveness of [Program] in improving
[Outcome consequence] as measured in
effect size or on the average cost of
[Program]?
x x Proceed to Q1.3










Note: Practical implications of u are the average impact of [Program] on [Outcome conse-
quence] across schools, or the average cost of [Program] across schools.
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Table 3.2: Priors of ufluency , ucomp and ucost for Reading Now and Literacy Ladders













The principal’s best guess is 0.2;
and she is not very confident
about this estimate.
0.2 0.1 2× 0.1
ucomp
The principal’s best guess is 0.3;
and she is fairly confident about
this estimate.
0.3 0.1 1.5× 0.1
ucost
The principal’s best guess is
$400; and she is very confident
about this estimate
400 50 1× 50
Literacy Ladders
ufluency
The principal does not have an
opinion. 0 0.2 10× 0.2
ucomp
The principal does not have an
opinion. 0 0.2 10× 0.2
ucost
The principal does not have an
opinion. 0 50 10× 50
3.2.
3.3.3.4 The posterior predictive distribution f(X̃|θ)
Now the researcher runs two models for Reading Now and Literacy Ladders respectively, for
which the likelihood functions are the same while the priors are different. The computation
of Bayesian inference is conducted by Stan, a probabilistic programming language based on
the algorithm of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. The Stan code is attached in Appendix G. The
output includes the posterior distributions of all the unknown parameters (i.e., f(θ|X)) and
the predictive posterior distributions of the three consequences (i.e., f(X̃|θ)). The predictive
posterior distributions show how the anticipated consequences are distributed given what we
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have learned about θ from both the priors and the data. The comparison of the two programs
on the predictive posterior distribution of each consequence is displayed in Figure 3.2. The
diagrams indicate that Reading Now outperforms Literacy Ladders in improving reading
comprehension, but it is less effective in raising test scores in fluency and costs more than
Literacy Ladders. Since neither of the two programs can optimize all consequences, it is








ufluency ∼ N(0.2, 0.2) [Normal prior for ufluency]
ucomp ∼ N(0.3, 0.15) [Normal prior for ucomp]
ucost ∼ N(400, 50) [Normal prior for ucost]
∆ ∼ 1
δ
[Jeffrey’s prior for each element of ∆]








ufluency ∼ N(0, 2) [Normal prior for ufluency]
ucomp ∼ N(0, 2) [Normal prior for ucomp]
ucost ∼ N(0, 500) [Normal prior for ucost]
∆ ∼ 1
δ
[Jeffrey’s prior for each element of ∆]
Λ ∼ LKGCorr(η = 1) [LKJ prior for correlation matrix]
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Reading Now (mean = 0.18)
Literacy Ladders (mean = 0.21)







The effect of the program on comprehension test scores 





Reading Now (mean = 0.19)
Literacy Ladders (mean = 0.09)













The average cost of the program 





Reading Now (mean = 349.01)
Literacy Ladders (mean = 309.13)
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Reading Now and Literacy Ladders on the Three Consequences
(based on posterior predictive distributions)
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3.3.4 The Desirability Model
The researcher may decide to exclude the cost variable from the utility function for
two reasons. First, it follows the convention adopted by the cost-utility analysis in education,
as demonstrated in Levin and McEwan (2001, pp.189-216). Second, there are psychological
complications in how one compares cost with the outcomes in utility values. Therefore it is
easier for principals to allocate weights among multiple attributes that all represent gains,
compared to a combination of attributes that present gains and loss. Third, conversion of cost
into utility values tends to result in an underestimation of the importance of non-financial
consequences (Lewis et al., 1994, p.89). Therefore, the researcher elicits the one-attribute
utility functions for the two outcome consequences (i.e., cfluency and ccomp) respectively,
calculates the final utility of the two programs using a multi-attribute utility function that
models the combination of the two one-attribute utility functions, and then compares the
two programs based on a ratio of the final utility and the cost (i.e., the utility-cost ratio).
The utility-cost ratio represents the magnitude of utility achieved for investing a unit of
cost (either one dollar or a multiple of a dollar), and the program with a higher expected
utility-cost ratio is preferred. Note that compared to a linear estimator that will be used
if cost is incorporated into the utility function, the drawback of this method is that a ratio
estimator entails more uncertainty and is more likely to produce extreme estimates at both
tails.
3.3.4.1 One-attribute utility function
Informed by Roche (1972)’s research on the functional form of the one-attribute
utility function in the educational field, the researcher may assume that under certainty,
the principal’s one-attribute utility function ui(ci) for an attribute that models gains is
monotonically increasing with ci and concave, i.e., more ci is better than less for the decision
maker and small differences on low performances of the attribute are significant (Keeney and
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Raiffa, 1993, p.88). In this case, the utility value is presented as
ui(ci) = −e−λici (3.7)
where λi > 0 (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, p.200). To identify the value of λ for each attribute,
the researcher may take the following steps. First, ask the principal to determine the values
of the attribute when she is least satisfied (i.e., ui(ci) = 0) and most satisfied (i.e., ui(ci) = 1).
Second, once the lowest and highest points are identified, generate an interactive plot that
anchors the values of the attribute when the decision maker’s utility reaches 0.25, 0.5 and
0.75. Ask the principal to manipulate the value of λ on the sliderbar until the curve reflects
her preference in the best way, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Suppose that the principal believes that her utility is 0 when a program does not
have an impact on the attribute of interest (i.e., the lowest point is 0); and her utility is 1
when a program can increase students’ test scores on the attribute of interest by 1 standard
deviation (i.e., the highest point is 1)17. With the help of the interactive plot, she identifies
λfluency as 1.5 and λcomp as 2. In all, the one-attribute utility functions for the impact of
fluency and the impact of comprehension are
ufluency = −e−1.5cfluency (3.8)
ucomp = −e−2ccomp (3.9)
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Figure 3.3: Snapshot of the Interactive Plot that Helps to Construct the One-Attribute
Utility Function
3.3.4.2 Multi-attribute utility function
Although there are complex ways to aggregate the one-attribute utility functions
together18, the researcher may use the simplest one that takes the form of Formula 3.4. It
relies on a strong assumption that the attributes are additive independent19, implausible
in reality but much more feasible to elicit the decision maker’s opinion on the normalized
weight wi for each attribute. The researcher may ask the principal to allocate 100 points
between fluency and comprehension to show how much she values the two consequences;
the normalized weight wi for an attribute would be the number of points assigned to this
attribute divided by 100. Suppose that the multi-attribute utility function chosen by the
17Note that the posterior predictive distribution of the consequence of interest may go beyond the range
of (0, 1). In this case, when fitting the posterior predictive distribution of the consequence into the utility
function, the generated utility values may be smaller than 0 or larger than 1 in this step. The utility will be
normalized to be between 0 and 1 when the final utility is generated from the multi-attribute utility function.
18An example of multilinear function is provided in Appendix E.
19Additive independence is also defined in Appendix E.
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principal is
U = 0.4ufluency + 0.6ucomp (3.10)
= 0.4(−e−1.5cfluency) + 0.6(−e−2ccomp) (3.11)
3.3.5 Combination of the Uncertainty Model and the Desirability
Model
The next step is to fit the posterior predictive distributions of cfluency and ccomp
generated from the uncertainty model into the utility function obtained from the desirability
model, generating the posterior predictive distribution of utility. Note that the posterior
predictive distribution of utility uses a large number of draws to depict the probability
distribution of utility (i.e., f(U(c, θ|X, a)) in Formula 3.1). Therefore when calculating the
expectation of utility, instead of integrating over θ as shown in Formula 3.2, all we need
to do is to take the mean of its posterior predictive distribution. As to the special case
that excludes cost from the utility function, the same logic also applies. The decision rule
is to maximize the expected utility-cost ratio. As a result, the program with a larger (or
the largest) mean of the posterior predictive distribution of the utility-cost ratio is preferred,
where the posterior predictive distribution of the utility-cost ratio is the ratio of the posterior
predictive distribution of utility and the posterior predictive distribution of cost.
To visualize the comparison of the two programs, the researcher may plot the pos-
terior predictive distributions of the utility and the utility-cost ratio for Reading Now and
Literacy Ladders together, as in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. In these figures, the utility
values are normalized to be between 0 and 1, and the average cost is divided by 100. The
normalization and the rescaling processes are aimed at increasing the visualizability of these
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figures and do not affect the comparison of the two programs. The results indicate that based
on the existing evidence, the principal’s subjective judgments and her preference, Literacy
Ladders is expected to generate higher satisfaction for every 100 dollars invested, although
Reading Now is expected to generate higher satisfaction if cost is not taken into account.
In conclusion, the model recommends the principal implementing Literacy Ladders at the
Neverland Primary School. The researcher may also conduct several sensitivity analyses to
show how the conclusion responds to the change of the priors and the utility function.
3.4 Barriers and Bridges
Built on the simple demonstrative example, in this section I summarize the advantages
of applying Bayesian decision theory to educational resource allocation from the perspective
of statistical theory. In particular I explore what kind of information is needed by educational
practitioners, the limitations of research findings provided under the frequentist framework,
and why Bayesian decision theory can help lower the barriers. The fundamental difference
between the frequentist and the Bayesian frameworks lies in the perception of probability.
Frequentism, the most common estimation paradigm that includes Maximum-Likelihood
Estimation (MLE) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), commits to the assumption that
probability is the proportion of times that an event occurs when the number of identical
trials diverges to infinity. In contrast, Bayesianism regards probability as to what degree one
believes that the statement is true. The two frameworks will be compared in three aspects:
generalization or extrapolation to a specific site, incorporation of information from multiple
sources, and incorporation of multiple consequences into one framework. Note that some
of the advantages of Bayesian decision theory may not have been fully demonstrated in the
simple example above due to the limitation of the data, the lack of piloting and validation
in the field or some other reasons; however, they may be worth further exploration in future
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Reading Now (mean = 0.9)
Literacy Ladders (mean = 0.87)
Figure 3.4: Comparison of the Utility for Reading Now and Literacy Ladders (based on the
predictive posterior distribution)
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Reading Now (mean = 0.26)
Literacy Ladders (mean = 0.28)
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the Utility-Cost Ratio for Reading Now and Literacy Ladders
(based on the predictive posterior distribution)
CHAPTER 3. ARTICLE TWO 76
research.
3.4.1 Challenge 1: Generalization or Extrapolation to a Specific
Site
When utilizing research evidence to guide decision-making, a local-level decision
maker may find that the most valuable information would be 1) the best guess for what
is likely to happen in her particular context in terms of effect and cost if an intervention
is implemented, and 2) what the best- and worst-case scenarios could be in her particular
context. Findings collected under the frequentist framework usually provide information
on what happens on average in a generic or typical context20 in the population of interest.
Unlike the frequentist inference, the Bayesian framework is not restricted by the identical
replication assumption and can easily extrapolate the research evidence to a specific con-
text. In addition, the interpretation of Bayesian point estimates and credible intervals is
more intuitive than the frequentist interpretation.
3.4.1.1 Barriers
Generalization: what worked → what works → what (probably) will work
One of the main complaints from practitioners is that research tells you “what worked,”
but not “what will work” (Biesta, 2007, p.16). Under the frequentist framework, the trans-
formation from “what worked” to “what will work” has to go through an intermediate phase:
“what works.” The connection between “what worked” and “what works” relies on the key
concept of external validity, or generalizability. To illustrate this connection, a distinction
20This is for the case when the estimator is Average Treatment Effect (ATE). When the estimator is Local
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) in quasi-experimental evaluations, the results indicate what happens on
average for a particular subsample affected by a regression discontinuity cutoff or an instrumental variable.
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between sample and population is made: what worked in a sample should contribute to our
understanding of what works in the population. The sample that one observes in one trial is
considered a random draw of data from the population, and the inference from the sample to
the population is based on an imaginary situation in which the sampling process is repeated
again and again and the number of repeated identical trials diverges to infinity. Similarly,
the transformation from “what works” to “what will work” also assumes that the replication
of the program to the site of interest is one of the identical trials.
In reality, it is impractical to believe that the application of a scientifically-proven
effective program to a new site is an identical replication of the experiment in the evaluation
study due to the particularities from site to site (Asen et al., 2013, p.54). A decision maker
would need to compare the specific conditions of the context of the evaluation study and
the context of her school in order to predict what is likely to be achieved if the program is
adopted at her school. Back to the reading program selection example, a number of factors
that a principal would need to take into account when localizing some research evidence may
include the current reading level of the students, reading services already available in the
school, and teachers’ preparation (Orland, 2009, p.119). Given that these factors are very
likely to differ from site to site, it must be misleading to assume that the effect and cost
obtained from some sites can be directly applied to a new site (Orland, 2009, p.119). In fact,
practitioners seem to have doubts on the generalizability of evaluation studies. According to
a case study that describes and analyzes the decision-making process of three school districts
in Wisconsin, decision makers seldom referenced distant cases, such as evaluations conducted
in California, to strengthen their arguments (Asen et al., 2013, p.58).
To account for the particularities of each site, one may expect to relax the assumption
that all the sites are randomly drawn from the same population, and instead assume that each
site is randomly drawn from a separate population. In this case, every estimator of interest
(e.g., average treatment effect, average cost) should be extended to a vector of estimators,
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each unique for a site. Frequentists usually use a random-effects model to obtain the site-
specific estimates. Unfortunately, random-effects models suffer several disadvantages. First,
random-effects models assume that the site-specific effects are independent of the explanatory
variables, which can hardly be warranted (Weimer, 2009, p.98). Second, the site-specific
estimators can only be consistently estimated when the number of sites remains constant
and the number of students in each site approaches infinity. However, in reality, it is more
likely to be the situation that more sites can be recruited into the experiment, each site
with more or less the same sample size. When the number of sites goes to infinity while
the number of students in each site remains constant, the site-specific estimators are not
asymptotically consistent anymore.
The data structure in educational research can impose more challenges for generaliz-
ability. In evaluation studies for school interventions, students are usually grouped by site
(either classroom or school), and both effect and cost information can be at best identified at
the site level, where the randomization is conducted, in the form of average treatment effect
and average cost. Therefore, when research findings are summarized, the unit of analysis is
site rather than individual, leading to a comparatively small sample size due to the budget
and time constraints commonly imposed in evaluation studies.
Uncertainty
The best guess as to what is likely to happen (i.e., the point estimate of the expec-
tation) is important for decision makers, but not sufficient. Researchers also need to convey
what the (comparatively) best- and worst-case scenarios could be, or a range that the fixed
true parameter is very likely to fall in. The range to report is expected to capture the un-
certainty of our belief on what would occur with regard to effect and cost if the program is
implemented in a specific site. While uncertainty can be represented quantitatively, qual-
itatively and logically (Dubois and Prade, 2009, p.85), both frequentism and Bayesianism
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adopt its quantitative representation: probability (Lindley, 2014, p.190).
Under the frequentist framework, the only source of uncertainty that is modeled is
sampling variability, as captured by sampling error. Given that a sample is self-evidently not
the population, sampling error provides information on how different the sample estimate is
from the true parameter of the population. Therefore, sampling error (as well as measures of
the sampling error such as the standard error and confidence intervals) is used to model the
uncertainty of the point estimate in terms of estimation precision, rather than the uncertainty
of our belief regarding what the true parameter is. For example, the p-value in null hypothesis
testing indicates whether or not the sample should be taken seriously21 , rather than to
what extent the hypothesis statement is true (Novella, 2015). A confidence interval is a
realization of the confidence interval function based on the sample, which does not convey
any information on whether the true parameter is captured by the range. In addition, the
sampling distribution is assumed to be distributed normally, another assumption that can
not be warranted.
3.4.1.2 Bridges
Extrapolation: what worked → what (probably) will work
Under the Bayesian framework, the transformation from “what worked” to “what will
work” is realized through extrapolation. Since there is no distinction between sample and
population, it is not necessary to use “what works” to connect “what worked” and “what
will work”; as a result, a representative large sample (as defined in the frequentist frame-
work) is helpful, but not essential for Bayesian inference. Note that either effect or cost
is a random variable, i.e., a function from the sample space to (some subset of) the real
21In other words, the p-value indicates the adequacy of sample size, presuming that the null hypothesis is
false.
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numbers. The effect or cost data that are observed or predicted are some realizations of the
corresponding function. The connection between “what worked” and “what will work” rests
on the assumption that the underlying parameters in the function that generates observable
and unobservable data are drawn from the same distributions. Conditional on what we ob-
served at the site(s) of the evaluation (modeled as the likelihood) and what we believe/guess
about the parameters for a new site (modeled as the priors), we can make a statement
on the distributions of the underlying parameters (i.e., posterior distribution) and further
make predictions on unobserved data for the new site of interest (i.e., posterior predictive
distribution) (Geweke and Whiteman, 2006, p.6).
The Bayesian extrapolation acknowledges the particularities of different sites and does
not simply assume that they are identical. In fact, the main criterion for model selection is
to minimize the out-of-sample prediction error. Fitting the observed data well is necessary,
but not sufficient, since the real test of a model is how well it predicts. Bayesianism usually
utilizes training data or information criteria to test a model’s capacity to do out-of-sample
prediction. Training data refer to a subset of the dataset used to fit in models, and the
model that can best predict the rest of the dataset is usually chosen as the “proper” model.
Information criteria, such as Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) and Widely Applicable
Information Criterion (WAIC), are aimed at measuring the trade-off between the expected
out-of-sample fitting power and the model complexity, where the fitting power is modeled by
log predictive densities and the penalty term is the estimated effective number of parameters
(Gelman et al., 2013b, p.1001). In all, compared to frequentism that pays more attention
on within-sample fitness22, Bayesian’s ability to focus on out-of-sample prediction renders it
more suitable for decision-making.
The Bayesian hierarchical model, although not adopted in the demonstrative example
to model the likelihood due to the data limitation, is more appropriate than the random-
22For example, MLE chooses parameters to maximize the probability of observing the sample.
CHAPTER 3. ARTICLE TWO 81
effects model when each site has a specific estimator. Let’s set up a setting of a multi-
school district, where the schools share some similarities in the characteristics of district-
level leadership, teacher union and teacher contracts, while each school is unique in the
socioeconomic composition of students, teachers’ profiles, school-level leadership and intrinsic
school culture. In a hierarchical model, data are structured as J groups, each group having
Nj observations. If only site-level data are available, the number of groups will be N and
each group has 1 observation. In this way, one can distinguish parameters that capture the
site-specific characteristics from the (hyper)parameters that are common to all sites. Priors
on site-specific parameters show one’s prior belief on how parameters vary across sites, and
priors on group-level hyperparameters depict the commonality. Note that the hierarchical
model allows for great flexibility in modeling the dependence of observations within each
group. In the extreme, the hierarchical model can approach a completely pooled model
which considers that the true parameter of interest is the same across sites (as shown in the
demonstrative example), or turn to N different site-level models where the true parameter
is drawn from a separate distribution for each site. When consistency is regarded as one
criterion for estimation, the hyperparameters can be consistently estimated at its posterior
mode with certain priors (Lancaster, 2000, p.405).
Uncertainty
For Bayesian inference, uncertainty arises from incomplete information, rather than
sampling variability as in frequentism. Frequentist and Bayesian inferences are different in
their perception of the properties of data and parameters. As mentioned before, frequentism
assumes that the parameters are fixed, and the observed data are random. In contrast,
Bayesianism assumes that although the true parameters are fixed, there is uncertainty in
our beliefs about what the true parameters are. In addition, the data observed are fixed,
and inference is made conditional on the observed data (Casella, 1993, p.229). Therefore, in
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Bayesian inference, randomness does not come from the data, but from the prior information
that captures one’s beliefs about the true parameters before seeing the data. This belief is
combined with the likelihood to generate the posterior distribution. With the information
added from the data, in expectation the variance of the posterior is smaller than or equal to
the variance of the prior. The more information we have from the prior, the more confident we
are about the true parameters, and the smaller the uncertainty is. Note that the Bayesian
model doesn’t distinguish whether the data or the priors are “right” or “wrong”. Faulty
information will lead to a deviation from the true value, but the variance of the posterior
belief will get smaller in expectation too.
The interpretation of credible intervals under the Bayesian framework is also more
intuitive and reasonable compared to the confidence interval under the frequentist framework.
A 95% credible interval is the range between the 2.5th-percentile and 97.5th-percentile of the
posterior distribution, centered at the mode. It shows that based on our prior information
and the data observed, we are 95% confident that the true parameter is captured by this
interval. The same procedure applies to the posterior predictive distribution as well. The
95% credible interval of the posterior predictive distribution can provide information on
what (comparatively) the worst- and the best-case scenarios could be, as captured by the
lower bound and the upper bound respectively. In addition, different from the assumption
of normality for the sampling distribution under the frequentist framework, there is no
parametric assumption on the posterior distribution or the posterior predictive distribution.
3.4.2 Challenge 2: Incorporation of Information fromMultiple Sources
Another challenge of evidence-based practice is how to integrate available informa-
tion from multiple sources so that a well-reasoned solution is reached based on compre-
hensive synthesis. Sources of information include research findings, professional expertise,
and contextual knowledge of the site in which a program will be implemented that may
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influence program implementation and impact (McColskey and Lewis, 2009, p.1). While
classical meta-analysis conducted under the frequentist framework can synthesize the find-
ings of quantitative empirical studies, Bayesian inference can incorporate information from
multiple sources in a more flexible way by constructing subjective priors.
3.4.2.1 Barriers
Case studies on decision-making practice have illustrated that practitioners are usu-
ally concerned about the heterogeneity of research findings, especially on effectiveness (Fusarelli,
2008, p.181). For example, a program may demonstrate positive, large effects in some sites,
while having negative effects in some other sites (e.g., New Chance as evaluated in Quint
et al. (1997); JOBSTART as evaluated in Cave et al., 1993). Factors that lead to inconsis-
tent research findings for one program may include different target populations, differences
in the level of resources or in resource allocation, varying levels of fidelity of implementation,
or unique contextual characteristics. Under the frequentist framework, each evaluation of a
specific program is considered a different trial; and the null hypothesis testing is to check
whether “nothing is going on” in each separate trial, as measured by whether the result could
be found by “chance” (van de Schoot et al., 2014, p.843). Given that information provided
by different studies is independent of each other, practitioners often tend to cite the evidence
that supports their own argument (Asen et al., 2013, p.46).
One of the statistical tools used to systematically synthesize existing knowledge in
the literature is meta-analysis. Although different in assumptions, procedures and statisti-
cal models, meta-analysis generally refers to the techniques that “examine the distribution
of the effect sizes and the relationship between effect size magnitude and variation in the
study design and samples” (Pigott, 2009, p.154). In terms of the type of evidence to summa-
rize, meta-analysis only applies to quantitative empirical studies (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001,
p.2). Summary statistics of these quantitative studies are the main source of information to
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integrate (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001, p.2), while qualitative information on the design qual-
ity of these studies, such as whether the evaluation is conducted by the developer of the
program, can also be incorporated into the analysis model by quantifying the information
into a quality scale (Valentine, 2009, p.137). The exclusion of qualitative studies such as
case studies, implementation reports and court testimonies raises the question of whether
meta-analysis can provide a comprehensive synthesis framework on what works as well as
why, when and how it works (Pigott, 2009, p.159). Despite some efforts to extend the scope
of quantitative impact evaluation to incorporate more contextual and site-specific variables
using mixed methods (e.g., Chatterji, 2005), integrating evidence from different sources in
different formats remains a significant challenge for research synthesis (Pigott, 2009, p.160).
In addition to evidence in various forms, another source of information that should
be taken into account is the subjective judgments of the decision maker23, as demonstrated
in Section 3.3.3.3. While some evaluation researchers tend to strive for pure objectivity,
Edwards and Newman, two renowned researchers on decision theory, pointed out that “judg-
ments are inevitably a part of any evaluation” and “judgments of magnitude are best when
made numerically” (1982, p.8). The value of subjective judgments lies in at least two as-
pects. First, professional expertise gained from experience may help practitioners to make
a judgment on what is likely to work based on their understanding of the context, such as
the SES composition of the students, the achievement level of the students, and teachers’
profiles (Biesta, 2007, p.5; Fusarelli, 2008, p.185). Second, in some cases, subjective judg-
ments can provide some effectiveness information on concepts that can not be defined or be
measured (Grabisch, 2009, p.724) or on programs that do not exist (Edwards and Newman,
1982, p.10). Despite the practical need to incorporate subjective judgments, the frequentist
framework can not accommodate this.
23Again for simplicity, we assume that the decision maker represents the preference of all stakeholders,
such as practitioners, teachers, parents, taxpayers and educational experts.
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3.4.2.2 Bridges
As explained in Section 3.2.3, the Bayesian framework provides a flexible mechanism
to incorporate quantitative findings, qualitative information and subjective judgments into
the model through prior distributions. Incorporating information through priors is helpful
to reduce the uncertainty of the estimates, especially when the sample size is small. Kaplan
and Park (2013) showed the different effects of non-information priors and informative priors
on the posterior summary statistics using a multivariate normal likelihood as an example.
The results are consistent with intuition: the smaller the sample size, the less information
one can gain from the data, and the more influential the prior will be with respect to the
posterior (van de Schoot et al., 2014, p.856).
3.4.3 Challenge 3: Incorporation of Multiple Consequences into
One Framework
The third challenge for using empirical evidence to guide decision-making might lie
in the difficulty of addressing multiple consequences24. Most educational interventions are
designed to have multiple objectives; and each outcome of interest is usually narrowly defined
and measured in evaluation research to the degree that it is recognized or measured at all
(Edwards and Newman, 1982, p.10). It is quite rare that one solution can optimize all
of these outcomes of interest. As a consequence, education decisions in practice involve
the conflicts of interests and preferences, which require the decision maker to generate a
compromise among the stakeholders through incorporating multiple consequences into one
framework (Teghem, 2009, p.200). As stated in Section 3.2.4, in Bayesian decision theory,
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory is utilized to identify the utility function, through which all
24In the literature of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory, “outcome” is more frequently used than “consequence”.
Again I use “outcome” and “consequence” exchangeably.
CHAPTER 3. ARTICLE TWO 86
of the outcomes of interests can be projected into a single scale of utility. Compared to
the idea of transforming multiple outcomes into pecuniary values as used in cost-benefit
analysis, the adoption of utility can generate a common value of desirability that is user-
and audience-specific; in addition, it can capture the value of the outcomes that can not be
easily measured or monetized.
3.4.3.1 Barriers
Schools are usually considered loosely knit organizations that involve multiple and
conflicting goals and objectives (Fusarelli, 2008, pp.184-185). For example, a reading pro-
gram is aimed not only at increasing students’ knowledge and skills in reading, but also
other goals such as fostering students’ non-cognitive skills and promoting common values of
the society (Orland, 2009, p.119). The multiplicity of objectives leads to the complication
of balancing the trade-off between conflicting interests in many ways. First, it is important
but challenging to identify a set of outcomes that are “relevant, inclusive, non-overlapping,
and operational” (Bell et al., 1978, p.3). The set of outcomes may not be unique; therefore
the identification is supposed to be pertinent to the question of interest (Bell et al., 1978,
pp.3-4). Researchers would be able to increase the value of educational research by providing
a comprehensive assessment of all outcomes of interest (Weimer, 2009, p.96). Second, some
intangible outcomes related to psychological aspects may not easily be measured; as a result,
evaluation research tends to focus on outcomes that can be captured by well-validated instru-
ments. Even when outcomes are measurable, they are usually evaluated using different scales
with incommensurable units (Bell et al., 1978, p.3). In recent years, the use of standardized
mean difference effect sizes is widely adopted, with the purpose of transferring all incom-
mensurable units into metric free standard deviation units (Lipsey et al., 2012, p.8). Even
so, comparability is still compromised due to distributional issues, since the interpretation
of effect sizes rests heavily on the variation of the populations from which the samples are
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drawn25 (Lipsey et al., 2012, p.9). In all, the complexity resulting from multiple outcomes
obstructs practitioners from using the research evidence to guide their decision-making in a
direct way (Orland, 2009, p.119).
In the field of cost analysis26, cost-benefit and cost-utility studies respond to the call
for a framework that incorporates multiple outcomes by transforming them into monetary
value and utility respectively (Levin, 1983, pp.21-26). In educational research, cost-benefit
analysis usually relies on experimental, quasi-experimental or correlational evaluation studies
to estimate the impact of an intervention on outcomes that are readily assigned a dollar value,
such as individual earnings (Levin and McEwan, 2001, p.159). When these evaluation studies
fail to track the participants over their lifetimes or the outcomes measured are not direct
pecuniary values, benefits are often projected based on some additional assumptions or other
studies that link the measured outcomes (e.g., reduction in crime rate) with their monetary
values (e.g., reduction in the expenditure of the justice system) (Levin and McEwan, 2001,
p.163). The projection is only feasible under the conditions that the outcomes of interest
are well measured, and the measured outcomes can be priced out (French, 1996, p.43; Levin,
1983, pp.25-26). Since not all of the outcomes of interest can be measured or monetized in
reality, cost-benefit studies usually claim that the benefit reported is underestimated (e.g.,
Levin et al., 2006, p.64; Belfield et al., 2006, p.182). The unmeasurable downward bias
25Lipsey et al. (2012) noted that effect sizes estimated from samples of narrower populations will be larger
than those based on broader populations, even when the actual magnitudes of the intervention effects on the
same measure are identical (p.9).
26Cost analysis, a group of studies that attach cost information to impact evaluations, is aimed at providing
more guidance to decision makers for resource allocation in education ((Levin and Belfield, 2015, p.401)).
Levin (1983) categorized cost-related studies into four types based on their analytical approaches: cost-
effectiveness, cost-benefit, cost-utility and cost-feasibility (pp. 17–31). Excluding cost-feasibility analysis
that evaluates whether the cost of any alternative exceeds the budget (Levin, 1983, p.30), the other three
types of cost analysis can be used to help decision makers choose among several alternatives so that the best
alternative can produce a given result in the least costly way. However, cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit and
cost-utility analysis are different in terms of the representation of the outcomes of interest. Cost-effectiveness
analysis focuses on the effect of achieving a particular objective shared by these alternatives (Levin, 1983,
pp.17-18). Cost-benefit and cost-utility analysis represents the outcomes using monetary values and utility
respectively.
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embedded in the benefit estimation may distort the optimal choice when comparing several
alternatives.
One difficulty of integrating multiple outcomes is how to model the interdependencies
among them. In both cost-benefit and cost-utility analysis, cost as a measure of what one
loses is considered orthogonal to other outcomes that measure what one gains, given that
the correlation between loss and gains is not captured by the cost-benefit or the cost-utility
ratio. In addition, in cost-benefit analysis, the outcomes representing gains are modeled as
conditionally independent of each other. In other words, a solid cost-benefit analysis would
rest on a good estimation of the impact of each outcome conditional on other outcomes in
the model. However, in evaluation studies (including experimental and quasi-experimental
designs, either parametric or non-parametric), the effectiveness of an intervention on differ-
ent outcomes is usually estimated separately, since the outcomes of interest, as dependent
variables, are plugged into the estimation model one at a time. Therefore the reported im-
pact on each outcome is marginal effectiveness, rather than conditional effectiveness. When
marginal effectiveness is used, the total benefit could be overestimated due to the double
counting of the joint benefits induced by the correlations of multiple outcomes. The de-
pendency problem is also encountered in meta-analysis when there are multiple measures.
Scammacca et al. (2014) recommended using multi-level modeling or the Structural Equa-
tion Modeling (SEM) approach to incorporate the correlations between the outcomes if the
correlations are known; when the correlations are unknown, the authors suggested conduct-
ing sensitivity analyses to determine a possible range of correlations between the measures
(p.351). In cost-utility analysis, one way to model the dependency of two outcomes (e.g.,
reading weights and mathematics weights) is to use a multi-dimensional mapping. Suppose
a principal is presented with a diagram that maps the weight value for each combination
of the possible weights of the two outcomes. For example, the combined weight value is 3
out of 10 if the reading weight is 1 out of 10 and the mathematical weight is 1 out of 10;
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and the combined weight is 5 if the reading weight is 2 and the mathematical weight is 1.
Then the principal is asked to choose the combination of reading weight and mathematical
weight that makes most sense to her, and the corresponding combined weight will be used
(Levin, 1975, p.113). The multi-dimensional map is intuitive to explain to principals, but
intensive piloting is needed to identify a reasonable combined weight for each combination
of the possible weights of two outcomes. In all, while the demonstrative example takes the
strong assumption of additive independence, more work is needed in the future to explore
how to relax the assumption of independence for the utility function.
3.4.3.2 Bridges
As explained in Section 3.2.4 and demonstrated in Section 3.3.4, in Bayesian decision
theory, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory is introduced to elicit the subjective preference infor-
mation on the desirability of the decision maker. Compared to transforming all outcomes
into monetary values, the adoption of the concept of utility can easily incorporate both
unmeasurable outcomes and measurable outcomes that can not easily be priced out. The
estimation of utility involves multiple types of data, including the objective measurement of
effectiveness, subjective judgment of effectiveness on unmeasurable outcomes, and subjective
preference information on how much each outcome is valued by the decision maker (Levin,
1983, p.29). Built on Functional Central Limit Theorem, it is also possible to extend the
single utility function to a distribution of functions and then integrate them under different
assumptions in order to capture the uncertainty of the utility function form.
3.5 Conclusion
Probably the first study to demonstrate the application of Bayesian decision theory
in the field of educational resource allocation since 1980s, this article is only an exploratory
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attempt to accommodate the proliferation of evaluation studies and the new progress made
in Bayesian computation in recent years. More research is needed in at least three aspects.
First, it is necessary to explore how to elicit the required information from educational de-
cision makers, including the decision makers’ prior beliefs and their utility functions. The
process requires the efforts from both the researchers and the practitioners. On one hand,
the researchers may strive for parameters with more practical implications and models with
more intuitive interpretations so that they can communicate the statistical models to the
practitioners in layman’s terms. Both the elicitation of priors and the identification of utility
functions involve some arbitrary assumptions imposed by the researchers. These assump-
tions should be clearly documented in detail and researchers should have solid training.
On the other hand, the practitioners may need to enhance their expertise in data-driven
decision-making. Second, it is very likely that multiple stakeholders are involved in the
decision-making process. Therefore it is important to pilot on how to elicit individual and/or
group priors and utility functions, especially documenting on the process that a group of
stakeholders make compromise and reach a group prior and a group utility function. Third,
provided that prediction is heavily involved in decision-making, more exploration is needed
in model checking, model comparison and model extension with the purpose of increasing
the out-of-sample prediction power. Note that in each aspect of prior construction, utility
function and model construction, there is a trade-off between two dimensions: comprehen-
siveness or fitness, and time and expertise constraints. Therefore, it is also important to
check how the conclusion responds to the change of priors, models, and utility functions.
With more and more empirical studies available in the future, it might be possible to find
a balance point between the two dimensions in order to boost the application of Bayesian
decision theory in real educational decision-making practice.
In summary, Bayesian decision theory is a mechanism to process research evidence
as well as subjective judgments in a decision-making context. It may help bridge the gap
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between research and practice by localizing the evidence and making it more context- and
user-dependent in three ways. First, the extrapolation of effect and cost information indi-
cates what is likely to occur at the specific site of interest. Second, by constructing subjective
priors, the decision maker can decide what prior information is taken into account for her
decision-making, and how much each kind of information contributes to the decision-making
process. Third, the subjective utility function enables the decision maker to illustrate how
much she values each consequence. Since Bayesian decision theory is aimed at generating a
solution that works best for a specific decision maker in a specific context, its power lies in
guiding the decision maker to “get her head straightened out”, rather than persuading other
people from an objective perspective. The localization of research evidence is expected to for-
malize the process of communication and interaction between researchers and practitioners,
pushing the two worlds into greater alignment.
Chapter 4
Article Three
Research Findings and Decision-making in Educational Resource Allocation:
Lessons Learned on an Experimental Research Design
4.1 Introduction
Principals and educational practitioners are often required to respond to educational chal-
lenges in their schools by choosing new strategies or programs (Levin and McEwan, 2001).
In order to promote well-informed decisions in educational resource allocation, in the last
fifteen years the legislative and executive branches of the federal government have created
institutions and incentives to enhance the use of research evidence in educational reforms
(Berlin, 2016, p.1). Such efforts include building research infrastructure by establishing the
Institute of Education Sciences in 2002 and the Evidence-Based Policymaking Commission
in 2016 (Berlin, 2016, p.1), investing in research, replication and scale-up of programs that
have shown promising positive impacts through rigorous evaluations (Cheung and Slavin,
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2016, p.1), and supporting local decision makers to develop evidence-based whole-school in-
terventions in low-performing schools as mandated in Every Student Succeeds Act (Congress,
2015). To achieve the policy goal of increasing the adoption of effective or cost-effective pro-
grams supported by rigorous evaluations, it is important to understand how decision makers
respond to the evidence that is provided.
There are mainly three types of evidence provided to practitioners: 1) student achieve-
ment data of their own schools; 2) value-added measures of teacher performance at their own
schools; and 3) effectiveness and cost information of educational interventions obtained from
formal evaluations. Previous research indicates that information pertaining to what hap-
pened at their own schools, including the student achievement data and the value-added
measures, tend to affect principals’ decisions on curriculum and instruction (Lai and Schild-
kamp, 2013, p.9) or their perceptions on teachers’ performance (Rockoff et al., 2012). The
effect of evaluation findings on guiding and informing decision-making has been investigated
using large-scale surveys, literature reviews, interviews and on-site observations, but the
conclusions remain mixed depending on the context of the studies and the methodology
used. For example, Penuel et al. (2016) designed a survey instrument to examine educa-
tional leaders’ attitudes toward research and their efforts to use research. Based on 733
responses collected from 45 states and 485 different school districts, the study finds that the
vast majority of respondents involved in designing professional development for teachers and
directing resources to programs reported that “research was used frequently or all of the time
to make decisions in that activity” (Penuel et al., 2016, p.2). Drawing on a comprehensive
literature review, Coburn et al. (2009) argue that district central offices do use research evi-
dence in the decision-making process; however, both the search and the interpretation of the
results are mediated by the pre-existing beliefs and knowledge of the users and influenced
by the organizational culture. Asen et al. (2013) conducted an in-depth case study on the
process by which decision makers acquire and reconstruct research evidence. They find that
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research does not guide decision-making in a linear way but carries different meanings in
different scenarios.
While these studies enhance our understanding on how research is used in the edu-
cational decision-making process, there have been no quantitative studies that identify the
causal effect of research findings on decision-making. In practice research findings can be
used conceptually to affect people’s understanding of the decision problem with no action
taken or symbolically as a mere persuasion tool to justify a decision already made (King and
Pechman, 1984; Penuel et al., 2016, p.2). The causal relationship is important in the way
that it represents the instrumental use of evidence, i.e. the direct impact of research findings
on guiding and shaping a decision (Johnson et al., 2009, p.378). Assuming that decision
makers have a question in mind and then use relevant research to make a decision, instru-
mental use is the type of research use that No Child Left Behind and other current policies
are trying to promote (Tseng, 2012). Unfortunately, self-reported surveys on attitudes and
behaviors can only describe the current situation of research use, but are not adequate to
identify the causal relationship. In theory qualitative studies can be used to explore causality
(Maxwell, 2004), but conclusions are heavily restricted to the specific context of study and
therefore lacking of generalizability to other contexts.
To fill in the gap in quantifying the causal effect of research findings on decision-
making, this article proposes a preliminary research design of a randomized control trial that
aims to detect whether principals and practitioners update their beliefs on the effectiveness
and cost of educational programs in the light of research evidence. Based on a pilot testing
that involves 108 educational practitioners, this article focuses on discussing the plausibility
of using an experiment to answer the question of interest, especially on the content validity
of the instrument and the analysis strategy. In addition, in order to get a better picture of
the “natural” decision-making process and identify factors that affect decision-making but
are not considered in the experiment, a pilot qualitative study was conducted among 83
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practitioners, in which they were guided to work on self-defined decision problems in groups.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the Bayesian learning model as the
theoretical framework. Section 4.3 provides details of the experimental design and reports
the preliminary results of the pilot testing. Section 4.4 describes the pilot qualitative study.
Section 4.5 explores several potential limitations that are revealed by the pilot testing and
explains how the results of the pilot qualitative study contribute to identifying the limitations
of the experiment. Section 4.6 summarizes the lessons learned on the experimental research
design.
4.2 Bayesian Learning Theory
The study is built upon Bayesian learning theory, a framework of human cognition that
uses probabilistic distributions to model the update of beliefs in the light of information
with uncertainty (Jacobs and Kruschke, 2011; Tenenbaum et al., 2006). Bayesian learning
theory assumes that people form their posterior beliefs by combining the new information
with their prior beliefs that are derived from previous experience and knowledge (Jacobs and
Kruschke, 2011, p.9). Suppose one’s prior belief follows the distribution of f0(θ0) and the
posterior belief has the distribution of f1(θ1), where θ0 and θ1 are vectors of parameters in
the probability density functions respectively. Based on the Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief
f1(θ1) is proportional to the product of the prior belief f0(θ0) and the information revealed
I(φ). Taking into account multiple factors that affect the formation of prior belief and the
inference process of information, the behavioral model of the Bayesian learning theory is
formalized as follows (revised based on Rheinberger and Hammitt, 2015, pp.6-8).
f1(θ1) ∼ f0(θ0|X)I(φ|λ,Z) (4.1)
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where X is a vector of factors that influence the prior belief, such as personal characteristics
(e.g., age, gender and education) and individual and collective working knowledge (Honig and
Coburn, 2008, p.594); λ represents a vector of factors related to the information provided,
such as the type, format, access, credibility and precision of the information; and Z is a vector
of behavioral factors, such as exposure, precautionary effort and features of the research use
culture in the organization.
An ideal research design would collect information on all the parameters of the theo-
retical framework, as indicated in Formula 4.1. However, given the length constraint of the
instrument used for data collection, in practice we often can not gather sufficient data on
all the factors involved (Rheinberger and Hammitt, 2015, p.9). Among all the information
characteristics λ and the behavioral factors Z in the information function I(φ|λ,Z), this
study only focuses on the type of information (i.e., uncertainty information and localized
estimates) and the precision of it. The format to present the information and the credibility
of the information are controlled through the instrumental design (explained in 4.3.2), and
the behavioral factors Z are controlled through the experimental design (explained in 4.3.3).
Information is delivered as a package that has a certain information type and a certain
precision level; as a result, the information function I(φ|λ,Z) is simplified to a categorical
variable that contains all combinations of information types and precision levels, notated as
T 1.
1In this study, T is a vector of 6 elements, as explained in 4.3.3
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4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Research Question
The experiment focuses on testing the effect of two types of evidence on change of beliefs:
1) a range of possible values that capture uncertainty and 2) localized estimates that apply
to the specific school facing a decision problem. In addition, the same type of information
with different precision levels are presented to principals and practitioners in order to test
whether the information precision has an impact on the change of beliefs. These two types
of evidence are selected for two reasons. First, previous research has shown that research
findings presented traditionally, i.e., point estimates obtained from an evaluation setting
accompanied by significance levels or 95% confidence intervals, have limited applicability in
school practice (Biesta, 2007, pp.1-2; Slavin, 2002, p.17). Used to capture sampling variabil-
ity if a program is replicated for infinite times in an imaginary situation, both significant
levels and confidence intervals lack practical implications and can be easily misinterpreted
(Coburn et al., 2009, p.4). In addition, practitioners tend to have doubts on the general-
izability of evaluation findings to their own schools. For example, practitioners from three
school districts in Wisconsin were more willing to cite evaluations conducted in the same
state than those evaluated in California (Asen et al., 2013, p.58).
Second, methodologies in the field of program evaluations have been improved re-
cently to produce 1) uncertainty information that has more practical implications, and 2)
estimates that apply to the specific context of a school. For example, Chapter 2 of this
dissertation proposes a Bayesian hierarchical model to generate a distribution of estimates
for program effect or cost, which provides information not only on the best guess but also
on the uncertainty of the best guess. This uncertainty information represents the compar-
atively worst-case and best-case scenarios of effect or cost if a program is replicated once,
which directly addresses decision makers’ concerns as compared to sampling variability. In
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terms of generalizability, one strand of the methodological improvement is to re-weight a
point estimate of a non-randomly selected sample to match a population of interest based
on student and school characteristics using propensity score matching (Stuart et al., 2011;
Tipton, 2013; Tipton, 2014). Another strand, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this disserta-
tion, is to extrapolate the program effect or cost obtained from the evaluation setting to a
decision-making context under the Bayesian framework.
Although the uncertainty information and the localized estimates are supposed to be
more intuitive and informative for decision makers, whether these two pieces of information
affect educational practitioners’ perceptions on the expected effect and expected cost of a
program is still in question. The specific research questions are stated as follows.
1. Does the availability of uncertainty information (i.e., a range of possible values of an
estimator) have an impact on the prior-posterior belief change?
2. Does the precision of the uncertainty information have an impact on the prior-posterior
belief change?
3. Does the availability of localized evidence have an impact on the prior-posterior belief
change?
4. Does the precision of the localized evidence have an impact on the prior-posterior belief
change?
4.3.2 Instrumental Design and Validation
The basic idea of the experiment is to 1) elicit the respondents’ prior beliefs on the
relative effectiveness and relative cost of two educational programs, 2) deliver different types
of information to each of the randomly selected groups, and 3) elicit their posterior be-
liefs. These three procedures are implemented through an electronic survey. In October and
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November 2015, the survey went through 8 rounds of validation interviews (n = 14) in order
to improve the comprehensibility of the questions and the content validity of the measure
(Chatterji, 2003, p.58). These interviewees include principals and assistant principals, re-
searchers of educational policies and leadership, professors and PhD students in Educational
Leadership and Economics of Education, and staff members of a principal preparation pro-
gram. Their responses were incorporated in the revisions. The survey sent out for the pilot
testing is presented as follows.
4.3.2.1 Settings
In the survey, respondents are led into a scenario in which as a principal at Neverland
Primary School, they need to make a choice between two hypothetical reading programs,
one cooperative learning program Reading Now and one computer-assisted program Literacy
Ladders. The objective of the decision is to increase the percentage of third graders who
reach state/school proficiency standards in reading. Respondents are informed that both
programs are feasible to be implemented at Neverland Primary School; the community and
the parents support either of them; and the main concern in this scenario is efficiency. The
purpose of this setup is to guide the respondents to focus on program effectiveness and cost
while acknowledging that decision makers may also need to take into account other factors
in the real decision-making context.
The two programs are described in both words and tables. First, the implementation
plan of each program is introduced briefly as follows.
Reading Now provides teachers with extensive professional training to improve
their pedagogical knowledge, such as how to organize students to cooperate in
small groups. Five teachers in Grade 3 participate in a weekly training session in
the previous Spring semester as professional development, each session lasting two
hours. Then they implement these specific instructional methods to teach reading
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in groups of twenty students for thirty minutes per day during the academic year.
Literacy Ladders is a computer-based program. Students are in groups of twenty
and use adaptive software to practice their reading skills thirty minutes per day
during the academic year. Groups should be supervised by teachers to check
students’ progress and answer questions. In August, five teachers in Grade 3
participate in a 4-hour training session provided by the developer of the program.
The training fee is covered by the program license fee.
After the program description, I provide a table that compares the key resources required
to implement the two programs for 100 students, including program license fee, teachers’
compensation and computers.
The two options, Reading Now and Literacy Ladders, are designed to be hypothetical
due to two reasons. First, assuming that the effect of research evidence on belief change
is negatively correlated with the amount of firsthand experience one has with a program, a
setup of hypothetical programs may allow us to obtain the optimistic estimate of the effect.
In other words, if a significant impact of evidence on practitioners’ belief change can not be
found for hypothetical programs, it would be even harder to expect that such impact exists
with real programs for which practitioners are more likely to rely on their previous expe-
rience working with similar programs or recommendations from trusted colleagues to make
the decision. Second, the respondents are informed that the options are hypothetical, from
which they can infer that the evidence provided is fabricated. Compared to providing manip-
ulated information for existing programs, it can avoid misleading the respondents’ judgment
when they encounter these programs in real life. In addition, compared to providing real
evidence for existing programs, it can eliminate the potential confounding effect induced
by the credibility of the evidence provided or the access to acquire research. However, the
setting of hypothetical programs can also lead to superficiality in the response and lack of
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serious consideration.
4.3.2.2 Elicitation of the Prior Belief
The first step is to elicit the distributions of a respondent’s prior beliefs on the rel-
ative effectiveness and the relative cost of these two programs only based on their previous
experience and program descriptions. It is challenging to elicit one’s belief as a distribution
since people usually don’t have the ability to express uncertainty in statistical language2.
The interviewees who participated in the instrumental validation were presented with three
sets of questions, among which they reported two sets could not be understood. First, they
did not have a sense on the magnitude of the relative effectiveness or the relative cost at
this point, and therefore could not report specific numbers on the best guess, the best-case
scenario and the worst-case scenario of the relative effectiveness or the relative cost. Second,
they could not understand how to distribute 100 scores across several ranges of possible val-
ues to represent the possibility that each range of possible values would occur. As a result,
the last set of questions is used, in which respondents are only asked to report the ranking
of the two programs in terms of effectiveness and cost, and how confident they are about the
statement. Take program effectiveness as an example. Respondents are first asked whether
they have an opinion on which program will be more effective in increasing the percentage
of students who reach reading proficiency if implemented at Neverland Primary School. If
their answer is yes, they are asked to rate their agreement with the statement that “I expect
that Reading Now (the cooperative learning program) will be more effective than Literacy
2In the literature, the distribution of beliefs is elicited by directly asking people the probabilities or asking
the respondents to allocate beans or stones into a number of bins (Delavande et al., 2011, pp. 152-153).
For example, Dominitz and Manski (1997) ask the respondents to report the percent chance that their
income will be less than a number of thresholds. When eliciting parents’ belief on their children’s academic
achievement, Dizon-Ross (2014) asked the parents to distribute tokens across bins representing different
achievement ranges (p. 16). Note that compared to the outcomes of interest in these examples (i.e., income
and academic achievement), the concepts of relative effectiveness and relative cost of two programs elicited
in this survey are very abstract. .
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Ladders (the computer-assisted program)” on a 4-category Likert scale3. In addition, they
are asked to rate their confidence about their agreement statement on a 3-category Likert
scale4. The same process is repeated to elicit the prior belief on the relative cost of the two
programs. The interviewees reported that the description table on the key resources was
helpful for them to form their belief on the relative cost.
4.3.2.3 Evidence provided
The main challenge in presenting evidence on program effectiveness lies in selecting an
outcome measure that can be understood by the respondents. Although Penuel et al. (2016)
show that the majority of school leaders can interpret the meaning of effect size correctly in
the context of a randomized study (p.38), interviewees of the instrumental validation for this
study reported that they could not process effect size intuitively even with an explanation
on how to calculate effect size, nor could they have a judgment on whether an effect size is
substantially large or small. As a result, the evidence on relative effectiveness is presented
as the percentage points difference in students who reach proficiency. The effectiveness
evidence provided to the respondents fits the pattern that cooperative learning programs are
more effective than the computer-assisted programs in raising reading achievement for third
graders, as summarized in Slavin et al. (2009). Since there is no literature on the relationship
between effect size and the percentage points difference in students who reach proficiency,
the numbers presented are all fabricated. The interviewees reported that the numbers were
not unreasonable.
The cost evidence provided to the respondents was estimated based on the descrip-
tions of the resources required to implement the two programs. For each program, I first
identified the quantities of all the ingredients and then priced them out using national prices.
3The 4-category Likert scale is “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “agree” and “Strongly Agree”.
4The 3-category Likert scale is “Not very confident (between 1 and 4 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is “I am
sure”), “Fairly confident (between 5 and 7 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is “I am sure”)” and “Very confident
(between 8 and 10 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is “I am sure”)”.
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The interviewees also reported that the numbers presented were reasonable.
4.3.2.4 Elicitation of the Posterior Belief
To elicit the posterior belief on effectiveness, respondents are first asked to identify
their best guess on the percentage points change in students who reach proficiency if the
Grade 3 students at Neverland Primary School participate in Reading Now compared to
Literacy Ladders. Then they are asked to rate their confidence level about the best guess on
a 3-category Likert scale5. The same process is repeated to elicit the posterior belief on the
cost difference per participant between Reading Now and Literacy Ladders.
4.3.2.5 Decisions and Reasons
After the elicitation of the prior beliefs, respondents are asked whether they have an
opinion on which program to choose at this point. If their answer is yes, they are further
asked to report their choice, their confidence level on the choice and their reasons to choose
a specific program. If their answer is no, the survey asks for the additional information that
they need to make the decision. These questions are repeated after the elicitation of the
posterior beliefs.
4.3.3 Treatments and Randomization
To clarify, I label the information updating process on the relative effectiveness of
the two programs as Trial 1, and the same process on the relative cost of the two programs
as Trial 2. Trial 1 is used to test whether the availability and the precision of uncertainty
information has an impact on the prior-posterior belief change, while Trial 2 is used to
test whether the availability and the precision of localized estimates has an impact on the
prior-posterior belief change.
Within each trial, respondents were randomly assigned into one of the three groups:
5The 3-category Likert scale is “Not very confident (between 1 and 4 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is ’I am
sure’), “Fairly confident (between 5 and 7 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is ’I am sure’)” and “Very confident
(between 8 and 10 on a scale of 1-10 where 10 is ’I am sure’)”.
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the Control Group, Treatment Group 1, and Treatment Group 2. Given that there are two
rounds of randomization, a certain respondent does not need to be assigned into the same
group in both trials. For example, one can serve as a Control in Trial 1 while receiving
Treatment 1 in Trial 2.
Information delivered to the respondents for each group in each trial is specified in
Table 4.1. In Trial 1, both Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 2 receive uncertainty
information while the control group does not; and the uncertainty information received
by Treatment Group 2 is more precise than that received by Treatment Group 1. The
information received by the control group is as follows.
Your research analyst provides you evidence on the effectiveness of Reading Now
compared to Literacy Ladders. A recent evaluation study found that in the
schools similar to your school Neverland Primary School, the percentage of stu-
dents who reached proficiency on a reading test was estimated to be 5 percent-
age points higher on average if they participate in Reading Now, compared to
what they would have scored if they participated in Literacy Ladders. Note that
each school is different in its student and teacher population and ability to gain
success out of a new program, so there is some uncertainty around that estimate:
while 5 percentage points is the best guess, it could be lower or higher than this
number.
Information received by Treatment Group 1 is only different in the last sentence, “while 5
percentage points is the best guess, it could be as low as 0 percentage points, and as high as
10 percentage points”. The range presented to Treatment Group 2 is “as low as 3 percentage
points and as high as 7 percentage points”.
In Trial 2, both Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 2 are provided with lo-
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calized estimates while the control group is not; and the localized estimates received by
Treatment Group 2 are more precise than those received by Treatment Group 1. All respon-
dents are informed of the following.
In the schools where the programs were evaluated, Reading Now was $50 more
expensive per participant than Literacy Ladders (including license fee, personal
and equipment costs), and it could be as high as $70 more due to such things like
teacher experience levels and student characteristics. However, students in the
evaluation schools are quite different from the students at your school Neverland
Primary School in demographic characteristics. For example, 20% of students in
the evaluation schools are ESL (English as a Second Language) students while
the number is 30% at Neverland Primary School. You also know that a program
tends to be more costly when implemented for a student body with more ESL
students.
The control group does not have any extra information, while the treatment groups are told
that your analyst runs a model and estimates the cost difference that would apply to your
school given the percentage of ESL students there. Treatment Group 1 is informed that the
best guess on how much more Reading Now costs than Literacy Ladders is $65 at Neverland
Primary School, and the cost difference could be as low as $40 and as high as $90. The three
numbers provided to Treatment Group 2 are $65, $55 and $75 respectively, the same best
guess as Treatment Group 1 but a narrower credible interval.
As illustrated in Table 4.2, to test whether the availability of uncertainty informa-
tion or localized estimates has an impact on the prior-posterior belief change, respondents
assigned to Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 2 are grouped together and com-
pared with the control group in each trial. Then Treatment Group 2 is compared with
Treatment Group 1 to test whether more precise information leads to significantly different
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Table 4.1: Experimental Design
Trial Setting Information Delivered
Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Trial 1 Relativeeffectiveness
Point estimate of the
expectation









Point estimate of the
expectation and the
credible interval at

















prior-posterior belief change on average when the same type of information is imposed. Since
respondents were randomly assigned into one of the groups, all the observable and unob-
servable characteristics that affect the updating process of beliefs should be distributionally
identical across the three groups (Gerber and Green, 2012), including all the factors that
influence the prior belief X, all the behavioral factors Z and all the other information char-
acteristics included in λ except for the type and the precision level of information. Therefore
since the control group and the combined treatment group are only different in whether a
type of information is available, the difference in the average prior-posterior belief change
between these two groups is attributed to the availability of the type of information. Simi-
larly, Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group 2 are only different in the precision level of
the information received, so the difference in outcomes between these two groups is caused
by the precision of information.
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Table 4.2: Analysis Strategy
Research Question Data Groups to Compare
1. The availability of
uncertainty
information
Trial 1 Control vs. (Treatment 1 + Treatment 2)
2. The precision of
uncertainty
information
Trial 1 Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2
3. The availability of
localized estimates
Trial 2 Control vs. (Treatment 1 + Treatment 2)
4. The precision of
localized estimates
Trial 2 Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2
Table 4.3: Completion Rate at Each Stage of the Survey
No. of respondents who... Completion rate
Clicked the survey 139 NA
Consented to participate 128 1
Reached the beginning of Trial 1 108 0.844
Completed Trial 1 108 0.844
Reached the Beginning of Trial 2 101 0.789
Completed Trial 2 99 0.773
4.3.4 Data Collection
The target population for the pilot testing is 816 current students and alumni of a
principal preparation program in a graduate school of education. The link to the electronic
survey was sent to them by email in December 2015. As shown in Table 4.3, 128 respondents
consented to participate in the study, among whom 84.4% completed Trial 1 and 77.3%
completed Trial 2. The response rate out of the number of people who were reached is
low probably because the survey was sent out between Christmas and New Year, and some
alumni fail to update their registered emails. 22.7% of the respondents who consented to
participant in the study were principals or equivalent when filling out the survey, 28.1%
were assistant principals or equivalent, 24.2% were teacher leaders and 11.7% were teachers.
The composition of the respondents indicates that about 80% of them are very likely to
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Table 4.4: Comparison of Background Characteristics between the Sample and the Popula-
tion: Gender and Race




Black or African American 0.240 0.203
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 0.120 0.070
Asian 0.150 0.109
Note. The proportions of male and female may not sum up to 1 due to missing values. The
proportions of racial categories may not sum up to 1 due to missing values or additional
categories that are not reported.
have experience in school-level decision-making as principals, assistant principals or teacher
leaders. Table 4.4 shows that the consented sample has similar gender distribution as the
population. However, 58.6% of the consented sample were white as compared to 49% in the
sampled population, indicating that the minorities, including Black or African American,
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin, and Asian, were less likely to consent to participate in the
study than the white. In addition, the unobservable characteristics of the contented sample
might be different from those of the population, given the low response rate. To increase the
response rate in the next wave of data collection, it is suggested that incentives be provided
to potential respondents when distributing the survey, since prepay incentives seem to be
more cost-effective than postpayment in raising the response rate (Gelman et al., 2003, p.11).
Note that the focus of this article is on identifying the limitations of the experimental design
rather than reporting the results of the pilot testing, therefore the balance check of the
background characteristics and the prior belief measures are reported in Appendix H, and
the descriptive tables of the posterior beliefs are reported in Appendix I.
4.3.5 Outcome of interest
For simplicity, I assume that both the prior belief f0(.) and the posterior belief f1(.)
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are distributed normally. Therefore, for individual i6,
f0i(u0i, σ0i) ∼ N(µ0i, σ20i) (4.2)
f1i(u1i, σ1i) ∼ N(µ1i, σ21i) (4.3)
The deviation of the posterior belief from the prior belief shows the strength of the informa-
tion in changing the prior belief, which can be measured by the Relative Belief Ratio (Evans,
2016). For individual i, the Relative Belief Ratio RBRi is the ratio of the posterior belief





Since the prior belief, the posterior belief and the prior-posterior belief change are all
modeled as distributions, the null hypothesis to test is equal distributions rather than equal
means. Suppose the goal is to check whether information Tj leads to significantly different
prior-posterior belief change compared to information Tk; for the group of individuals who are
revealed with information Tj, their relative belief ratios are distributed as a multivariate joint
distribution F (RBR|Tj); and for the group of individuals who are revealed with information
Tk, the multivariate joint distribution of their relative belief ratios is F (RBR|Tk). The null
hypothesis for equal distributions is
H0 : F (RBR|Tj) = F (RBR|Tk) (4.5)
The construction of the Relative Belief Ratio for each respondent (RBRi) involves
three steps. First, construct a normal distribution of the prior belief f0i(u0i, σ0i) by identi-
fying u0i and σ0i. Second, construct a normal distribution of the posterior belief f1i(u1i, σ1i)
6To bridge the notations in the theoretical framework with those in the empirical model, the normality
assumption of the beliefs implies that θ0 ∈ (u0, σ0) and θ1 ∈ (u1, σ1).
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by identifying u1i and σ1i. Third, generate the distribution of the Relative Belief Ratio
(RBRi) by taking the ratio of the posterior belief and the prior belief. Although modeling
beliefs as distributions has the advantage of taking into account both the best guess and
the uncertainty simultaneously, there are no standard methods that transform information
elicited in layman’s language into statistical distributions. Based on the belief-elicitation
questions used in the survey, I propose one way to do the transformation. The explanation
of the steps is built on Trial 1.
In order to adapt to the statistical expertise of educational practitioners, the survey
questions used to elicit the prior belief do not directly ask for the mean u0i and the standard
deviation σ0i of the prior normal distribution. Therefore to restore the distribution, it is
necessary to transform the prior belief measures based on a few arbitrary assumptions.
First, since only those respondents who report to have an opinion on which program
is more effective are asked the agreement question and the confidence question, I recode these
two variables to incorporate those who do not have an opinion. I add one more category “No
opinion” to the ordinal variable generated from the question on how much one agrees that
Reading Now is more effective than Literacy Ladders, extending the 4-category agreement
Likert to 5 categories. If a respondent reports that she doesn’t have an opinion on which
program is more effective, I label her as “No opinion” in the new 5-category agreement
Likert. Similarly, the 3-category confidence Likert is transformed to 4 categories, which are
“no opinion”, “not very confident”, “fairly confident”, and “very confident”.
Second, using an Ordered Probit Model, I regress the 5-category agreement Likert on
a set of background variables, including dummies of age range, gender, dummies of highest
degree achieved, dummies of race, and total years of experience.
Agreement ∼ Age+Gender +Degree+Race+ Total Exp (4.6)
The regression identifies 4 cut-points ( Cp for p = 1, 2, 3, 4) on a standard normal distri-
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bution, which are −2.2, −1.1, −0.3, and 0.9. These cut-points divide the standard normal
distribution into five regions.
Third, I assume that the best guess on the relative effectiveness of the two programs
u0i in the population follows a normal distribution with the mean of 0 and the standard de-
viation of 4 before any information is revealed. It implies that only based on prior knowledge
and experience, half of the population believe that Reading Now is more effective than Lit-
eracy Ladders while the other half believe the opposite; in addition, 95% of the population’s
best guesses on the relative effectiveness of the two programs, measured as the percentage
points change in students who reach proficiency if the Grade 3 students at Neverland Pri-
mary School participate in Reading Now compared to Literacy Ladders, fall into the range
of [−8, 8]. Based on this assumption, I rescale the 4 cut-points by multiplying them by the
standard deviation of the best guesses in the population (i.e., 4) and then shifting them by
the mean of the best guesses in the population (i.e., 0). Now the 4 rescaled cut-points divide
the normal distribution with the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 4 into five regions.
Each region takes the same proportion of area under the curve as its corresponding region
on the standard normal distribution.
RCp = Cp × 4 + 0 for p = 1, 2, 3, 4 (4.7)
The rescaled cut-points (RCp for p = 1, 2, 3, 4) are −8.6, −4.4, −1.2, and 3.5.
Fourth, I calculate the conditional means of the probability density function of N(0, 4)
lower than the smallest rescaled cut-point, between two adjacent rescaled cut-points, and
higher than the biggest rescaled cup-point. I then impute u0i with the conditional mean that
corresponds to one’s choice on the 5-category agreement Likert, as shown in Table 4.5.
Fifth, I rescale the standard deviation of the best guesses in the population (i.e., 4) by
multiplying it by 1, 2, 2.5, and 10 respectively. Then I impute σ0i by the rescaled standard
deviation that corresponds to the confidence level of one’s statement, as shown in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.5: The Imputation of u0i
Agreement Likert u0i
Strongly disagree Conditional mean of N(0, 4) if x < RC1, which is −9.7
Disagree Conditional mean of N(0, 4) if RC1 < x < RC2, which is −5.7
No opinion Conditional mean of N(0, 4) if RC2 < x < RC3, which is −2.6
Agree Conditional mean of N(0, 4) if RC3 < x < RC4, which is 1
Strongly agree Conditional mean of N(0, 4) if x > RC4, which is 5.2
Table 4.6: The Imputation of σ0i
σ0i
No opinion 4× 10
Not very confident 4× 2.5
Fairly confident 4× 2
Very confident 4× 1
It implies that if one is very confident about her best guess, the dispersion of her belief is
the same as the dispersion of the best guesses in the population; the less confident one is,
the more dispersed her belief is.
When the posterior belief is elicited, the respondents are asked to report their best
guess on the percentage points change. I impute u1i with this reported best guess. σ1i is
imputed using the same method as σ0i, with the rule shown in Table 4.7.
Once f0i(u0i, σ0i) and f1i(u1i, σ1i) are identified, I simulate 100000 draws from the
previous two distributions respectively, and take the ratio of the posterior belief f1i(u1i, σ1i)
Table 4.7: The Imputation of σ1i
σ1i
Not very confident 4× 2.5
Fairly confident 4× 2
Very confident 4× 1
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and the prior belief f0i(u0i, σ0i) to get the distribution of the Relative Belief Ratio (RBRi).
4.3.6 Test of Equality of the Relative Belief Ratio
I use the distance components (DISCO) analysis to test the equality of the multi-
variate distributions of the Relative Belief Ratio across groups. Utilizing Euclidean distance
to measure the dispersion, DISCO analysis performs a non-parametric multisample test for
the null hypothesis of equal distributions (Rizzo and Szekely, 2010, p.1035). As reported in
the first row of Table 4.8, the multivariate distributions of the Relative Belief Ratio are not
significantly different across the three groups, between the Control Group and the combined
group of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, or between Treatment Group 1 and Treatment Group
2. The results indicate that as we have elicited in the present context, there is no evidence
to show that either the availability of uncertainty information or the precision of it has a
significant effect on the prior-posterior belief change on average.
Since the construction of the prior and posterior distributions relies on arbitrary
assumptions on the distribution of u0i in the population and how to rescale the standard
deviation of the previous distribution to construct σ0i and σ1i, I also conduct sensitivity
analyses that vary these assumptions. The results, also reported in Table 4.8, show that the
conclusion is robust across different assumptions. The same process is repeated for Trail 2
to test the effect of localized estimates that apply to the school facing the decision problem.
Table 4.9 indicate that based on the pilot data, we do not have evidence to conclude that
the availability of localized evidence or its precision level has a significant effect on the prior-
posterior belief change in the experimental context. The results are consistent with the
literature on advise taking in the fields of psychology and organizational sciences. One of
the most robust findings in this literature is “egocentric advice discounting”, which indicates
that decision makers tend to overweigh their own opinion relative to the advice given to
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Table 4.8: P-values of DISCO Tests for Trial 1 (N = 108)
Distribution Scaled by C vs.T1 vs.T2 C vs.T1+T2 T1 vs.T2
1 N (0, 4) (1.5, 2, 2.5, 10) 0.4092 0.9899 0.3317
2 N (1, 3) (1.5, 2, 2.5, 10) 0.8735 0.9262 0.6228
3 N (0, 4) (1, 2, 3, 5) 0.4803 0.1748 0.9486
4 N (2, 5) (1, 2, 3, 5) 0.7735 0.3457 0.805
Note. “Distribution” refers to the distribution of u0i in the population. “Scaled by” refers to
the numbers multiplied by the standard deviation of the previous distribution in the process
of constructing σ0i and σ1i.
Table 4.9: P-values of DISCO Tests for Trial 2 (N = 99)
Distribution Scaled by C vs.T1 vs.T2 C vs.T1+T2 T1 vs.T2
1 N (0, 30) (1.5, 2, 2.5, 10) 0.8444 0.2847 0.6515
2 N (5, 25) (1.5, 2, 2.5, 10) 0.1895 0.9046 0.1428
3 N (0, 30) (1, 2, 3, 5) 0.8267 0.7979 0.8135
4 N (10, 50) (1, 2, 3, 5) 0.7164 0.3165 0.4483
Note. “Distribution” refers to the distribution of u0i in the population. “Scaled by” refers to
the numbers multiplied by the standard deviation of the previous distribution in the process
of constructing σ0i and σ1i.
them (Bonaccio and Dalal, 2006, p.129).
4.4 Pilot Qualitative Study
The experimental design simplifies the decision-making process by assuming that 1)
the decision is in the hands of the principal; 2) the only concern is efficiency, and 3) the
research evidence is readily available and matches the decision problem perfectly. While
this design aims to lead the respondents to focus on the program effectiveness and cost and
increase the precision of the estimate of interest, it may also raise the issue that to what extent
these assumptions affect the generalizability of the experimental results to the real decision-
making context. In July 2016, I collaborated with Dr. Fiona Hollands, Associate Director of
Center for Benefit-cost Studies in Education, and conducted a qualitative study on evidence-
based decision-making for school leaders. Data collected from this pilot qualitative study
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may inform us of the generalizability issue of the experimental design.
The pilot qualitative study was conducted among 83 current students of a principal
preparation program at a graduate school of education, the majority of whom are principals,
assistant principals, teacher leaders and teachers. These students were organized in 15
groups, and each group was asked to work on a self-defined decision problem by following a
protocol that guides them to clarify what evidence is needed to make the decision and how
to collect it. Each group also filled out a Qualtrics survey to record their responses, and 14
groups successfully submitted their answers. The group activity was organized as follows.
First, each group selected a school-based choice problem and identified two to three possible
solutions. Second, each group identified up to 10 stakeholders who should participate in the
decision. Third, each group discussed what criteria should be considered in making a choice
among the options and listed them out. Fourth, each group reached a consensus on which
criterion is most important. Fifth, assuming that a score of 100 has been assigned to the
most important criterion that the group just identified, they were asked to assign a score out
of 100 to indicate how important each of the other criteria is relative to the most important
one. Following that, they were asked to identify ways to measure to what extent each of the
options fulfills each criterion. For example, if one criterion is “parent preference”, they may
choose to send out a survey asking parents to rate each option on a scale of 1 - 10.
The qualitative study does not make restrictions on what the decision problem is, who
participate in the decision and what are the main criteria to make the choice. Compared to
the experimental design, it shares more similarities with the real decision-making context.
Therefore part of the results will be used to identify some limitations of the experimental
design in the next session.
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4.5 Plausibility of Using an Experiment to Detect the
Causal Effect
Based on data collected from the pilot testing and the pilot qualitative study, this
section discusses the plausibility of using the experimental design to identify the causal effect
of research use on decision-making.
4.5.1 Settings
4.5.1.1 A contrived decision problem on choosing among programs
As explained in 4.3.2, the experiment is built on a hypothetical setting in which the
respondents are asked to choose among two educational programs. To find out whether
this choice problem is common in practice, I analyzed the self-defined decision problems
collected from the pilot qualitative study. Among the 14 submitted responses, 5 groups were
working on choosing among multiple curricula or instruction strategies; 2 choice problems
were on allocation of staff (e.g., using existing teachers or hire separate teachers for the
specialized learning period); 2 on options in financing facilities (e.g., buy, lease or build
a community center); and 2 on ways to create projects (e.g., teachers assign projects or
students determine by themselves). Other choice problems identified by the students are
related to learning platforms, organization of school life (e.g., no uniform, casual uniform
or formal uniform), and time of an action (e.g., which year to start external partnership).
The results imply that choice problems on educational programs, curricula and instruction
strategies are frequently encountered in school practice, so the target population of the pilot
testing are probably familiar with the contrived decision problem set up in the experiment.
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4.5.1.2 The decision is in the principal’s hands
For simplicity, the experiment assumes that the community and the parents do not
have a preference on the program selection, and the decision is in the principal’s hands.
According to the 5 responses on choosing among multiple curricula or instruction strate-
gies, practitioners identified 8 stakeholders on average for each decision problem. The most
frequently mentioned stakeholders include parents (17.5%), teachers (15%), supporting or-
ganizations and staff (e.g., community outreach coordinator, school family council) (15%),
principal (10%), students (10%), and teacher leaders (7.5%). It shows that the decision-
making process is supposed to be a “participation group decision”, in which the stakeholders
as a whole clarify their preferences, gather information, make compromise and reach a con-
sensus (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, p.539). If the participation group decision model is adopted
in school practice, the impact of evidence on decision-making can be decomposed into two
parts: 1) the belief change induced by research evidence at the individual level; and 2) use
of research as a persuasion tool at the group level (Henig, 2008, p.42). In this case, the
experiment can be used to identify the impact on belief change at the individual level, but
is not sufficient to detect the impact of research on reaching a group consensus.
4.5.1.3 Efficiency is the main concern
The experiment assumes that both programs are feasible to be implemented at Never-
land Primary School and the main concern of the decision problem is efficiency. In the pilot
qualitative study, the 5 groups working on choosing among curricula or instructional strate-
gies identified 9 criteria on average. Following the procedures of content analysis, I coded
the 45 raw criteria into 24 unique criteria in 6 categories. These unique criteria and cate-
gories were devised through the constant comparative method, which requires that the raw
criteria were continuously compared with each other until they were sorted into categories
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that share something in common (Merriam, 1998, p.179). The frequency of being mentioned
and the average importance weight for each unique criterion are displayed in Table 4.10. It
shows that while program effectiveness and resources required to implement a program are
highly valued, other criteria, such as support from stakeholders, implementation, fitness and
sustainability, are considered at the same time in the decision-making process. Therefore a
decision-making process involves trade-off among multiple criteria, and effectiveness and cost
do not seem to dominate the decision. Note that the frequencies and importance weights
on effectiveness and cost are very likely to be overestimated since we introduced program
evaluations and cost analysis before the group activity.
The pilot testing of the experiment confirms that effectiveness and cost are not the
main factors that contribute to the formation of prior beliefs on program choice before any
information is revealed. The data reveal that respondents tend to have strong priors on the
relative effectiveness and the relative cost of the two programs and which program to choose.
Among the 108 respondents whose prior beliefs were elicited, before any research evidence
was revealed 72.2% had an opinion on which program is more effective; 75% had an opinion
on which program is more costly; and 62% had an opinion on which program to choose.
The survey also collected qualitative information on the reasons that lead them to choose
one program over the other only based on their prior beliefs. A qualitative analysis of these
answers, as shown in Table 4.11, indicates that the prior beliefs were formed mainly through
the general beliefs on pedagogy (30.9%), spill-over effects or long-run concerns (16.0%), and
impressions or anecdotal information (13.6%). Effectiveness (2.5%), cost (7.4%) or the trade-
off between cost and effectiveness (2.5%) were not the main concerns for the decision-making.
As a result, research findings on program effectiveness and cost, regardless of the type or the
precision of the information, do not seem to have a strong power in either changing people’s
beliefs on program effectiveness or cost or reshaping one’s decision on which program to
CHAPTER 4. ARTICLE THREE 119
Table 4.10: Criteria and Importance Weights for Choice Problems on Curricula and Instruc-
tional Strategies
Criterion Frequency Average Importance Weight
Effectiveness on
Student performance 6 0.149
Student engagement 1 0.191
Student discipline 1 0.104
Resources required
Cost of the curriculum 3 0.092
Teacher workload 3 0.091
Teacher training and PD 3 0.111
On-going support 2 0.073
Student investment 1 0.11
Outside resources required 1 0.043
Support from stakeholders
Teacher buy in 2 0.131
Parent friendly 2 0.116
Applicability to community concerns 1 0.104
Implementation
Ease of implementation 2 0.096
Planning time 1 0.104
Schedule 1 0.175
Fit
Alignment to school mission and vision 3 0.122
Alignment to the Common Core 2 0.114
Culturally and contextually relevant 3 0.068
Relatability to students 2 0.091
Others
Availability (existing or created by teachers) 1 0.17
Home accessibility 1 0.064
Instruction to student ratio 1 0.064
Replicability/recalibration 1 0.158
Sustainability 1 0.128
Note. Responses of 5 groups were analyzed. The frequency of “effectiveness on student
performance” is 6 because one group reported “student achievement” and “student data” at
the same time as selection criteria.
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choose7.
4.5.1.4 Effectiveness and cost information is readily available
The experiment also assumes that research findings on effectiveness and cost are
readily available and match perfectly with the decision problem. However, previous research
finds that practitioners often lack the time and access to find studies that “address the
question or issue at hand, in a form that can access and use, at the time that they it”
(Coburn et al., 2009, p.71). This challenge of finding “right” evidence is confirmed by the
pilot qualitative study. While all 14 groups successfully identified the criteria and 12 groups
reported the important weights for the criteria, only 4 groups understood how to identify
the measures. It shows that access to the relevant evidence is a key factor that prevents
decision makers from using research: while they are able to identify a comprehensive list of
criteria that should be considered, they find it difficult to gather evidence to evaluate the
options on each criterion.
The research design also assumes that the credibility of the information provided is
consistent. However, in reality practitioners may collect information on effectiveness and cost
from different sources, and how they update their beliefs may heavily rely on their judgment
on the credibility of the information source.
4.5.2 Content Validity of the Instrument
Although the survey has been validated through interviews, there is still a chance
that the respondents fail to understand the questions, which would induce measurement
errors that may conceal a potentially existing effect. When eliciting the posterior belief in
each trial, I set up a question on whether one has an opinion on whether Reading Now is
7Table J.1 and Table J.2 in the Appendix J report how the choice of the programs and the confidence
level about the choice change from prior to posterior.
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Table 4.11: Factors that Affect Decision-making Before Any Information is Revealed
Factors Frequency Proportion
General beliefs on pedagogy (e.g., student-teacher interaction;
individualized learning, collaboration among staff and students,
better ratio of students to teacher)
25 30.9%
Spill-over effects or long-run effects (e.g., improvement in teacher
competency benefits other subjects and students in the long run;
the navigation of computer software helps students to get
prepared for the state assessment)
13 16.0%
Impressions or anecdotal information (e.g., I believe in building
capacity in staff; I value teacher development over computer
programs; the collaborative learning program will promote better
math instruction)
11 13.6%
Previous experience working with the same type of programs 8 9.9%
Implementation difficulties (e.g., teacher turnover, Internet
failures, disruptions to schedule due to SBAC, maintenance,
technology troubleshooting, classroom management issues)
8 9.9%
Cost and financial concerns (e.g., expense of computers,
investment amongst teachers)
6 7.4%
Research evidence on effectiveness (e.g., there is more research to
prove that the direct instruction by teachers has more impact on
students who are struggling readers)
2 2.5%
Availability of data/accuracy of assessment 2 2.5%
Trade-off between cost and effectiveness 2 2.5%
Teacher preference (e.g., I think teachers would be much more
likely to stick with the program)
1 1.2%
Irreplaceability of current services / resources (e.g., I can influence
the effectiveness of my teachers)
1 1.2%
Student engagement (e.g., Students like technology) 1 1.2%
Specific school context (e.g., qualifications of teachers, whether
students are homogenous or not)
1 1.2%
Total 81 100%
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more effective/costly than Literacy Ladders right after information is revealed. Respondents
may choose from three choices: Reading Now more effective/costly, Reading Now less effec-
tive/costly, and no opinion. This question is designed to cross-validate the accuracy of the
reported percentage points difference / cost different per participate. As shown in Figure
4.1, some respondents provided contradictory answers for these two questions. For example,
in Trial 1, 6 respondents reported that they believe that Reading Now is less effective than
Literacy Ladders, implying that the percentage points change in students who reach pro-
ficiency if Reading Now is implemented compared to Literacy Ladders should be negative;
however, the percentage points change identified by these 6 respondents ranges from 3 to
10. Similarly in Trial 2, 3 respondents first chose that Reading Now is less costly, and then
reported positive numbers on the cost different per participant between Reading Now and
Literacy Ladders, ranging from 10 to 60. The measurement errors may induce a downward
bias of the estimate, leading to non-significance even when an effect exists.
4.5.3 Analysis Strategy
As mentioned in Section 4.3.5, restricted by practitioners’ limited statistical expertise,
information of the prior and posterior beliefs elicited by the instrument is not sufficient to
construct the distributions of the beliefs, so the transformation relies on arbitrary assump-
tions that can not be validated. More exploration is needed on how to model prior-posterior
belief change based on the information that can be elicited from practitioners.
4.5.4 Outcome of interest
The outcome measured is self-reported belief change, which may not lead to behavior
change in decision-making (Webb and Sheeran, 2006). In this context, there might be multi-
ple reasons that contribute to the disconnection between belief change and behavior change.
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First, self-reported belief change is subject to an upward bias, making it not strong enough to
change behaviors. Second, the real decision-making process involves the compromise of mul-
tiple stakeholders, so whether belief change at the individual level can affect a group decision
highly depends on the organizational culture, institutional norms and political dynamics at
a school.
4.6 Summary
The ultimate goal of most policy research is to guide decision-making (Gelman et al.,
2013a). There are three steps to connect research to decision-making: information produc-
tion, information provision, and information processing. Producing and providing evidence
does not automatically lead to evidence-based decision-making. Therefore it is important to
understand whether and how information is processed by practitioners. This article proposes
a randomized control trial to explore how practitioners respond to uncertainty information
and localized evidence provided. Based on the 108 responses gathered in the pilot testing,
either uncertainty information or localized evidence presented in the specific setting is strong
enough to lead to significantly different prior-posterior belief change, even when these two
types of information are provided at different precision levels.
As the first experiment to test the impact of research findings on educational decision-
making in resource allocation, this study contributes to the research on evidence utilization
through some exploratory work on instrumental design and analysis strategy. Supplemented
by a pilot qualitative study that guides decision makers to work on self-defined decision prob-
lems, the pilot testing of the experiment provides some evidence on the plausibility of using
an experiment to detect the causal impact of research evidence on decision-making. First,
the experiment simplifies a complex decision-making environment that is usually unique for
each school, so the conclusions drawn from the experiment may not be generalizable to the
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real decision-making context. For example, the experimental design focuses on program ef-
fectiveness and cost and excludes all the other factors that affect decision-making, nor can
it take into account the fact that decision-making is usually made by a group of stakehold-
ers. In addition, it assumes that research evidence is readily available and the credibility of
information is constant. Due to these differences between the experimental design and the
real decision-making context, the quantified effect only applies to the specific experimental
setting, and is probably limited in informing of research use in school practice. Second,
the testing data reveal that practitioners may not understand the questions used to elicit
beliefs, and the measurement errors induced may lead to an downward bias in the estimate.
Third, the analysis strategy models the prior-posterior belief change as a distribution, and
the construction of the belief distributions relies on some arbitrary assumptions that can
not be validated. Fourth, the outcome measured is self-reported belief change instead of
decision-making behavior. In all, compared to case studies on decision-making processes
and self-reported surveys that describe practitioners’ attitudes and behaviors on research
use, an experimental design has the advantage of quantifying the impact of the treatment
defined on the measured outcomes with high interval validity. However, the experimental
design proposed in this article also suffers from limited generalizability to the real context,
measurement errors and untested model assumptions.
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Table A.1: Demonstration Dataset : New Chance
Site N Average Treatment Effect Average Cost (in $10,000)
1 Allentown 71 0.183 1.999
2 Bronx 59 0.264 1.579
3 Chicago Heights 33 0.1 1.04
4 Chula Vista 79 -0.007 1.63
5 Denver 70 0.002 1.279
6 Detroit 104 -0.099 1.441
7 Harlem 64 0.109 2.189
8 Inglewood 72 0.307 2.154
9 Jacksonville 94 0.159 1.422
10 Lexington 79 0.008 2.163
11 Minneapolis 80 0.041 1.932
12 Philadelphia 84 -0.019 1.206
13 Pittsburgh 97 0.173 1.793
14 Portland 93 0.032 3.152
15 Salem 73 0.023 1.198
16 San Jose 88 0.255 1.835
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Table A.2: Demonstration Dataset 2: JOBSTART
Site N Average Treatment Effect Average Cost (in $10,000)
1 Atlanta 34 0.059 1.166
2 CET/San Jose 64 0.031 0.646
3 Chicago Commons 43 -0.05 1.433
4 Connelley 109 0.282 1.066
5 East LA 52 0 1.206
6 EGOS Denver 112 0.074 0.456
7 Phoenix 67 0.207 1.248
8 SER/Corpus Christi 148 0.28 0.434
9 El Centro 100 0.39 1.079
10 LA Jobs Corps 117 0.077 1.572
11 Allentown 76 0.095 1.192
12 BSA (NYC) 57 -0.012 2.019
13 CREC (Hartford) 49 0.078 1.182
Appendix B
Article 1: Sampling Variability Methods
article listings
Estimator: site-level EC ratio
Listing B.1: R code of methods that capture the sampling variation (site-level EC ratio)
## Site−l e v e l EC r a t i o
# Delta method
delta_func <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ){
p <− mean( ate ) / mean( co s t )
part1 <− var ( co s t ) / mean( co s t )^2 + var ( ate ) / mean( ate )^2
− 2 ∗ cov ( ate , co s t ) / (mean( co s t ) ∗ mean( ate ) )
bound1 <− p − qnorm (0 . 9 75 ) ∗ abs (p) ∗ s q r t ( part1 )
bound2 <− p + qnorm (0 . 9 75 ) ∗ abs (p) ∗ s q r t ( part1 )
CI <− c ( bound1 , bound2 )
po int <− mean( ate / co s t )
r e s u l t s <− c ( point , CI )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
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}
# F i e l l e r ' s method
f i e l l e r_ f u n c <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ){
part1 <− mean( co s t ) ∗ mean( ate )
− qnorm (0 .975)^2 ∗ cov ( cost , ate )
part2 <− (mean( co s t ) ∗ mean( ate )
− qnorm (0 .975)^2 ∗ cov ( cost , ate ))^2
part3 <− (mean( co s t ) ^ 2 − qnorm (0 .975)^2 ∗ var ( co s t ) )
∗ (mean( ate ) ^ 2 − qnorm (0 .975)^2 ∗ var ( ate ) )
part4 <− mean( co s t ) ^ 2 − qnorm (0 .975)^2 ∗ var ( co s t )
bound1 <− ( part1 − s q r t ( part2 − part3 ) ) / part4
bound2 <− ( part1 + sq r t ( part2 − part3 ) ) / part4
CI <− c (min ( c ( bound1 , bound2 ) ) , max( c ( bound1 , bound2 ) ) )
po int <− mean( ate / co s t )
r e s u l t s <− c ( point , CI )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
}
# boots t rapp ing
boot_func <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ){
boot <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ){
data <− cbind ( ate , co s t )
sample <− data [ sample ( 1 : nrow ( data ) ,
nrow ( data ) , r ep l a c e = TRUE) , ]
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r a t i o <− sample [ , 1 ] / sample [ , 2 ]
ratio_mean <− mean( r a t i o )
re turn ( ratio_mean )
}
rep <− r e p l i c a t e (8000 , boot ( ate , co s t ) )
r e s u l t s <− quan t i l e ( rep , c ( 0 . 5 , 0 . 025 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
}
# Monte Carlo
monte_carlo_func <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ){
MC <− f unc t i on ( ate , co s t ) {
data <− cbind ( ate , co s t )
sample <− rmultnorm (nrow ( data ) ,
c (mean( ate ) , mean( co s t ) ) ,
cov ( data ) , t o l = 1e−10)
r a t i o <− sample [ , 1 ] / sample [ , 2 ]
ratio_mean <− mean( r a t i o )
re turn ( ratio_mean )
}
rep <− r e p l i c a t e (8000 , MC( ate , co s t ) )
r e s u l t s <− quan t i l e ( rep , c ( 0 . 5 , 0 . 025 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
}
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Estimator: weighted EC ratio
Listing B.2: R code of methods that capture the sampling variation (weighted EC ratio)
# boots t rapp ing
boot_wec_func <− f unc t i on ( ate , cost , n ){
boot <− f unc t i on ( ate , cost , n ){
data <− cbind ( ate , cost , n )
sample <− data [ sample ( 1 : nrow ( data ) , nrow ( data ) ,
r ep l a c e = TRUE) , ]
weight <− n / sum(n)
r a t i o <− sum( weight ∗ sample [ , 1 ] )
/ sum( weight ∗ sample [ , 2 ] )
r e turn ( r a t i o )
}
rep <− r e p l i c a t e (8000 , boot ( ate , cost , n ) )
r e s u l t s <− quan t i l e ( rep , c ( 0 . 5 , 0 . 025 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
}
# Monte Carlo
monte_carlo_wec_func <− f unc t i on ( ate , cost , n ){
MC <− f unc t i on ( ate , cost , n ) {
data <− cbind ( ate , cost , n )
sample <− rmultnorm (nrow ( data ) ,
c (mean( ate ) , mean( co s t ) , mean(n ) ) ,
cov ( data ) , t o l = 1e−10)
APPENDIX B. ARTICLE 1: SAMPLING VARIABILITY METHODS 148
weight <− sample [ , 3 ] / sum( sample [ , 3 ] )
r a t i o <− sum( weight ∗ sample [ , 1 ] )
/ sum( weight ∗ sample [ , 2 ] )
r e turn ( r a t i o )
}
rep <− r e p l i c a t e (8000 , MC( ate , cost , n ) )
r e s u l t s <− quan t i l e ( rep , c ( 0 . 5 , 0 . 025 , 0 . 9 75 ) )
re turn ( r e s u l t s )
}
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Table B.1: Point estimate and Confidence Interval of the site-level EC ratio of New Chance
(using methods to capture the sampling variation)
Point estimate 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
Delta 0.05 -0.08 0.18
Fieller 0.05 -0.10 0.22
bootstrapping 0.05 0.02 0.09
Monte Carlo 0.06 0.01 0.10
Table B.2: Point estimate and Confidence Interval of the weighted EC ratio of New Chance
(using methods to capture the sampling variation)
Point estimate 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
bootstrapping 0.05 0.02 0.09
Monte Carlo 0.05 0.02 0.08
Only for demonstration purpose, these methods are applied to the dataset of New
Chance. The results are reported in Table B.1 and Table B.2. Note that as mentioned in
2.3.1.2, given the small sample size of the data, results generated by these methods are very
likely to be deviated from the true values.
Appendix C
Article 1: Stan code
Listing C.1: Stan code of complete pooling model
data {
int<lower=0> J ; // number o f s choo l s
row_vector [ 2 ] y [ J ] ; // e f f e c t and co s t
r ea l <lower=0> sigma ;
r ea l <lower=0> eta ;
}
parameters {
vec to r [ 2 ] z ;
vector<lower=0>[2] d e l t a ;
cho lesky_factor_corr [ 2 ] L ;
}
transformed parameters {
vec to r [ 2 ] mu;
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mu <− z ∗ sigma ;
}
model {
y ~ multi_normal_cholesky (mu,
diag_pre_multiply ( de l ta , L ) ) ;
// p r i o r s
L ~ lk j_corr_cholesky ( eta ) ;
increment_log_prob(− l og ( de l t a ) ) ;
z ~ normal ( 0 , 1 ) ;
# imp l i e s that mu ~ normal (0 , sigma )
}
generated quan t i t i e s {
vec to r [ 2 ] y_t i lde [ J ] ;
f o r ( j in 1 : J )
y_t i lde [ j ] <− multi_normal_cholesky_rng (mu,
diag_pre_multiply ( de l ta , L ) ) ;
}
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Listing C.2: Stan code of hierarchical model
data {
int<lower=0> J ; // number o f s choo l s
row_vector [ 2 ] y [ J ] ; // observed e f f e c t and co s t
r ea l <lower=0> sigma ;
r ea l <lower=0> eta ;
}
parameters {
vec to r [ 2 ] mu;
vec to r [ 2 ] theta_z [ J ] ;
vector<lower=0>[2] d e l t a ;
cho lesky_factor_corr [ 2 ] L_delta ;
vector<lower=0>[2] tau ;
cho lesky_factor_corr [ 2 ] L_tau ;
}
transformed parameters {
vec to r [ 2 ] theta [ J ] ;
// expected e f f e c t s and average c o s t s
{
matrix [ 2 , 2 ] L ;
L <− diag_pre_multiply ( tau , L_tau ) ;
f o r ( j in 1 : J )
theta [ j ] <− mu + L ∗ theta_z [ j ] ;
}
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}
model {
y ~ multi_normal_cholesky ( theta ,
diag_pre_multiply ( de l ta , L_delta ) ) ;
// p r i o r s
L_delta ~ lk j_corr_cholesky ( eta ) ;
L_tau ~ lk j_corr_cholesky ( eta ) ;
d e l t a ~ gamma(2 , 1 ) ;
tau ~ gamma(2 , 1 ) ;
f o r ( j in 1 : J )
theta_z [ j ] ~ normal (0 , 1 ) ;
}
generated quan t i t i e s {
vec to r [ 2 ] y_t i lde [ J ] ;
f o r ( j in 1 : J ){
y_t i lde [ j ] <− multi_normal_cholesky_rng ( theta [ j ] ,




Article 2: Program Description
Reading Now
Reading Now provides teachers with extensive professional training to improve their
pedagogical knowledge, such as how to organize students to cooperate in small groups. Five
teachers in Grade 3 participate in a weekly training session in the previous Spring semester as
professional development, each session lasting two hours. Then they implement these specific
instructional methods to teach reading in groups of twenty students for thirty minutes per
day during the academic year.
Literacy Ladders
Literacy Ladders is a computer-assisted reading program. Students are in groups of
twenty and use adaptive software to practice their reading skills thirty minutes per day during
the academic year. Groups should be supervised by teachers to check students’ progress and
answer questions. In August, five teachers in Grade 3 participate in a 4-hour training session
provided by the developer of the program. The training fee is covered by the program license
fee.
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Table D.1: Resources to Implement Reading Now and Literacy Ladders (for 100 students)
Reading Now Literacy Ladders
Program license
fee $100 per student, 100 students $100 per student, 100 students
Teachers’
compensation
Teachers’ time to participate
in the training (i.e., 36 hours
per teacher, 5 teachers) and
to implement the program
(i.e., 30 minutes per day per
teacher, 5 teachers)
Teachers’ time to participate
in the training (i.e., 4 hours
per teacher, 5 teachers) and
to monitor the program (i.e.,
30 minutes per day per
teacher, 5 teachers)
Computers None
Usage of computers (at least
20 computers should be
available; 30 minutes per day
for each of the 100 students)
Appendix E
Article 2: Multilinear Utility Function
There are many definitions of “independence” in utility theories. The additive multi-attribute
utility function must satisfy the assumption of additive independence, the strongest inde-
pendence assumption. Two attributes are called additive independent if and only if the joint
probability distributions on the two attributes only depend on their marginal distributions.
A more relaxed assumption is utility independence. According to Keeney and Raiffa (1993),
utility independence is defined as follows (p.285). Donate c̄ as the complement of c. At-
tributes c is said to be utility independent of c̄ if the joint utility function can be factorized
as u(c, c̄) = f(c̄) + g(c̄)u(c, c̄′) for all c and c̄, where g is always positive and c̄′ is arbitrarily
chosen specific amount of c̄. If utility independence holds for any ci and c̄i (1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
n ≥ 2) in the set of attributes c, U(c) can be decomposed into a multilinear function as
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where
1. u is normalized by u(x01, x02..., x0n) = 0 and u(x∗1, x∗2..., x∗n) = 1 where the worst conse-
quence for an attribute is superscribed as 0 and the best consequence is superscribed
as ∗.
2. ui(ci) is a conditional utility function on ci normalized by ui(c0i ) = 0 and ui(c∗i ) = 1.
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ijl)− u(c∗i , c∗j , c̄0ij)− u(c∗i , c∗l , c̄0il)
−u(c∗j , c∗l , c̄0jl) + u(c∗i , c̄0i ) + u(c∗j , c̄0j) + u(c∗l , c̄0l ) (E.4)































Note that the multilinear function is a generalization of the multiplicative and ad-
ditive utility functions. Similar to one-attribute utility function, the generalized functional
form provides more flexibility to model one’s preference, but also increases the number of
parameters to estimate to 2n − 2.
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Article 2: Evidence Used to Construct
the Data

























2 years 7 schools (3 E,
4 C), 63 classes
(31 E, 32 C),
1299 students


















2 years 5 schools (2 E,
3 C), 45 classes
(21 E, 24 C),
873 students






















































9 schools (4 E,
5 C), 22 classes















1 year 8 schools (9 C,
9 E), 18 classes,
392 students










































Note. The information in the table is extracted from Table 8, Slavin et al. (2009), p.
1443-1451. L = large study with at least 250 students; S = small study with less than
250 students; E = Experimental; C = Control; CAT = California Achievement Test; MAT
= Metropolitan Achievement Test; ITBS = Iowa Tests of Basic Skills; FL = Free/Reduced
lunch, W = White, AA = African American; Vocab = Vocabulary, Comp = Comprehension.
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2 years 101 students
(50 E, 51 C)








Note. The information in the table is extracted from Table 7, Slavin et al. (2009), p.
1435-1441. L = large study with at least 250 students; S = small study with less than
250 students; E = Experimental; C = Control; GRADE = Group Reading Assessment and
Diagnostic Examination; DRS = Diagnostic Reading Series; SAT = Scholastic Achievement
Test; FL = Free/Reduced lunch, W = White, AA = African American; H = Hispanic; ELL
= English Language learners; Vocab = Vocabulary, Comp = Comprehension.
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Table F.3: Cost Estimation of Reading Now (100 students served)
Ingredients Quantity Description Price Total cost
















450 hours Half an hour per
day per teacher,
5 days per week,






Note. According to National Education Association, the U.S. average public school teacher
salary for 2012-2013 was $56,103. The hourly rate is about $40, calculated as the annual
salary divided by the number of working hours in an academic year (i.e., 1440 hours).
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Table F.4: Cost Estimation of Literacy Ladders (100 students served)
















450 hours Half an hour per
day per teacher,
5 days per week,








Half an hour per
day per student,
5 days per week,






Note. According to National Education Association, the U.S. average public school teacher
salary for 2012-2013 was $56,103. The hourly rate is about $40, calculated as the annual
salary divided by the number of working hours in an academic year (i.e., 1440 hours). Sup-
pose a desktop computer costs $600 and can be used for 5 years. The annual cost of a
computer is $133 using a discount rate of 3.5%. The hourly cost of a computer is about $0.1,
calculated as the annual cost of a computer divided by the number of working hours in an
academic year (i.e., 1440 hours).
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Article 2: Stan Code
Listing G.1: Stan Code of the Multivariate Normal Model
data {
int<lower=0> J ; // number o f s i t e s
int<lower=0> K; // number o f consequences
row_vector [K] y [ J ] ;
vec to r [K] mu_location ;
// l o c a t i o n vec to r o f the p r i o r s f o r mu
vec to r [K] mu_scale ;
// s c a l e vec to r o f the p r i o r s f o r mu
rea l<lower=0> eta ;
}
parameters {
vec to r [K] mu;
vector<lower=0>[K] sigma ;
cho lesky_factor_corr [K] L ;
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}
model {
y ~ multi_normal_cholesky (mu,
diag_pre_multiply ( sigma , L ) ) ;
// p r i o r s
L ~ lk j_corr_cholesky ( eta ) ;
increment_log_prob(− l og ( sigma ) ) ;
mu ~ normal (mu_location , mu_scale ) ;
}
generated quan t i t i e s {
vec to r [K] y_t i lde [ J ] ;
f o r ( j in 1 : J )
y_t i lde [ j ] <− multi_normal_cholesky_rng (mu,
diag_pre_multiply ( sigma , L ) ) ;
}
Appendix H
Article 3: Balance Check
Table H.1: Balance Check for Background Variables (Trial 1, N =108)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Age 25-29 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.4 0.28 0.45 0.507
Age 30-39 0.54 0.51 0.65 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.53
Age 40-49 0.23 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.4 0.781
Age 50-59 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.356
Age 60+ 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.356
Male 0.29 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.49 0.544
Female 0.71 0.46 0.76 0.43 0.58 0.5 0.259
White 0.63 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.58 0.5 0.345
Black or African American 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.022
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.607
Asian 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.027
Some other race or origin 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.756
Bachelor degree 0.06 0.24 0 0 0.06 0.23 0.658
Master degree 0.74 0.44 0.95 0.23 0.92 0.28 0.887
PhD/EdD 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0 0 0.916
Other degree 0.17 0.38 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.776
Less than one year at current position 0.23 0.43 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.47 0.646
1-3 years at current position 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.5 0.39 0.49 0.958
4-6 years at current position 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.912
7+ years at current position 0.14 0.36 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.307
Total years of experience 10.84 4.74 10.23 4.33 9.9 3.88 0.651
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The analysis sample for the effect of uncertainty information is restricted to the 108 respon-
dents who completed Trial 1, among whom 68.5% are female; 57.4% were aged between 30
and 39; 19.4% were between 40 and 49; 58.3% are white; 19.4% are Black or African Amer-
icans; 12% are Asians ; 6.5% are Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin; and 87% had a master
degree. On average, the respondents in this sample had 10.3 years of working experience.
To test the balance of the background variables and the prior belief measures across
the three groups, I first transform all the categorical variables into sets of dummy variables,
and then use the F -test to check whether the means of all the dummies and the continu-
ous variables are significantly different across the three groups. Among the 21 background
variables, as shown in Table H.1, in Trial 1 only 2 racial dummies (i.e., Black or African
American and Asian) are significantly different at the 5% level.
Table H.2: Balance Check of Prior Beliefs (Trial 1, N = 108)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Have a prior opinion 0.8 0.41 0.7 0.46 0.67 0.48 0.439
Strongly disagree: RN more effective 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.23 0.776
Disagre: RN more effective 0.34 0.48 0.19 0.4 0.06 0.23 0.009
Agree: RN more effective 0.31 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.81
Strongly agree: RN more effective 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.817
Attitude question not administrated 0.2 0.41 0.3 0.46 0.33 0.48 0.439
Not very confident 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.55
Fairly confident 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.756
Very confident 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.355
Confidence question not administrated 0.2 0.41 0.3 0.46 0.33 0.48 0.439
Table H.3 and Table H.4 show the background variables and the prior belief measures
for Trial 2 are balanced across the three groups.
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Table H.3: Balance Check for Background Variables (Trial 2, N = 99)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Age 25-29 0.16 0.37 0.3 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.356
Age 30-39 0.56 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.56 0.5 0.99
Age 40-49 0.22 0.42 0.12 0.33 0.24 0.43 0.452
Age 50-59 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.355
Age 60+ 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.355
Male 0.34 0.48 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.45 0.749
Female 0.66 0.48 0.73 0.45 0.71 0.46 0.82
White 0.56 0.5 0.64 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.776
Black or African American 0.19 0.4 0.24 0.44 0.09 0.29 0.751
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 0.12 0.34 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.607
Asian 0.12 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.579
Some other race or origin 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.29 0.823
Bachelor degree 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.242
Master degree 0.91 0.3 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.36 0.319
PhD/EdD 0.03 0.18 0 0 0.03 0.17 0.783
Other degree 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.052
Less than one year at current position 0.28 0.46 0.39 0.5 0.24 0.43 0.357
1-3 years at current position 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.41 0.5 0.917
4-6 years at current position 0.25 0.44 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.46 0.216
7+ years at current position 0.09 0.3 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.24 0.68
Total years of experience 10.28 4.43 9.76 4.48 10.96 4.19 0.532
Table H.4: Balance Check of Prior Beliefs (Trial 2, N = 99)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Have a prior opinion 0.82 0.39 0.79 0.41 0.62 0.49 0.152
Strongly disagree: RN more costly 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.3 0.997
Disagree: RN more costly 0.33 0.48 0.44 0.5 0.25 0.44 0.266
Agree: RN more costly 0.33 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.43
Strongly agree: RN more costly 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.998
Attitude question not administrated 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.38 0.49 0.152
Not very confident 0.03 0.17 0 0 0.03 0.18 0.594
Fairly confident 0.58 0.5 0.59 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.408
Very confident 0.21 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.827
Confidence question not administrated 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.38 0.49 0.152
Appendix I
Article 3: Posterior Belief Measures
Similar to the prior belief, I transform the categorical variables measuring the posterior belief
into sets of dummies. I first use F -test to check whether the means of the dummies and the
continuous variables are significantly different across the three groups, as shown in Table
I.1 and Table I.4. Then I use t-test to check whether the means are significantly different
between the control group and the combined group of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, as
shown in Table I.2 and Table I.5. The same t-test is also applied to test whether Treatment
Group 2 demonstrates significantly different means compared to Treatment Group 1 in these
posterior belief measures, as shown in Table I.3 and Table I.6. None of these measures are
significant in any of the three tests, indicating that neither the availability nor the precision
of uncertainty information has a significant effect on the posterior belief.
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Table I.1: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 1, N = 108, Control vs. Treat 1 vs.
Treat 2)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Posterior: RN more effective 0.37 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.58 0.5 0.203
Posterior: RN less effective 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.17 0.616
Do not have a posterior belief 0.57 0.5 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.49 0.306
Comparative effectiveness 4.23 2.79 4.16 2.51 4.25 1.56 0.986
Not very confident 0.37 0.49 0.43 0.5 0.36 0.49 0.8
Fairly confident 0.57 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.5 0.88
Very confident 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.861
Table I.2: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 1, N = 108, Control vs. Treat 1+Treat
2)
Control Treat1+Treat2
mean SD mean SD diff p-value
Posterior: RN more effective 0.37 0.49 0.52 0.5 0.149 0.147
Posterior: RN less effective 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 -0.002 0.961
Do not have a posterior belief 0.57 0.5 0.42 0.5 -0.147 0.159
Comparative effectiveness 4.23 2.79 4.21 2.08 -0.023 0.965
Not very confident 0.37 0.49 0.4 0.49 0.026 0.799
Fairly confident 0.57 0.5 0.53 0.5 -0.037 0.72
Very confident 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.011 0.82
Table I.3: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 1, N = 108, Treat 1 vs. Treat 2)
Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD diff p-value
Posterior: RN more effective 0.46 0.51 0.58 0.5 0.124 0.296
Posterior: RN less effective 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.17 -0.053 0.321
Do not have a posterior belief 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.49 -0.071 0.548
Comparative effectiveness 4.16 2.51 4.25 1.56 0.088 0.858
Not very confident 0.43 0.5 0.36 0.49 -0.071 0.54
Fairly confident 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.5 0.042 0.723
Very confident 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.029 0.627
As to Trial 2, Table I.4, Table I.5 and Table I.6 indicate that the means of the posterior
belief measures are not significantly different across the three groups, between the Control
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Group and the combined group of Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, or between Treatment
Group 1 and Treatment Group 2.
Table I.4: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 2, N = 99, Control vs. Treat 1 vs. Treat
2)
Control Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD mean SD p-value
Posterior: RN more costly 0.62 0.49 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.713
Posterior: RN less costly 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.999
Do not have a posterior belief 0.34 0.48 0.42 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.7
Comparative cost 57.2 20.02 54.36 17.3 48.43 16.52 0.133
Not very confident 0.41 0.5 0.3 0.47 0.5 0.51 0.265
Fairly confident 0.5 0.51 0.64 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.36
Very confident 0.09 0.3 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.557
Table I.5: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 2, N = 99, Control vs. Treat 1+Treat
2)
Control Treat1 + Treat2
mean SD mean SD diff p-value
Posterior: RN more costly 0.62 0.49 0.54 0.5 -0.088 0.413
Posterior: RN less costly 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 -0.001 0.97
Do not have a posterior belief 0.34 0.48 0.43 0.5 0.089 0.399
Comparative cost 57.2 20.02 51.35 17.04 -5.852 0.16
Not very confident 0.41 0.5 0.4 0.49 -0.003 0.976
Fairly confident 0.5 0.51 0.55 0.5 0.052 0.632
Very confident 0.09 0.3 0.04 0.21 -0.049 0.405
Table I.6: Description of the Posterior Beliefs (Trial 2, N = 99, Treat 1 vs. Treat 2)
Treat1 Treat2
mean SD mean SD diff p-value
Posterior: RN more costly 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.51 -0.016 0.897
Posterior: RN less costly 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 -0.001 0.983
Do not have a posterior belief 0.42 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.017 0.891
Comparative cost 54.36 17.3 48.43 16.52 -5.938 0.156
Not very confident 0.3 0.47 0.5 0.51 0.197 0.103
Fairly confident 0.64 0.49 0.47 0.51 -0.166 0.177
Very confident 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 -0.031 0.546
Appendix J
Article 3: Change of Beliefs on Program
Choice
Table J.1: Change of Decisions from Prior to Posterior
Prior choice Posterior choice Frequency Prop (N = 99)
1 No opinion No opinion 30 0.30
2 No opinion Choose Reading Now 6 0.06
3 No opinion Choose Literacy Ladders 3 0.03
4 Choose Reading Now No opinion 1 0.01
5 Choose Reading Now Choose Reading Now 40 0.40
6 Choose Reading Now Choose Literacy Ladders 1 0.01
7 Choose Literacy Ladders No opinion 3 0.03
8 Choose Literacy Ladders Choose Reading Now 1 0.01
9 Choose Literacy Ladders Choose Literacy Ladders 14 0.14
Table J.2: Change of Confidence Levels Among Those Whose Decision are Unchanged
Prior Confidence Posterior Confidence Frequency Prop (N = 54)
1 Not very confident Fairly confident 1 0.02
2 Fairly confident Not very confident 2 0.04
3 Fairly confident Fairly confident 29 0.54
4 Fairly confident Very confident 4 0.07
5 Very confident Fairly confident 6 0.11
6 Very confident Very confident 12 0.22
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